8 
Land & Water 
July 25, 1918 
the salient of which that town was the apox. Kast of 
Rlioims the effort was held with \erv lieavN' loss. W'est ot 
Kheims it was liehl against tiie Mountain of Kheinis- the 
northern half of the sector— across tlie Marno to a depth of 
three or four miles on the southern open part of tlie sector. 
?:ven this movement, however, was sufficiently checked by 
the end of .Mondav, to make but little ])rof,'ress on the Tuesday 
and Wednesday. It was held and even thrown back on its 
riglit ; on its "left a serious push along the Epernay Road 
upon the Tuesday was virtually held u])on the Wednesday. 
With Wednesdav'night, therefore, we leave the main offensive 
checked, but still exercising active pres.sure. 
On Thursday morning a surv)rise counter-attack against 
the west of the pt>cket completely succeeds. The heights 
dominating the railway junction of Soissons are occupied, 
and the main road between Soissons and Chateau Thierry 
cut. N'o railway snppl\- could reach the cpiarter of a million 
men and more'caught" in flir big bulge Ix'tween Soissons 
and Kheims, and even njad traffic was reduced to half its 
value. Yet all that Thursday and part of I'riday the enemy 
hesitated to retreat. At last", on Friday night, he withdraws 
with very heavy loss the ei^ht divisions which had crossed 
the Marnc five days before. This expensive operation 
occupies a part of Saturday as well. On Sunday evening 
he leaves Chateau-Thierry, and a general retreat is still in 
progress at the close of that day. 
Meanwhile, the vitally necessary operation of pushing 
back the French and Americans, who liavc paralysed his 
railway supply, have cut his best road, and are threatening 
the whole of his right flank, is for some reason delayed. He 
has over twenty fresh divisions in reserve within two days' 
march, yet even on the fourth day — the Sunday evening — 
the Allied troops between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry 
continue to force him back. The reason is probably con- 
gestion, and possibly also lack of supply through the cutting 
of the railway. At that point we leave the battle. 
The Enemy's Tactics : By Henri Bidou 
IN a previous article we showed how the Germans in 
France had wavered between two different theories of 
strategy, one consisting in concentrating all available 
forces and dealing the decisive blow at the decisive 
point, the other consisting in taking advantage of the 
central position and, with reserves massed in the centre of 
the arc, delivering alternate blows upon the enemy's two 
flanks, at eccentric points wliere there may be a chance of 
effecting a surprise. The first method resulted in the battle 
of March 21st ; the second in the battles of April 9th upon 
the Lys and of May 27th upon the Aisne. 
It is important to observe that the event proves that the 
first method — that is, the violent blow at the decisive pcjint — 
can by itself alone give victory, and that the second method 
— that is, alternate blows at the two flanks — is no more than 
a preparatory proceeding entailing tlie employment of the 
other at the opportune moment. This is a point of capital 
importance for the historian of the campaign. 
On March 21st the Germans attacked at the point of/ 
junction of the French and British Armies, looking for great 
results from their separation. They are still looking for 
them. But as it was a matter of concern to them to sever 
the connection between the two afmies, it was also a matter 
of concern that the junction point where the connection 
was made should be a weak one. Is it necessarily a weak 
one ? The common belief that it is is erroneous. The 
junction between the armies of two great Powers may be 
the centre of their common defensive system and thus 
become its strongest point. I am persuaded that during 
May, 1918, the Amiens region, where the point of junction 
between the French and the British forces was situated, 
was in this condition and was one of the strongest sectors 
of the front. 
What, then, are the conditions under which the area of 
junction between two allies may be a point of weakness, 
rendering their separation both easy and profitable ? The 
one and sufficient condition is that the interests of the two 
allies should be divergent, and that the danger quarters 
which they are anxious to protect should be .in opposite 
directions. In April, 1796, Bonaparte, on the Apennines, 
had the Sardinian Army, commanded by Colli, confronting 
him on his left, and the Austrian Army, under Beaulieu, 
confronting him on his right. He struck at the point of 
junction. Why ? Because the interests of the two allies 
were divergent. Colli's one concern was to protect Turin, 
Beaulieu's to protect Alessandria. In the event of a reverse 
tliey would assuredly separate. That was Bonaparte's own 
remark. His task was further greatly facilitated by the 
fact that the two commanders opposed to him were indepen- 
dent of each other. 
