12 
Land & Water 
July 4, 191S 
The May Losses : By Arthur Pollen 
IT cannot be disguised that the figures for the tonnage 
lost in the month of May are disappointing. There 
seemed every reason to hope that the improvement 
which has been slow, but more or less consistent, in the 
last six months would soon show a sharp turn in our 
favour. Instead, there is an increased loss of over 44,000 
tons. It is material to ask whether this argues any increased 
efficiency in the enemy's efforts, or decrease in the efficiency 
of our own. The facts as known to us seem to be as follows : 
First, the Admiralty has appended a note to the returns, 
saying that the losses from marine risk were unduly heavy. 
The use of the word "unduly" may mean that they were 
unnecessarily large, because certain merchant skippers con- 
tinued slack in observing the precautions so persistently 
urged upon them, or it may mean that they are "excep- 
tionally" heavy through mere mischance. But, as we do 
not know the proportion of marine losses in previous months, 
this note, by itself, while clearly suggesting that some of the 
increase is due to this cause, affords us no guidance in 
estimating whether the direct war losses are greater or less 
than before. 
The second addition to the returns does, however, throw 
some light upon this, for, while losses have increased approxi- 
mately 12 per cent., so, too, has the amount of tonnage 
engaged in 'overseas trade — that is, exclusive of coast-wise 
and cross-Channel trade — which has entered or cleared 
British ports in the period. It is, then, certain that the 
direct action of mines and submarines must have taken a 
smaller, and not larger, proportion of the shipping. But 
marine losses have been abnormal ever since the U-boat 
campaign began, simply because it has been necessary to 
navigate by night without the aids to safety that are universal 
in peace time. And, further, the quota of skilled skippers, 
officers, mates, and watchkeepers has been much reduced by 
the demands of our offensive and defensive naval work. 
The exceptional marine losses, then, are truly caused by the 
submarine campaign, even though indirectly. We must 
next note that, in spite of the rise of 12 per cent, in May, the 
actual rate of loss for that month is lower than that for the 
first three months of the year. The average loss of shipping 
for these months was 380,000. The actual May figures are 
just over 350,000, and the mean of April and May is just 
over 330,000. Looked at broadly, then, though May is a 
set-back, it is a slight one only, and may mean no more than 
that the larger number of targets has naturally been followed 
by a proportional increase in casualties. 
To make the course of the submarine war intelligible, 
I have made out the accompanying graphs, which are, so 
to speak, both an abbreviation and extension of those issued 
by the Admiralty in March. The diagram shows tw'o curves 
— one for British and one for foreign and Allied shipping. 
The first part of the graph gives the average monthly losses 
grouped as follows. We start with those for the whole of 
X915, and then proceed with the combined mean for the first, 
second, and third cjuarters of 1916, and then for the last 
quarter of that year. The year 1915 and the first nine 
months of 1916 should be distinguished from other periods 
for these reasons. From 1915 to the end of the third quarter 
of 1916, neither side was prepared with its maximum effort, 
either for attack or defence. In the brief period from the 
end of March to the beginning of May, 1916, when Tirpitz's 
first effort at ruthlcssness was tentatively begun, and pre- 
maturely stopped by the threat of American intervention — 
there was, as we all remember, a sharp rise in losses. But 
it was followed by a period of comparative quiescence, so- 
that it seems scientific to treat from January to the end of 
September of 1916 as reflecting what might normally be 
expected from the conditions as they existed in the previous 
year. But in September, 1916, and to the end of that year, 
the Germans brought a very greatly increased number of 
U-boats into action, and in February of the following }'ear 
began the sink-at-sight policy. The last quarter of 1916 
shows, therefore, the effect of increased numbers without 
change of method, and the first quarter of 1917 the advance 
due to the transition from a comparatively civilised to a 
purely barbaric piracy. After the close 'of the first quarter 
of 1917 the progress of the campaign is set out month by 
month — that is, from April, 1917, to May of this year. And 
I have ended the graph with the indication of the quarterly 
averages for this year on the assumption that June will show 
the same results as the mean of April and May. 
Set out in this manner, certain not uninteresting facts 
come to light. In 1915, for instance, neutral and Allied 
shipping suffered cnl}' to the extent of 59 per cent, of what 
British shipping had to endure. ■ But in 1916 German exas- 
peration with neutrals, and especially Scandinavian neutrals,, 
brought about a remarkable change which continued in the 
intensive campaign during the last quarter of the year. 
During both these periods the non-British loss was 87 per 
cent, of the British. But when the sink-at-sight policy 
came in, the percentage fell off. Thus, in the first quarter 
of 1917 it fell to 79 per cent. ; in the next quarter to 65 ; 
in the third to 55. In the December quarter it rose to 
62 per cent., and remained at 62 in January, February, and 
March of this year ; but for the last two months it has fallen 
again to 48. The rise in 1915 was due partlj', as I have 
suggested, to Germanyjs determination to make neutrals 
see that she meant what she said in threatening a complete 
blockade of the British coast, but possibly more to the fact 
that neutrals could neither benefit by the direct assistance 
that the British Admiralty could give our own shipping, 
and, most of all, possibly, to the arming of our merchant 
vessels which began to be general at the beginning of that 
year. It was natural that the U-boat captains should 
prefer to go for tai^ets that could be attacked without 
danger. The decline in the percentage when the ruthless 
campaign began was natural enough, because much neutral 
shipping was held up, and much of^ what was still afloat 
eoojooo. 
sbcooo. 
400.000 
300,000 
200,000. 
^.-SOO,ooq 
SDO.OOO 
■iOO.OOO 
lOOWO 
'British . 
J9J8 
■^ 
\ApriiCMaf\JuBe\Jaly\Aug. \SepC.\ Oar \M>\^.\T)ec. \Jaii.\Teb. \7^ 'Jpri/\H&tr, 
Monthly rate of loss, British and Allied Shipping, from beginning of 191 5 to the present time 
