July 4, 1918 
Land & Water 
13 
came under British charter. But one of. the decisive factors 
in the change was undoubtedly tliat America added a million 
tons to Allied shipping, largely through the sequestration of 
German vessels interned in American ports, all of which 
came directly under the same protective measures as our 
own. The ratios, that is to say, of protected to unprotected 
trade in the Allied and foreign category was completely 
changed, so that the ratio of loss tended to approximate to 
the tonnage in the two categories. But that the present 
ratio should be so low is remarkable, because at no time 
has non-British shipping been so large, and it will be inter- 
esting to see if it continues. 
Another fact which seems to me to come out very strikingly 
in these curves is that if we start with April, 1917, we see 
that there is an extraordinary drop between that month 
and September, and that after September, though the decline 
continues, the improvement is more gradual. Take the 
British losses first — the rate in the April, May, June quarter 
of 1917 was 450,000 tons a month, and in successive quarters 
it has declined to 327,000, to 260,000 and, for the present 
quarter, to 225,000. Measured in percentages, the fall is 
from 100 to 72, then from 72 to 57, then to 51, and then to 49. 
The percentages for foreign and Allied are 100, 62, 55, 52, 
and 37. The British losses dechned 43 per cent, in the first 
six months, and 8 per cent, in the next five ; and the foreign 
and Allied 45 per cent, in the first period and 18 per cent, in 
the second. >_ 
The decisive change in our counter measures, adopted 
after the April-June quarter— when the Americans came 
into the game actively — was the establishment of the convoy 
■ system. And these figures seem to show that, while this 
measure was, in six months, able to halve our losses, its 
benefits have not been progressively felt. The limits, that 
is to say, of convoy, so far as the means at our disposal 
enable us to applj' it, have been more or less reached. Tiiat 
it did so much, and in so short a time, is a complete justifica- 
tion of those who, when von Tirpitz first issued his challenge 
to the world, in December, 1914, met the challenge with the 
very obvious reply that the methods which, in the previous 
four or five months had been completely effective in pro- 
tecting our transports and our warships, should be found an 
X adequate, if not a complete, protection for our merchant 
shipping. The three elements that had saved the only 
vessels till then under attack, had been their speed, their 
armament, and their escorts. The chief weakness of merchant 
shipping, as compared with the Royal ships and the trading 
vessels commandeered for. transports, was their want of Speed 
—pace through the water being a protective element of very 
great importance indeed. As this was lacking, the need of 
the other two elements, armament and escort, quite clearly 
became greater. The situation called for two forms of 
effort on the greatest possible scale. First the production 
of escorting vessels in numbers proportionate to the number 
of ships to be protected, and next — to supplement any 
deficiencies in escort — the development and production of 
means of self-protection and the training of men so that 
they should be used effectively when needed. 
Had the policy of building destroyers and providing 
armament crews been energetically followed since December, 
1914, how would it have affected the situation ? Is it reason- 
able to say that if, in 1917, convoys halved our losses, it would 
have had the same effect had it been adopted from the first ? 
If this is reasonable, the effect would have been astounding. 
Before the convoy principle was instituted the loss of British 
shipping was over 5,300,000 tons, of which nearly five millions 
must have been caused by submarines and mines. The loss 
of foreign and neutral shipping was over three and a half 
millions, of which at least two miUions must have been due 
to the same causes. If half the British losses and, say, a 
quarter of the foreign losses could have been saved by convoy, 
the Allies would be better off to-day by over three milhon 
tons. A much smaller saving than this would long since 
have changed the whole aspect of the war. It is difficult to 
imagine a more suggestive illustration of what was set out 
in these columns last week, viz., that the conversion of the 
chief naval command from its former autocracy into a 
republic of brains — quickened by an international infusion — 
has effected a complete revolution in the naval situation. 
It came none too soon, and must have changed the 
history of the last three years had it been effected earlier. 
