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Land & Water 
July 4, 1918 
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.^ALUCHlST&y 
Central Asia in its Relation to the European Powers, India and China 
tinents, and proj ects for hundreds of miles into Asia. Turkey 
marches with Persia, Persia with Afghanistan, Afghanistan 
with India, and in a sense with China. 
Persia is not only weak, and wanting in organisation, but, 
though regarded by Turkey as unorthodox, has in her con- 
siderable elements of Mussulman fanaticism. Afghanistan has 
obligations towards Great Britain, ard it may be hoped that 
she is proof against any temptation to disregard them ; but 
she consists of a number of wild tribes with a fervent ardour 
for Islam. Even China has some outlying Mussulman pro- 
vinces. And the Sultan of Turkey, who considers himself the 
head of the Mussulman faith, is in German hands. 
Germany has, in fact, two direct lines of advance into the 
heart of Asia — a northern line by the Black Sea and the 
Caspian into what used to be called Turan, the old Mussulman 
Khanates of Bokhara, Khiva, and Khokand, the steppes 
of the Turkomans, and neighbouring tracts — a southern line 
through Turkish territory to the borders of Persia. As to 
the northern line Germany is already in the Black Sea, af)- 
parently at Odessa and Sevastopol, and her vassal Turkey is 
in possession of the port of Batoum, from which runs the 
railway across the Caucasus to the Caspian. 
No doubt it would require a considerable development of 
military strength to open up this line and make it secure 
against local attacks ; but the military strength need not be 
German in anything but direction and supervision, for Turkish 
forces, and perhaps local forces, could be utilised for the 
purpose. And even if military occupation seemed to involve 
an, unduly large effort, the line affords a fine opening for the 
intrigue and peaceful penetration in which the Germans 
are so proficient. As 1:0 the southern line, through Turkish 
territory, the Germans are practically in military strength 
on the border of Persia now ; and during the first two years 
of the war, until expelled by the Russians and English, they 
upset the peace of that country very thoroughly. 
It is true that the line of advance into Central Asia by way 
of Turkish territory is threatened from the south, at three 
points, by the British. A British force is in Palestine, based 
on Egypt and the sea. Another, mainly composed of Indians, 
is in occupation of Mesopotamia, with its base on the Persian 
Gulf. A third force, raised by the British from tribal levies, 
is in Southern Persia. But, if Germany can spare troops for 
Eastern adventure, she can push them safely and easily into 
Asiatic Turkey, and in any case she is directing and super- 
vising large Turkish armies on this line ; while the Black Sea, 
and the line of advance from it, is not open to attack from the 
south. It may be pointed out, moreover, that to the north 
of both these lines Germany can act to some e.xtent, and is 
believed to be acting, upon Siberia andNorthern Asia generally, 
through Russia proper. 
For the purposes of the present war, therefore, Gemiany has 
already a strong position in Asia ; and it is to be noted that this 
is not the whole nor perhaps the main question. 
We have to consider also what would be the state of affairs 
in Asia if Germany succeeded in averting complete defeat 
in Europe, and in making peace on something like equal 
terms. It seems not improbable that even if checked and 
contained in Europe she would then be left free to throw her 
weight eastward upon Asia, as Russia was left after the 
Crimean war, and that she would, in that case, make at least 
as much use of her position as Russia did. She might, no 
doubt, incur some risk in the future from such a distant 
development, for she is not immediately in contact with Asia 
as Russia was ; but there seems to be no reason to suppose 
that, her alliances holding good, she would fail to establish 
herself as the leading Power in the west of that continent, 
and she would then become for all other Asiatic Powers a 
very different neighbour from the Russians. 
The Russia of last century and the beginning of this was, 
perhaps, at times somewhat peremptory in her methods, 
military and diplomatic ; but- she had nothing like the 
German strength or organisation or aggressive spirit. In 
many respects she was an Oriental rather than a Western 
Power, with easy-going Eastern ways. Imagine Germany 
with her resources and her ruthless policy established on the 
Caspian and, in Asiatic Turkey. It is not difficult to realise, 
how German trade and German influence of all kinds would 
be pushed from such a vantage ground into all the neighbour- 
ing countries. 
We know the love that Germany bears to us. Could any- 
one suggest a limit to the military preparations W'e should 
be forced to undertake, or the expenditure we should be forced 
■ to incur, in order to safeguard India and Egypt from the ever 
present danger of finding the greatest military power the world 
has ever known suddenly striking out at us from the Turkish 
border ? Japan, and possibly China, the two great Asiatic 
nations, would stand with us in a league of defence against 
the common peril ; and Japan has shown that an Oriental 
State can contend with Europeans in modern warfare, even 
in sea fighting, so long the monopoly of Europeans. But every 
Asiatic Power would be exposed to incessant pressure ; and 
it is conceivable that even China might be drawn into the 
circle of German influence. 
These may seem to be imaginary contingencies, but no one 
dreamt five years ago that there was the remotest possibility 
of our seeing Russia wiped off the map. No one can say now 
that the prospect suggested is impossible or even very un- 
likely. We know that the Germans are already raising the 
cry of Hamburg-Bombay, and that they have for many 
years past been working hard to bring Turkey under their 
control, with what success we have seen. That they meant, 
and mean, to found a, great Asiatic dominion is not denied by 
them, and that such a dominion would be a formidable danger 
to every Asiatic Power seems evident. Germany would, 
naturally, be in Asia what she has been in Europe- — the general 
bully and disturber of the peace. 
I do not believe the danger will materialise, for the Germans 
will be beaten in Europe, and if so, presumably, their whole 
system will be brought to an end, and Asia will not be left 
open to their unscrupulous lust. Also I believe that Russia 
is not dead, and that her dominions will not always be derelict. 
But the vast impcrtar.ce o\ Asia shou'd be understood by the 
British people. 
Other nations may be excused for not recognising it so 
clearly. We cannot afford to have any illusions on the sub- 
ject. A peace which treated Asia as unimportant would be 
for us the beginning of a ruinous antagonism. We must 
never lose sight of this. Meanwhile wc should do everything 
in our power to help Russia in her hour of prostration and 
bitterness. At the beginning of the war she did great 
service to the common cause, and if it be in any way possible 
we are bound in honour to come to her rescue now. But in 
any case, let us keep always before our eyes the fact that a 
peace which left Germany with her present position and policy 
in Asia would be for us, and in the end for the world, not 
peace, but a sword. 
