July 25, 1918 
Land & Water 
error so great as the neglect of this vital sector, and we can 
I inly answer that question as one answers the precisely 
similar question concerning Kluck and the ist German 
Army in September, 1914, by saying that the history of 
war is full <>f such Ijlunders, and that victory ultimately 
goes to the man that makes least of them. That this sector 
was vital is obvious to anyone who knows the mere elements 
of the map. The German troops between Chateau-Thierry 
and Rheinis, and particularly the German troops across the 
Marne, were figiiting with their tracks turned to the sector 
between Cutry and Chateau-Thierry. It was elementary 
therefore that a threat to this i)art of the line was a threat 
to undo the whole of the offensive to the east. But, apart 
from that, there is the question of communications. The 
main road which supplied the whole of the front from 
Cliateau-Thierry right away to the Momitain of Rlieims 
runs from Soissons to Kozoy, where it branches into two, 
one going on to Chateau-Thierry, and the other towards 
tJie Mountain of Rheims. The latter again brandies into 
two at Fere-en-Tardenois and sends an avenue of communica- 
tion tlirough the wooded district to the south, down to the 
.Marne at jaulgonne. If that road were cut anywhere above 
Rozoy the supply of the troops fighting south Of the Marne 
and against the Forest of Rheims would be ver>' heavily 
hampered. More important still was the case of railway 
communication. The railway communication of the whole 
of this pocket depends, as may be .seen by consulting Map III., 
upon the junction of Soissons just south-east of the town. 
If that is cut or brought under fire at short range nothing 
can come direct by rail from the bases into the Tardenois 
country. Chateau-Thierry and all the portiims of the Marne 
right up to Dormans and beyond suddenly find themselves, 
if this junction is out of use, 30 miles from rail-head. The 
onl\- possible reason for allowing such a threat to develop 
must have been that the enemy's commanders under- 
estimated the Allied strength, and thought that their offensive 
was holding all that the Allies could spare. In other words, 
they must have mis-read both the tactical value and the 
numbers of the American contingents. 
General Mangin struck upon a 20-mile front with French 
troops to the north and American troops to the south. His 
tactic was that initiated by (General Byng last year against 
Cambrai. He allowed no preliminary" bombardment ; put 
in tlie Tanks at once in large numbers, and swept forward 
with such rapidity that by half-past ten the whole of the 
first-line defences had been overrun. Thousands of prisoners 
and hundreds of guns had been taken ; a depth varying 
from 3 to 7J miles of ground had been passed, and, most 
importimt of all, the hiU called "The Hill of Paris," outside 
Soissons, was firmly in French hands, and to the south of it, 
near Buzancy, the great road was cut. It was a paralysing 
blow, and decided all that was to follow. >}« W»k{f ■H^iEtf^" 
If the reader will look at the accompanying map he will 
soissom 
TOWK 
Trcack 
since 
AlLmumiysufpiy 
&tiieeneznyuime 
whole pocietaiid. 
betxoeeitllhecms 
dad-C^ia&azc — 
Thierzy tntzst 
^ass tnroL^Ittkcs 
point 
appreciate the meaning of this stroke. From a bare plateau 
on the edge of a steep escarpment three hundred feet above 
the plain the French looked down at the vital junction of 
Soissons from a range of less than four thousand yards.* 
The cutting of the main road at Buzancy severed the 
main artery of petrol communication at the same time. 
The latter }X)int was not so serious as the former, for 
petrol communication could still be managed by numerous 
secondary roads proceeding southward from the Aisne Valley. 
But the paralysing of railway communications was very 
• All m in railway cnmmiinication passes through Soissons save for 
■ me Uijilt licld railway constructed by the enemy list month. 
serious indeed. The news must have reached the General 
in Command of tlie eight divisions beyond the Marne by noon 
of Thursday, and yet for the second time the German Higher 
Command decided tipon delay and upon the hopeless task of 
attempting to retrieve the sittiation. For thirty-si.\ hours 
they continued with such stocks as they had to keep up the 
pressure beyond the Marne, but they* failed to advance, 
and at 9 in the evening of Friday they began their retreat. 
