Land & Water 
July 25, 1918 
The Counter Stroke: By H. Belloc 
As this paper went to press last week news came 
that the last and most formidable of the German 
offensive movements had just been launched. 
I say "the most formidable" not because it 
was the largest in scale— though the front 
attacked was the largest yet attempted— but because it 
represented the maximum effort which the enemy could 
develop in this season. His first great blow of March 21st 
and 22nd, delivered after a long period of repose and *jf 
special training, and having behind it the weight of 60 divi- 
sions, which- were rapidlv increased after its success to 80, 
and at last to the equisalent of nearly 100, was a stronger 
military effort. It was intended to be, but was not decisive. 
The French and British armies were not separated. But it 
destnned 50 miles of the old ix>rmanent front ; very shortly 
afterwards another 15 miles of it was destroyed, and, in. 
general, that great blow established a state of affairs upon 
which the enemy believed that he could so build as to achieve 
his decision this summer.. He cnjo\-ed the initiative, and, 
above all, he had a new tactical metlKid with which he seemed 
able, whene\'er he chose, to break a line. 
In pursuance of his success he struck on May 27th, and, 
as wc know, ff)rced the Chemin des Dames at one stroke 
and overran the whole of the Tardenois for 30 miles. ]n 
his next attempt in the battle of the Matz he was checked, 
but the advantage of the initiative remained with him. He 
still had a superiority in number ; he still enjoyed the advan- 
tage of a new tactical method. He waited for five weeks. 
In spite of the advantage this pause gave to our recruitment 
through the rapidly arriving American contingents, he cUd 
so because he believed that a full preparation for the last 
conclusive stroke would pay him. He has dehvered that 
stroke, and it has completely failed. The occasion is as 
gi-eat as any that wc have seen upon the West since the hrst 
battle of the Marne in 1914. 
The operations are, of course, not complete at the moment 
of writing. But the week over which they are spread forms 
a united and simple piece of military history which can be 
presented as a whole. There .lies within those seven days 
from the moriiing of Monday, July 15th, to the evening ot 
Sunday, July 21st (upon the dispatches of which this article 
is written, upon Mondaj', July 22nd) a complete military 
episode of stroke and counter-stroke which forms a separate 
chapter, and may prove a turning point of the war. 
The enemy, by his great success of May 27th and the 
succeeding days, had established a line in the shape of a 
sickle. From the north-eastern corner of the Forest of Villers- 
Cotterets to the neighbourhood of the F"orest of Argonne, the 
front up to July i-|th^ bore a general shape, which may be 
represented in the annexed diagram.* 
" The old front had passed as does the dotted line in front 
of Soissons and Rheims, to be continued on to the point of 
Massiges, 'near the Argonne. Tlie (ierman success of the 
• It is one of the numerous coincidences of this war that, although 
circumstances are very dificrent, this sickle-shaped front is a repeti- 
tion of the shape of the front on a larger scale when the first battle of 
the Marne w;>s fought four years ago. It is a further coincidence that 
the counter-offensive of July 18, a blow .on the extreme left at the tip 
of the sickle, corresponds to the action of the Ourcq on the extreme 
left of the battle of the Marne, with which my readers are familiar. 
end of May liad, as it were, forged the bend of the 
sickle. • . ■ 
The storv of the past week is this : — 
The enemy attempted, by attacking on both sides of 
Kheims in the bend of the sickle between Chateau-Thierry 
and Rlieims, and on the handle- of the sickle between Kheimji 
and Massiges, to catch the Allied troops and material in the 
angle between. In their first effort to do this thev are 
checked imperfectly on the left — that is, in the bend of the 
sickle, and more "severely upon the handle ' of the sickle, 
between Rheims and Massiges. For two days they try 
painfully to advance, but with slight success in the former, 
amounting to the shaded belt on the diagram, and with 
nothing ajiprecialile in the latter. They have already by 
the evening of this third day— that is, by the evening of 
Wednesday, tlie 17th — suffered losses out of all proportion 
to their advance or to the damage they have inflicted upon 
their opponent when, upon the morning of the fourth day 
— the Thursday — there is delivered agjiinst them on the tip 
of the sickle and along its outer edge, from C and D, and 
everywhere in between, an unexpected and very heavy blow 
whic'h bends the sickle right backwards, puts the enemy 
troops within the bend of it into peril of being cut off, and 
puts an end to the great offensi\-e movement against the 
salient of Rheims. The enemy withdraws from tlie belt 
which he had occupied in his first thni.'^t, and his offensive 
plan has gone to pieces. It is so far but a negative result, 
3'et a negative rtsult of enormous significance. I*"or it means, 
as we shall see in a moment, not only that the all-important 
factor of numbers has changed in character, but that the 
enemy has miscalculated that change. 
Before we go further, we must ask ourselves why the 
enemy, in preparing this last great blow which was to be 
decisive, chose the salient of which Rheims is the centre. 
He that possesses superiority and the initiative as well, will 
strike at a salient in his wealcer opponent's line by attacking 
one or both of its sides. It is true that this great salient 
of Rheims was shallow. That is, its angle was very obtuse. 
Rut if it were broken in upon either side — and, better still, 
upon both sides — there would follow very large consequences 
indeed. There would, of course, be immense captures of 
men and of material. There would probably he a chance 
of advancing rapidlv for several days througli the breach 
so made, as it happened after St. Ouentin and after the 
Chemin des Dames ; and if such an advance were made, 
say, to Sezanne and Chalons (three days' march from the 
fronts attacked), apart from the destruction of another great 
fraction of the Allied forces, the whole direct railway com- 
munication between the centre and the east of the Allied 
line would have disappeared. The following sketch of the 
railway system shows it. 
The shortest direct line from the Allied centre to the east 
at Verdun, in front of Nancy, and so right down to the Vosges, 
was the line which runs past Sezanne and Vitry. The main 
line by Epernay and Chateau-Thierry had been cut since 
the German success of May. A further advance cutting this 
second line would have left the Allied front in an impossible 
state. There would have been a salient at Verdun difficult 
to supply and therefore to hold. 
thorough 
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About T^miles 
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«4iiuyiUiJUjjiiiuuiJ" 
RHEIMS 
'WLSSigi 
Epernay 
ChateauThievty 