Now let us return to the year 1918 and to the circumstances 
obtaining now, and let us assume that it was the enemy's 
plan to separate the French and the British armies. How 
might he hope to weaken the point of junction which it was 
his desire to break ? By giving each of his adversaries 
reasons for ai)prehension in danger quarters that were eccen- 
tric and divergent. Where were these danger quarters ? 
A glance at the map shows that Calais satisfies the conditions 
m regard to the British armies, and Paris, or even Chalons, 
satisfies them in regard to the French armies. Consequently 
the best method by which the Germans could prepare a 
battle of Amiens was to divert the British reserves north- 
wards towards Flanders, and the French reserves south- 
westwards, between Paris and Kheims. Thus we see how, 
when the battle of March 21st failed to effect a separation 
between the arniies ofHaig and of Petain, and when, again, 
a resumption of the offensive on the same ground, at the 
confluence of the reserves of the Allies, appeared to present 
too great difficulties, the German High Command was led 
to attack upon the left and the right, with the object of 
making the Elnglish anxious about Calais, and the French 
about Paris, and with the object of inducing them to deflect 
their reserves upon these two points and so leaving the 
field clear for a new attack upon Amiens. 
It is not likely that the enemy's reasoning proceeded on 
such strict lines as these. In war things are far too complex 
to be reduced to simple formuke. But his line of thought 
must have been much the same. In any case, this is the 
explanation of the two flanking operations of April 9th in 
Flanders and May 27th on the Aisne, viewed as the prepara- 
tion for a new attack in the centre. It is further worth 
remarking that these diversions upon the flanks might 
themselves have produced important results, which is the 
necessary condition antecedent to the efficacy of a diver- 
sion. They still remain a serious menace, for they may 
form the jumping-off ground for important and perhaps 
associated operations. 
The Stroke against Italy 
The Austrian operation in Italy, begun on June 15th, 
has the same character of an eccentric diversion. The 
enemy, regarding General Diaz's forces as tlie right wing of 
the Allied Army as a whole, planned the mana,"uyre_ to cause 
the Allies apprehension about that wing and, in all pro- 
bability, to compel them to dispatch troops in that direction. 
In his speech on June i8th, M. Wekerle even went so iar as 
to classify the Austrian attack as a mere pinning-down 
engagement, and he pretended that the Austrian armies 
had obtained a strategic success since they had prevented 
the Italians from sending troops to France. ThAt, how- 
ever, is obviously comfort come too late. Besides, M. 
Wekerle did not deny that the original plan was of larger 
scope. 
As a matter of fact, in Italy, too, the idea was to carry out 
upon a wide front of about seventy-five miles an envelop- 
ment around the flanks. The Austrian right wing, formed 
by Schenchenstael's army, was to come down by the two 
banks of the Brenta ; the left wing, consisting of Wurm's 
army, was to cross the Lower Piave. ^Ne have seen that 
these vast enveloping operations, which were so popular in 
Germany at the beginning of the war, are almost never 
crowned with success. It is very seldom that the two claws 
of the pincers succeed in closing. On this occasion it was 
the right claw that did not clos'e. After the first day, despite 
a measure of success, it was manifest that the battle was 
lost for the Austrians upon the Brenta : the XlVth British 
Corps, the Xllth French Corps, and the Italian troops had 
barred the road into the plain on that side. 
Now, not only did the Austrians attack upon a dispro- 
portionate front — in all, they engaged seventy regiments in 
a line of seventy-five miles — but the nature of the country 
did not permit of communication between their two wings. 
The mass of reserve, consisting of the IVtli Army brought 
