July 2S, 1918 
Land & Wat 
er 
5 
succcsji, tlierefore, upon this sector of Rheims would liave 
been almost as decisive as the success orif^inally planned in 
the attack between the Scarpe and the Oisc last March. 
Another effect which would have followed, to which allu- 
*sion has often been made in these columns : An effect wliich, 
though it may be called political, is at this stage. of the war 
of the highest military significance. The Ijreakdown of this 
salient of Kheims would have given the enemy, on his right 
a further approach. to Paris. Batteries established another 
15 miles further from the positions he already held upon the 
Marne would command the capital. 
It will further be noted that had the enemy obtained siich 
a success upon the sector of Rheims he would fiecessarily 
have drawn down, in order to stem the tide of his advance, 
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every sj^are man the Allies C(;uld send. They would have 
come swinging round to a point more, distant from the vital 
point of Amiens than any point yet attacked in force during 
the present offensive; and with his remaining strength, 
after what might jjrove a rapid and inexpensive victory 
upon the sector of Rheims, a second blow upon the Amiens 
front would conclude the war ; for if the Amiens front were 
broken, the British Army would be isolated and thrust back 
upon the coast. 
Now let us turn to the details of the double operation. 
The German offen<jive, the Allied counter-stroke, and the 
consequent breakdown of the enemy's scheme. 
Two sectors meet at Rhejms : one due east, towards 
Argonne ; the other south-west, towards Chateau-Thita-ry ■ 
the former over bare rolling plain ; the latter over wooded 
country and hills. The great obstacle here is the Mountain 
and forest of Rheims ; and the only gate by which it can 
be turned, the only place upon which this south-western 
hmb of the long line could be forced, was that part upon 
the Marne between Chateau-Thierry and D(jrmans. The enem\' 
had aligned with curiously simple symmetry almost exactly 
the same number of men upon either side of" Rheims. There 
were about 15 divisions in the first line between Chateau- 
fhierry and Rheims. The same number between Rheims and 
Massiges ; say, not quite half a million men, of which some 
270,000 were infantry to be used in the shock. Immediateh- 
behmd these were reserves almost as numerous. The prepara- 
tions were upon a scale recalling tho.se of the first great 
attack m March, and the length of front attacked was similar 
— somewhat over 5(j miles. 
I will attempt to take mv readers step by step through 
the Six days of the battle to date : The first day was that 
of the mam German blow and its check ; in the second 
and third the enemy attempted, with very little and' twite 
local successes, to carry on in spite of tlie check; on the 
Ourth he received the unexpected and staggering blow 
beliind the whole of his offensive line when Foch gave Mangin 
■ the task of counter-attacking against Soissons ; and the 
hfth, sLxth, and seventh, in which the fruits of that counter- 
attack appeared with the enemy's retirement over the Marne 
and the complete breakdown of his offensive scheme 
On the firs^t day (Monday, Juh- 15th) the attack had 
fortunes which we have already followed in these columns 
Its right or western wing, between Rheims and Chateau- 
1 uerry, was held by the obstacle of the Mountain of Rheims 
which, indeed, the enemy did not hope to force but tin- 
more open country to the south, whereby that obstacle 
might be turned, gave opportunity for action. The (iermans 
crossed the Marne upon a front of about ii miles from above 
Chateau- Thierry upwards, occupied the further steep risinj; 
hills beyond, and in their first blow readied the crest of 
these and the valley beyond, in which lie the villages of 
St. Agnan and La Thapelle. 
It was clear that tlje I--rench put into practice here a new 
tactic of defensive in depth, i)iish<'d far bevorul even the 
German practice of last year ; for though the belt of country 
overrun was more than 30 square miles, not a gun was left 
beliind, and the number of prisoners counted by the enemy 
., was small. 
