July 25, 1918 
Land & Water 
frum Rumania, was assembled in the plain behind the left 
wing, with no possibility of moving to the assistance of the 
right wing. As a matter of fact, this mass of reserve' does 
not seem to have come into action, and the Austrians brought 
about their own defeat by employing only half of their forces 
in the battle — the most gross blunder that a general staff 
can commit. 
The defeat of the right wing wrecked the entire scheme, 
which was based upon concentric progress of the two wings. 
However, the left wing, upon the Piave, achieved some 
rather important successes ; it crossed the Piave at two 
points, between which it then established lateral connection, 
thus forming a vast bridge-head nearly twenty miles in 
width and four to five in depth. Moreover, the centre, 
consisting of the Vlth Army, under the Archduke Joseph, 
had also achieved a success. In front of it, on the other 
side of the Piave, was a broad hill formatitjn, rounded and 
flattened like the back of a tortoise, and covered witii acacias. 
This was called the Montello, and it was held by the Vlllth 
Italian Army, commanded by General Pennella. The arch- 
duke succeeded in throwing three divisions upon this range. 
If he occupied the whole of it, the Italian right wing (the 
Ilird Army, of the Duke of Aosta), already driven back 
upon the Lower Piave, would be in danger of having its left 
tlank turned. Thus the battle, which the Austrians had 
lost upon their right wing on the Hrenta, might be re-won 
upon their centre on the Montello and upon their left wing 
on the F,ower I'iave. 
But, on the other hand, this centre and this left wing 
were in the unfavourable position of fighting with their 
backs to the Piave. All their reinforcements and all their 
supplies had to come across the river. At this moment 
terrihc rainstorms swelled the stream. The Austrians had 
thrown three bridges across the river; the one highest up 
the stream was washed away and the two below it were 
broken by its debris. The engineers tried in vain to repair 
them under the fire of the Italian guns. The Austrians 
made a desperate attempt to gain ground and drive the 
Italian batteries out of range of the river. They failed. 
Then, on the night of the 22nd — 23rd, they carried out a 
fighting retreat and recrossed to the eastern bank of the 
Piave. They only kept some bridge-heads on its lower 
reaches, in the hope of launching new attacks from there 
at a later date. But these bridge-heads also were recaptured 
by the Italians, who thus made the safety of their right 
wing absolutely secure. 
. This battle is likely to stand out in history as an example 
of that mediocrity of command of which the Austrians have 
given so many proofs. Aftack upon too wide a front, lack 
of lateral communication between the different parts of the 
army, diffusion of effort, giving battle with back to a river, 
employment of only a part of the forces available, all the 
classic blunders that a general can commit were committed 
by the generals of the Emperor Charles, under the eyes of 
their sovereign. 
What the consequences of this operation may be to the 
progress of the war as a whole, it is not easy to say. It is 
unlikely that the Austrian Army will soon be in a condition 
to renew it? effort. Moreover, its present position, upon a 
concave arc with poor communications, permits of its being 
kept under observation by inferior forces. The Italian 
Army, with its reserves massed in the plain and able to be 
moved easily and by short roads, has an advantage over 
its adversary which can be construed in economy of man- 
power. That, at least, is the inference which analogous 
situations throughout all history permit us to draw. Never- 
theless, the Austrian Army is not destroyed. One half of 
its divisions in Italy has not been engaged. What is more, 
according to the latest information it was keeping a mftss 
of some ten divisions in Tyrol, able to move with equal case 
to either the P'renoli or the Italian front. It would be pre- 
mature, therefore, to driw any conclusion. 
Thus we may state it as a fact that in the campaign which 
opened on the first day of spring the enemy has failed to 
accomplish his original strategical plans and also those 
which he endeavoured to substitute for them afterwards, 
in themselves evidence of his growing embarrassment. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that he has gained a great deal 
of ground, taken a large number (jf prisoners, and won some 
important successes. He owes these successes to a new 
method of tactics which it behoves us now to examine. 
