Land & Water 
July 25, 1918 
10 Itfilej 
German cuiuance^^^^^^* 
Trench advance 
CHATEAU 
THIERRY 
-& 
river ; while on the danger-point of tlie Epernay Road they 
lost ground all day. They had been holding on Tuesday 
morning Chatillon, to the north of the river, and Mareuil, 
to the south of it : Two gate-posts, as it were, on either side 
of the door which barred German advance up the Epernay 
Road, turning the Forest and Mountain of Rhcinis. But 
by night the enemy had forced this door, and the French 
were right back 4,000 yards at Oeuilly. That same evening, 
however, the fact that the enemy was hampered in his offen- 
sive bejvand the Marnc was apparent from the fact that the 
French before nightfall recovered the heights above the 
St. Agnan Valley, and apparently before it was quite dark 
observation was restored over the course of the Marne 
between Jaulgonne and Dormans, where a number of pontoon 
bridges connected the eight divisions south of the river with 
their supply from the north. 
The nature of the handicap thus suffered by the enemy 
will be evident. The pontoon bridges could not carry even 
field artillery ; apparently only mountain guns and the new 
light pieces got across. Further, it was very difficult to 
keep up a proper supply of shell, and when the French 
recovered by Tuesday night direct observation over these 
pontoons the enemy's position became very difficult indeed. 
The enemy Higher Command, however, still' decided to 
continue the struggle. It was an error- in judgment, quite 
apart from nuich more remarkaljlc blunder which was t() 
follow. It was clear during all the fighting of Wednesday 
that the eight divisions beyond the Marne would not make 
good On the vital point of the Epernay Road there was 
fighting backwards and forwards all day long from Oeuilly 
a thousand yards east to Montvoisin, and then back again 
to Oeuilly, and then back again to Montvoisin, which the 
enemy held by the fall of darkness. But this gain of about 
a thousand yards on the whole day at one point alone (though 
that an important one) was a result quite insufficient for 
three days of such an effort. Further, the enemv proved 
incapable of wresting the hjeights above the Marne from 
the French, so that the next day would open with their 
bridges still under direct observation and accurately shelled. 
But there happened on that fourth morning — the morning 
of Thursday, the i<Sth — something much more important 
and much more decisive than the mere harassing of these 
unfortunate eight divisions which had crossed the Marne. At 
dawn on that day General Mangin had struck suddenJx- 
without artillery preparation along the whole western fiaiik 
of the Chateau-Thierry salient from Cutr^ right away down 
to the heights beyond the Clignon, opposite Torcy and 
Belleau — a distance of 20 miles. 
At this point, which is the decisive moment of the battle, 
we must ask ourselves how the enemv came to make an 
12 3 TVTdes S" 
Con^ursaf 2Sme6res 
^m 
Ortginal^ine »»^» » »»»» 
lui£ of Monday nigAf-Jti^IS'^ >•>.>.?<. 