We have had no details of the materiiil methods employed, 
but we may presume that a system of small, very strongly 
fortified posts supporting each other and carried far out 
beyond the main position (a system which the Germans 
taught us in 1917, and upon which the Allies have now 
improved), accounted for the check received at the end of 
the day. Quite apart from this, however, the enerliy 
received upon this extreme right of his, before nightfall of 
Monday, an experience which ought to have given him pause 
in his calculation both of our numbers and of the tactical 
value of the new American contingents ; for the German 
attempt to extend their bridge-heads south-westwards, and 
to get elbow-room upon the Paris Voads, met within the 
first twelve hours (when offensive shock is at its greatest) ,• 
with two bad local reverses, and both of these were suffered 
at the hands of the Americans. 
The first was in trying to force a way down the road through 
Vau.x. The attempt was completely shattered ; hundreds 
of prisoners were taken, and the general officer in command 
of one of their brigades, with his staff, fell into the hands of 
our Allies. The second was south of the river above Chateau- 
Thierry, at Fossoy. There a local American counter-attack, 
delivered in the afternoon or evening of the Monday, threw 
the Germans right back upon the river and over it, leaving 
again hundreds of prisoners in the hands of their opponents. 
These two actions were extremely significant. They were 
an indication not only of the numerical increase already 
afforded by the Americans, but of the tactical value in battle 
of these men coming thus late upon a campaign where all 
the older belligerents were already suffering from exhaustion. 
While such things were happening upon the German right 
wing between Rheims and Chateau-Thierry upon this first 
day of the battle, upon the left wing, between Rheims and 
Massiges, the (ierman effort had cornpletely failed. It had 
not even had the measure of success enjoyed by the other 
half of the German armies upon the western wing. General 
' Gouraud had a better opportunity of using the new 
defensive in depth than could be found, perhaps, in any 
otlier part of the Western front. The German com- 
muniques speak of his voluntary retirement upon the- main 
battle position. The French communiques and longer 
descriptions tell us much more. For they show us why 
here also not a gun fell into the enemy's hands. The 
isolated strong posts took' an extremely heavy toll of the 
enemy's attacking divisions before the "battle 'position was 
reached. It seems certain that the French preparation was 
aided by some bungling upon the enemy's part, for the whole 
weight went out of the attack after it's first lunge. It was 
crippled with losses. 
The complete failure upon the German left wing, between 
Rheims and the Argonne, the check with its ominous 
American episode upon the German right wing, already boded 
ill for the fortunes of the new offensive upon the close of its 
first day. None the less, it was the judgment of the enemy's 
command that with perseverance an*d at much heavier 
expense than he had originally allowed for, great results 
could still be obtained. He had found himself unable to 
extend towards Paris and the south-west from Chateau- 
Thierry ; he was held upon his left in' the bare plains of 
Champagne. 'But he might yet, by putting a special weight 
of men there, push on across the Marne towards Epernay, 
turn the obstacle of the Forest of Rheims, make the salient 
of Rheims untenable, and destroy some great mass of men 
and material in a vigorouseflort to pinch off the head of the 
salient at least, if he could do no more. 
If we look back at Diagram I., and see what the salient of 
Rheims would have become had the enemy reached Epernay 
with less than 20 miles between him and his eastern wing, 
we shall appreciate the nature of his cakkilation. It was 
a second best, but still a result worth having ; and it might, 
if the defensive were vigorous and yet broke down, have 
results that coul'd be further developed. It might make a 
breach here right through the French line. Tuesday, there- 
fore, is full of this effort of his to push along the Epernay 
Road, while other local efforts would hold the French iuid 
their Allies northward up to Rheims and all along the eastern 
sector beyond Rheims so as to prevent reinforcenieiit at 
the threatened spot. 
These efforts had a certain measure of success which, 
in those who knew nothing of the stroke next coming on the 
Allied side, caused some anxiety. On the Tuesday morning 
the Frencli were still deprived of direct observation over 
the crossings of the Marne, standing as they did in the deep 
valley of St. Agnan, south of the hills that dominate that 
