July i8, 1918. Land & Water 
Too Strong to Fight : By Arthur Pollen 
THE Whiie Paper dealing with the Dutch convoy 
question brings out the following facts. On 
April 16th, in the course of a debate in the Dutch 
Parliament, the Minister of Marine, dealing with the 
need of "fetching what is necessary" from the 
Colonies, and of sending out Government employees and public 
stores, announced that in the future these operations were to be 
carried out under convov. They would be sent when and 
as the amount of coal available "made the journey possible. 
These proposals were reported to Mr. Balfour on the i8th 
and on the 25th, he informed the Dutch Government that 
Great Britain recognised no right of convoy, and were any 
such proposals carried out, would exercise her rights to visit 
and search any merchant vessels of which the convoy might 
be composed." To this communication no reply was given. 
It was not even acknowledged, and the Dutch Government 
proceeded with its plans as if our embargo had never been 
made. The Government's power to requisition ships, hitherto 
limited to taking them for the purpose of bringing colonial 
supplies to Holland, was by a new law extended to cover tlie 
dispatch of Government goods and passengers to the Colonies. 
This Bill was under debate during the first fortnight of Mav, 
and at one sitting the Government were asked whether it 
was certain that the convoying of ships would not occasion 
great international difficulties. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs replied that he could give no guarantee on this sub- 
ject, but "probably no difficulty would arise," In the same 
debate the Minister of Agriculture drew attention to the 
question of fats in connection with the convoying of ships, 
and a leading Rotterdam paper stated that it was intended 
that the convoyed vessels, on their return journey, would load 
cargoes in the East Indies for the margarine industry. 
While these debates, were in progress, Sir Walter Townley, 
at. The Hague, was instructed to remind the Dutch Foreign 
Minister that no reply had been received to Mr. Balfour's 
telegram on April 25th. But he could elicit no more than 
that the Minister did not demur to it. 
By May 31st, liowever, the Dutch Government seems to 
have realised that its public was being led to expect too 
much. An official communique was accordingly issued to 
remove "certain incorrect views," which seemed to have 
got current. This set out the urgent importance of "reliev- 
ing the material and personnel " of the Dutch squadron in 
the East Indies, and explained besides, that numerous 
officials and military officers had long been waiting for facili- 
ties to get out. It was also necessary "to send Government 
goods urgently by merchant steamer, or requisition one, and 
to send it for goods needed in colonies." The meaning of this 
jargon is not clear. It seems to allude to some unspecified 
caigoes for the return journey. T\w communique specified the 
ships that would compose the convoy, gave the date of 
leaving, and prescribed the route it would take. Its real 
points, however, were addressed, one to the Dutch public, 
the other to the British Government. The first were told 
that it was not intended to institute under protection of 
warships commercial intercourse which, without such protec- 
tion, would not be permitted by the belligerents. As for 
British rights, "it is obvious," the commtmique ran, "that 
the convoy commandant would not tolerate any examination 
of the convoyed ships." 
" This extraordinary defiance reached the Foreign Office on 
May 31st, and — again after a week's consideration — two 
communications were made to the Dutch Minister in London. 
The first was a formal note in writing signed by the Foreign 
Secretary. The second was a confidential statement made 
verbally by the Under Secretary at the Foreign Secretary's 
request. In the formal letter, Mr. Balfour drew attention 
to the warning of April 26th, to the fact that no reply had been 
received to it, and expressed his surprise at the official state- 
ment that the Dutch Govefnment would tolerate no exam- 
ination of the convoyed ships. In face of this. His Majesty's 
Government was compelled to reiterate, in the most formal 
manner, that the right of visit and search was one Great 
Britain could not abandon, and that the demand that slie 
should do so in this case, was one to which she could not 
possibly accede. The formal note \vas, in fact, an ultimatum 
just as unequivocal as the challenge ia the communique. 
