Land & Water 
July 1 8, 1918 
the last few months that the new defensive (following the 
model set by the Germans themseh-es last year) is something 
quite different from that of two years ago. It is organised 
in depth, and it is elastic. More than that one cannot say. 
There is one point, however, well worth remarking, which 
is this. Mere advance upon a narrow front, such as that of 
the few miles across the Marne now established, if it does not 
break a line is worthless, and its check is tantamount to defeat. 
We saw that in the battle of the Matz. The enemy threw 
his whole weight into the central sector of the Matz valley 
itself. There alone did he obtain any considerable gain — 
3,000 to 5,000 yards on the first day — but the wedge thus 
formed was awkwardly narrow, and counter-attacks pre- 
vented its development. The advance was held upon both 
sides. We have exactly the same position repeated here in 
the first day of the great battle now engaged. It is essential 
that the enemy should get elbow room, especially to the west, 
and that is why he made so vigorous an effort against the 
Americans at Vaux ; with regard to which operation we have 
the news at the moment of writing, that it was not 
onh' repelled, but one of the Brigadiers in command of 
it captured. 
The Albanian Operations 
To understand the Italian effort in Albania we must first 
begin with a diary which the reader will do well to follow 
upon the accompanying sketch map. The whole effort is 
concerned, as we shall see later, with the extension of the 
insufficient covering hitherto given to tlie land-locked har- 
bour of Valona. 
AustruuL line 3e/brEJuly ^ 
Approxmia& line Ju^Jl ■ ■ 
u> 
20 
JO 
''MtUs- 
It was upon the morning of Saturday, July 6th, that the 
offensive opened upon what would seem to be a front of some 
120 kilometres or say, roughly, 75 miles, running a little north 
of west from the heart of the mountain watershed due east of 
Valona to the sea, just north of that harbour. Much the 
greater part of this line and all the left of it was in the hands 
of the Italians ; the French supported upon the east, or 
right, and there was evidently a certain element of surprise, 
for in the very first day over a thousand troops, with more 
than one officer to every 20 men were taken. This first 
day's work struck mainly against the lower Valley of the 
Vojusa, but, for reasons that will be apparent in a moment, 
the object of the whole operation was not to secure the line 
of the Vojusa, but to pass beyond it, and turn the Austrians 
from off the mountain ridge of Malakastra beyond. Upon 
the second day of the effort, Monday, aided from the sea by 
the fire of British monitors, the Vojusa was crossed at its 
mouth, and for some ten miles above and not without sharp 
fighting the country immediately to the north of the moutli 
of the Vojusa was cleared. 
Now it will be evident from the map that the moment 
this effort was on the way to success the Malakastra Range 
was in peril. It was in danger of being turned by the left 
or west. The Italians acted with great promptitude and 
threw their cavalry forward, which reached Fieri before night- 
fall, getting right behind the mountains upon this side, and 
following the rough road which here leads from the one river 
to the other. One may say, therefore, that by the Sunday 
night, July 7th, the Austrian positions on the Malakastra 
Range were no longer tenable, unless they could promptly 
throw back this menace upon their right wing. But not 
the right wing alone wns menaced. The reader will see 
upon the^map_^a road going from the middle Vojusa valley 
to the lower Osum Valley across the mountains. .Just where 
this road tops the Malakastra Ridge is the strong ])osition 
of Cafa Glava, to the left and the right of which are the villages 
of Levani on the slopes of the mountains, and Corocof upon 
the main road. Cafa Glava was carried, and both Levani 
and Corocof occupied before night. The range was there- 
fore thoroughly turned at both ends, and tliough the eastern 
end, where the advance lay along the main road to Herat, is 
not an open flank like the western end, but continues in a 
tangle of mountains, yet the main Austrian positions upon 
the Malakastra between the Bcrat Road and the Fieri Road 
were now impossible, and before night fell upon the Sunday 
the Austrians were in full retreat. The fact that they had 
been condemned from an early part of the day to rapid 
retirement is evidenced by their losing only 300 more prisoners. 
Meanwhile the French were attacking upon the watershed 
to the East, beyond the Osum Valley, where lie the twin 
heights — Cafa Devries, whence flow the upper waters of the 
Tomoritse, and Cafa Becit, to the east of it. They were also 
threatening, though probably only as a demonstration, so 
far east as the southern end of the Ochrida Lake, which is 
far to the north of all these positions. 
On the third day of the advance, Monday, the Italians 
had got across the Semeni River, and their cavalry was 
operating in the Plain to the north of its lower reaches. 
With the French advancing meanwhile rapidly down the 
Tomoritse, it was clear that the important position of Berat — 
important as a local base for the Austrian operations — could 
no longer bejheld. During this same day, Monday, the 
enemy evacuated that town and fell back northward ; the 
Austrians rapidly retreating and burning their stores as they 
went. 
Upon Thursday, what may be the first phase of the opera- 
tion, or what may be the whole of th© operation — we do 
not yet know — came to an end. Its total effect had been 
as follows: 
► It had removed the Austrian line from the Vojusa to north 
of the Semeni ; it had compelled the enemy to evacuate 
Berat, and had put him in four daj's' fighting upon a line 
nearly east and west, and pointing from the sea to the southern 
end of the Ochrida Lake. 
This being the diary of events, let us see what is their 
military meaning : What larger plans our Allies may have 
in this neighbourhood we do not know, but the immediate 
object of such a successful move as has just taken place is 
clear. It is to give more elbow room to Valona Bay, and 
the removing from it of the threat which always existed 
so long as the enemy were upon the Malakastra Ridge, jvith 
Berat as a local base behind them. 
■• The importance of Valona Ba}' is familiar to all. It fs 
deep, nearly land-locked, and situated just upon the southern 
straits of the Adriatic. Before the days of submarines one 
might say that the power controlling Brindisi upon the one 
side and Valona upon the other could cross the Adriatic. 
To-day Valona has not the same meaning, but it is still by 
far the most important point south of Cattaro ; the only 
good harbour in what are, counting all sinuosities, nearly 
200 miles of coast. Valona Bay is overlooked on its eastern 
side by a high and steep range of mountains, but this does 
not extend along the whole length of the harbour. All the 
northern part has a shore getting more and more flat as the 
sea is approached. Through this sea plain runs the Viosa ; 
immediately behind the Viosa, forming a very strong position, 