The question arises : Do these curves really show that 
the convoy principle has reached its limit of economic applica- 
tion ? Is the drop in loss in the last five months of 8 per 
cent, in British and of 18 per cent, in foreign and Allied 
shipping, due to other causes than convoy or to its further 
extension ? If to the latter, is the cost of this extension 
justified by the saving it effects ? Can it be extended further 
and give virtually complete protection,? If the economic 
limit has been reached, then clearly it is to the barrages and 
to the hydrophone hunting, so vividly described by the 
German Captain Rose in lectures reported to us from Munich, 
that we must look for our final success. 
Germany in Asia : By Sir Mortimer Durand 
ANYONE who looks at a map of the world will see 
that Europe is, to all appearance, a comparatively 
small tract of territory lying in the north-west 
corner of Asia. Some geographers have called 
it a peninsula of Asia, or a mere appendix to 
Asia, and neither geographically nor otherwise can the 
smaller continent be regarded as wholly separate from the 
greater. The religion* of Europe came from Asia ; the 
civilisation of Europe originated mainly in Asia ; the blood 
of Europe is intermingled with the blood of Asia. 
At the present day Europe is politically the more important 
•of the two, but that was not always the case. In area, Asia 
is more than four times as large as Europe ; the population 
of Asia is even now more than double that of Europe ; and 
in former times the political importance of Asia was cor- 
respondingly great. The wealth of Europe has been largely 
■drawn, and is still largely drawn, from her trade with Asia, 
which has enriched and strengthened one European State 
after another : Rome, Constantinople, Venice, Portugal, 
Holland, England. Even in military power Asia has, until 
a few hundred years ago, been equal, at times superior, to 
Europe. We know what the Turks did in Europe. Perhaps 
not one Englishman in a hundred has ever heard of the Persian 
-conqueror. Nadir Shah.' Yet, in the eighteenth century, while 
Turkey was still strong enough to stand up against Russia 
and Austria combined, he routed great Turkish armies in the 
field, and carved out an empire as extensive as Napoleon's. 
It is certain that in the future, if predominance in Asia 
remains with Europe at all, the European State or States 
which can command the resources of Asia in wealth and 
man-power will have an immense advantage. 
Until lately it seemed reasonably sure that this predomin- 
ance was to fall to the lot of Great Britain or Russia, or be 
shared between them. The astonishing break-up of Russia 
in the last two year&has entirely altered the position, and has 
brought us face to face with a new set of circumstances which 
require close study by Englishmen, for they must be of vast 
importance to the future of the British Empire. Germany 
has stepped into t'he place formerly occupied by Russia, or 
is, at least, openly trying to do so, and the fact is momentous. 
No one can say what will be the future of the Russian 
dominions, but it seems probable that sooner or later, in one 
form or another, Russia will again take her place among 
the nations of the earth. It is by no means certain, nor 
even likely, that the various adventures to which Germany 
is committing herself in those dominions will prove to bQ as 
easy and free from complications as they may now appear to 
her. We know something ourselves of the difficulties which 
are apt to gather round such tempting excursions into distant 
lands. But, however this may be, whether Russia has been 
shattered once for all into separate fragments, or will yet 
show that she is capable of more or less complete reunion, the 
fact remains that she seems at present in a helpless condition, 
and that Germany is stretching out an eager hand to grasp 
the power she once held in Asia. It seems, therefore, neces- 
sary to consider what are Germany's chances of success, and 
how her proceedings concern us. 
It is evident that in some respects Germany is now well- 
placed for forward action in Asia, and that if she cannot be 
disabled for such action by blows struck at her in Europe, 
she may hope to establish herself in a formidable position 
among Asiatic Powers. Between her and the centre of Asia, 
as far as the frontiers of China and India, lies a great stretch 
of territory hitherto held in part by the Russians, in part by 
independent Mussulman States. The Russian part, also 
largely Mussulman, is now completely disorganised, and it is 
impossible to say vvhat power, or will, of resistance against 
aggression it may retain. 
Of the independent Mussulman States the strongest is 
Turkey, which lies across the Straits between the two Con- 