The confidential statement verbally communicated to the 
Dutch Minister went even further. For it pointed out that, 
if the proposed convoy was really not intended to institute 
commercial intercourse and. if the Netherlands Government 
were honestly willing to afford the belligerents the same 
guarantees and control as thtv could themselves enforce. 
there was no sense in there being a convoy at all. The send- 
ing of it, in fact, was "hardly capable of explanation, except 
on the assumption that the "convoyed vessel^ are to be pro- 
tected in some transaction, which the belligerents do not 
recognise as legitimate." 
So far the formal and the confidential statements deal 
faithfully and candidly with the situation. Great Britain 
could not abandon her rights. The demand that she should 
do so was one to which she could not possibly accede. The 
Dutch Government's professed objects in sending out the 
convoy could be attained just as easily, if the ships in question 
were unaccompanied by warships. The obvious sequel was 
that the proposal should and must be abandoned. 
The Volte-Face 
But, having stated that the project was hardly capable of 
any except a sinister explanation. Lord Robert then proceeded 
to "find another explanation of the situation, so simple and 
innocent that the right of search is to be incontinently 
abandoned after all ! The Dutch Government, perhaps, 
failed to realise the consequences which a belhgerent may 
logically draw from their announcement, and so "to pre- 
vent the action of the Netherlands Government frotn 
definitely creating a situation gravely imperilling friendly 
relations between the two countries," the British Govern- 
ment, while abandoning no rights and creating no precedent, 
would, for thisonce; waive their right of search, as an act 
of courtesy. • 
Surely, "there has never yet been so strikmg an example 
of forbearance. On April r6th the Dutch Government— 
perfectly knowing the attitude which this country takes with 
regard to its sed rights, knowing well that President Wilson's 
Government had, nearly, a year ago, adopted the British 
view, and that all tire other aOies were like-minded with us— 
calmly announced its intention to do that which the allies 
could" not possibly permit without renouncing a right on the 
rigid enforcement of which their whole power to blockade 
Germany is based. The proposal was not a week old before 
the British Government conveyed an explicit warning.that this 
right would not be renounced. This warning the Dutch neither 
disputed nor even acknowledged. It was simply ignored. 
Now the curious thing is this. To save the face of the Dutch 
Government we have waived our rights. But the Dutch 
have neither waived their defiance, nor withdrawn their 
threat. Mr. van Swinderen's only reference to the essentials 
of the matter are singular. His note to Mr. Balfour of 
June 15th is clearly not in reply to the formal official note 
of June 7th— though a footnote in the White Paper says it 
is. Mr. Balfour's note is, in fact, ignored. It is only with 
Lord Robert Cecil's confidential verbal statement that Mr. 
van Swinderen concerns himself. Once more the formal 
communication is passed over as if it had never been made. 
"The Netherlands Government are delighted," he tells the 
Secretary, that the two countries "agree as to the mode of 
carrying out the plan for convoy." The British shall be 
given everything ; a complete list of passengers and full 
particulars of cargoes so that there can be 'no possible 
" impression that anything is being concealed." But Holland 
cannot agree that this readiness to conform to the views of 
the belligerents is difficult to reconcile with the whole plan 
of the convoy. For the "protection of the men of war is 
advantageous by excluding all unnecessary delay." This, 
surely, is the merest trifling, or something much worse. It 
is not the presence of the Dutch warship, but the possession 
of the British permit that has given a free pass across the 
seas to this convoy. In the last sentence we get the first 
and only recognition of our ever having given the ulti- 
matum at all. "The Netherlands Government," says 
the Minister, "are fully aware that the British Govern- 
ment do not recognisa the right of convoy, upheld by 
the first-named Government and by all other nations, 
but in their opinion this point of international law can be 
left out of account in the present case of a very special 
sort of convoy, destined to transport between the Mother 
Country and its Colonies none but goods for the service of 
the Government, and Government passengers with their 
famihes." The Dutch, in short, now that we have sub- 
mitted, waive the whole incident on one side. There is 
not, from the first word of this correspondence to the last, 
a single expression of acknowledgment of our concession : 
nor anything to account for the strangely conciliatory line 
which "Mr. Balfour has taken. 
