July 
I I. 
1918 
Land & Water 
Local Offensives : By H. Belloc 
OF those local actions, the meaning of which we 
discussed last week, two have marked the interval 
between the appearance of that article and this. 
The first was the capture of Vaux, three miles 
from Chateau-TIiierry, by the Americans upon 
Monday, July ist. The second was the advance on the 
plateau of ViUers Bretonneux and in the valley below, and 
to the north of it, effected by British, Austrahan, and a 
certain number of American troops. 
Vaux formed a curious little salient in the German hne 
just where that line turns the comer, and from north and 
south begins nmning east and west in the neighbourhood of 
Chateau-Thierry. That the Germans held it so long after 
the French had captured Hill 204 is an excellent example of 
the power of the modem defensive. Before this war, every- 
body would have told you that such a position was impossible. 
As it was, the Germans in Vaux made the holding of Hill 204 
difficult, and the holding of Hill 204 is essential to the French 
in this neighbourhood because it looks right down on Chateau- 
Thierry and commands all the valley of the Marne above. 
Therefore, the Vaux salient had to be got rid of, and it was 
American troops that did the business. 
If the reader will look at the accompanying map, the 
position will be clear to him. The main Paris road as it 
Approximate line 
bewmopertztions 
leaves Chateau-Thierry comes upon the very steep and 
isolated hUl which, from its height in metres, is known as 
Hill 204. In order to avoid this height, it takes a bend 
round to the north, rises over the tongue or saddle which 
unites Hill 204 to the plateau beyond, and then sinks into 
the western valley. Vaux is just at the bottom of the hill, 
before the road rises again to the further side of the dale. 
With the French line crossing Hill 204, but with Vaux and 
the wood to the north of it in German hands, you had a very 
singular position. All the valley due west of Hill 204 was 
threatened by fire from the neighbourhood of Vaux, and 
therefore communication with the summit of the hill was 
difficult, and probably only to be effected at the southern 
side. We have been given no exact account of the trace in 
these few miles, but the situation must have been much 
what I describe. So long as Vaux was held by the enemy 
therefore the position of the French on Hill 204 was pre- 
carious. In spite of the village lying thus in a hollow right 
under the hill, fully observed and dominated, the defensive 
methods elaborated during this war made it as easy for the 
enemy to remain there as it is for them to remain in that 
little point opposite St. Mihiel upon the Meuse, where they 
had remained for more tlian three and a half years, some 
hundreds of feet below the French observers on the height 
and right under their eyes.* 
The flattening out of the ^'aux salient was done with 
remarkable accuracy and dispatch, and the tone not only of 
the French official dispatches, but of the commentators upon 
this piece of American work, shows how highly it was regarded 
by the French command. The prehminary artillery work 
*I only give ttiis Sf. Anhiel point as a par.allcl 1 xampk- of an 
apparen:l)r impossible position being easily held. There is no parallel 
in the tiictical value of the two places. The St. Mihiel point dots not 
interfere in any way with the French commun cations to the hill 
abore, whereas Vaux makes all the diflerence to Hill 204. 
was especially remarkable, and the subsequent advance 
(in which the Americans took over 300 prisoners) appears 
to have occupied no more than forty minutes. W'ith Vaux 
and the wood north of it in American hands, all the valley 
lying to the west of Hill 204 is cleared, and there is every 
facility for communicating with the summit. 
Next day — Tuesday, July 2nd — the Germans coimter- 
attacked heavily, as they were bound to do, seeing the 
importance of the position ; but the American artillery 
completely broke up the counter-attack, and the only result 
of the effort was to leave a further batch of prisoners in 
American hands, raising the total to over 500. 
A very interesting point in connection with this counter- 
attack was the rapidity of the American consoUdation. It 
is certain that the Gemians, who are thinking of the American 
Army exactly as they thought about the British Army three 
years ago, took it for granted that their new opponents 
would not be able to consoHdate a captured position quickly. 
They found, on the contrary, in less than twenty-four hours, 
the whole belt seized by the Americans had been rendered 
firm. 
The setond action — that of ViUers-Bretonneux and Hamel — 
was fought on Thursday, July 4th. It was marked by 
several interesting features. In the first place, the pre- 
hminary bombardment was extremely short. It lasted only 
a few minutes, and was directed solely against the German 
wire. In the second place, there was clearly evident a patchi- 
ness in the German troops. The resistance was not what 
had been expected, and the advance was obtained apparenth' 
at httle cost. The nature of the action will be apparent 
from the accompanying map. 
^^'^gl^^-.-'iSailly-U-Sec 
II 
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nporoxuTuu-e uiu 
The main road to Amiens runs along the height of the 
plateau known as the Plateau of ViUers-Bretonneux, which 
here overhangs the Somme Valley. It will be remembered 
how the Germans some weeks ago tried to rush the end of 
the plateau and get round on to the slopes that overlook 
Amiens. They were beaten by British troops on the left 
and French troops on the rigjit, of whom the former did 
especially good work. But though the plateau was secured 
by this action on its northern flank, the German position 
was strong, running through the village of Hamel, and there 
making a bulge in the hne which it was important to reduce. 
The action we are about to follow was the reduction of this 
salient. The AlUed troops — for the most part Australian, 
but with American contingents among them — attacked upon 
a front of 7,000 yards. The British lines on the north of 
the Somme were already fairly advanced, and the German 
positions at Hamel were thrust further west, and took these 
positions in flank. The object of the attack, therefore, was 
not only to relieve the danger to the Plateau of Vilkrs- 
Bretonneux, but also to relieve the danger which the Genuan 
positions at Hamel presented to the British lines north of 
the Somme. The left wing of the attack north of the Somme 
was less important than the main attack south of the river 
against Hamel and the woods in the neighbourhood of that 
village, and the whole object of the move was to seize Hamel 
and the German trench system beyond it. 
The chief obstacle is the united crescent of wood which 
Ues just south and west of the ruins of Hamel, the south- 