This movement was covered both by the approach of dark- 
ness and by the masses of smoke-cloud which screened it. 
But it was none the less exceedingly expensive. We must 
remember that all the enemy pontoons had by this time 
been accurately registered and that a perpetual stream of 
shell was falling upon the river at every crossing during that 
terrible night. Further, the bringing back of such a great 
mass of men and vehicles over bridges where men can only 
walk in columns of two files for the most part is a lengthy 
business. There must have been, counting light artiller\' 
and vehicles, more than eighty thousand men south of the 
Marne when the operation began. It apparently continued 
during the Saturday, and was not fully completed in twelve 
or perhaps fifteen hours. Apart from the night-firing, 
therefore, there were, it would seem, six or seven hours of 
broad daylight in which the French and Americans poured 
their fire on to the plain of the river, crammed with these 
slowly melting masses of men. There is a F'rench estimate 
worthy of respect that these eight divisions, before they had 
got well back over the river, had lost a half of their strength. 
That seems a very high estimate. But they had been fighting 
with the utmost vigour and without appreciable result for 
four complete days, with very difficult communications 
behind them, against a strong defensive which, during nfearly 
all the time haci had direct observation over their movement. 
They were compelled to cover the retreat during the daylight 
hours by large rear-guards, which were a target for the 
continued French fire, and there must have been heavy losses 
at the crossings themselves, the "defiles of the bridges" 
which were perfect targets. It is a most gratifying element 
in the situation that this very high toll of the enemy was 
taken at comparatively small expense on the Allied side, 
for there was no attempt to risk any large bodies of men 
in pursuit. Quite enough could be done by mere standing 
fire against the great bodies moving over the narrow valley 
below. 
Even though the enemy was thus compelled to abandon 
his bridge-head beyond the Marne, and even though it was. 
clear that the offensive was shattered, we naturally took it 
for granted in this country that the very large reserves which 
the enemy still disposed in the immediate neighbourhood, 
would be sufficient to throw back the French and Americans 
ultimately somewhat from the positions they had reached 
on Thursday as the result of a surprise. In point of fact, 
this did not happen, or, at least, has not happened at the 
moment of writing, when the last dispatches to hand are 
those of Sunday night, the 21st. Upon the contrary, there 
was a certain continuous advance towards every part of 
the great high road between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry 
all during the Saturday and the Sunday. Chateau-Thierry 
itself was abandoned by the enemy in the course of Sunday, 
and on the night of that day there was no part of the road 
which was not directly under fire or actually reached. By 
nightfall of Sunday the Allied line ran from the hill above 
Soissons through Buzancy, then in front of Ville Montoire, 
and thence southward close to Oulchy. South of the 
Ourcq it went through La Croix and Grisolles, crossed the 
high road at Bezuet, and reached the Marne at Mont St. 
Pere. There was naturally severe congestion of enemy 
troops in retreat at the road junction at Fere and heavj' 
bombing from the air u])on that point. 
We leave the story of the battle with the enemy retiring 
from the extreme of the pocket in .some confusion and with 
very heavy loss, but with plenty of room to fall back north- 
ward as far as he may choose unless a further Allied advance 
reduces the space open to him. 
As the numerous details of this great battle may prove 
confusing, I will conclude with a snimmary of the whole 
seven days. 
There are two phases : First, the great German offensive, 
which is checked, and which occupies the first three days — 
Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. Secondly, the counter- 
offensive of Thursday, with the consequent retreat continued 
throughout Saturday and Sunday. 
For the nSain offensive, the enemy put in ' line about 
58 divisions — possibly 60. Of these, just over half dehvered 
the first shock, and rather less than half were kept in reserve. 
The forced were equally divided into two armies : one east 
and the other west of Rheims, the object being to crush 