During the course of this war new methods of tactics have 
been invented on several occasions. In 1915 the Allies 
conceived the idea of the battle of assault, with unlimited 
objective, intended to swamp the enemy line, the attacking 
waves passing between the central points of resistance. In 
if)i6, on the contrary, the idea was the battle with limited 
objectives, consisting of a series of advances upon points 
previously pulverised by the artillery. It was no longer a 
matter of penetration, but of compelling the enemy to submit 
to pulverisation, division by division, upon a selected ground. 
The battle of the Somme was of this type. In 1917 the 
Germans reverted to the battle of penetration, but they 
had perfected the tactical method of achieving the penetra- 
tion. They tested the new system in the beginning of Septem- 
ber, 1917, at Riga, under the control of General von Hutier, 
and again two months later at Caporetto, under the control 
of General Otto von Below; When the theory had thus 
been tested they sent these two generals to France with 
two new armies, the XVIIIth and the XVIIth, and they 
tried it on a large scale on March 21st, 1918, on the 
Somme. 
Every one knows in what the method consists. Care is 
taken not to alarm the enemy by a preliminary massing of 
troops. These are brought to the scene of action at the 
appointed day by a series of night marches, carefully con- 
cealed. A siiort, but exceedingly violent, bombardment 
opens tlu- road to them. They do not hesitate to cross a 
no man's land of considerable width. (At Verdun, in 1916, 
the Germans attacked from more than a thousand yards 
from the French, without any parallels.) The head of the 
columns is formed of picked elements armed with light 
machine guns and light minenwerfer . Gaps are thus made, _ 
as if by hard points, over a limited area, through which 
columns immediately diverge, attempting to reach and en- 
velo]) the defenders of the adjoining sectors. The units 
have great independence of action and manoeuvre as circum- 
stances require. Rockets, indicating a weak spot in the 
enemy's position, immediately brifig the next columns to 
that point. The artillery follows close on the heels of the 
infantry. And so the whole army, by an intricate and 
intelligent operation, filters into the enemy position, turns 
all resistance, and advances without a check. Even in actions 
of secondary magnitude the advance should extend beyond 
the positions of the enemy's heavy guns, more than five miles, 
that is to say. In actions of the first magnitude the advance 
has penetrated more than thirty-seven miles in France and 
more than sixty in Italy. 
To this new method of tactics a new parrj' had to be 
opposed, and the whole problem of the future can be stated 
in the question : Has that parry been devised ? It must be 
understood by every one that we are compelled to speak 
with the utmost reserve, and that anythiiig like complete 
treatment of the question would be most inopportune at 
present. Here, however, are a few facts. 
Use of Reserves 
In the first place, when the enemy has begun his process 
of rapid infiltration into and penetration of conquered posi- 
tions, it becomes exceedingly difficult to stop him. WJiere ' 
shall the reserves that are being sent against him be deployed ? 
It is not known where he is, and the reserves are overrun before 
the}' have taken up their battle formation. That is exactly 
what happened upon the Lys for several days. The same 
thing occurred between the Aisne and the Marne". When 
the first positici^ns have once been lost a considerable advance 
by the enemy must be expected. It is the .exact antithesis of 
what happened in 1916, when, after having captured the 
enemy's first positions, one was almost sure of being brought 
to a halt immediately afterwards. On September 12, 1916, 
at Bouchavesnes, only one German trench, called Govern- 
ment Trench, remained before the French. When they 
tried to carry it on the following, morning, they found that 
the whole terrain had been put into defensive condition 
during the night and they were unable to advance. Lines 
were coming into being behind the captured lines. So at 
that time it was reasonable to think that an assailant 
could be checked step by step. It is ntet the same in the 
battles of to-day. Now it is essential that the offensive 
should be crushed before it has had its initial success ; other- 
wise it becomes very difficult to contain it. The old French 
doctrine, based upon the idea of security, recovers its full 
validity. 
Now, although the enemy does not assemble his troops 
beforehand, and although while they are ap)proaching the 
battlefield in silence and by night marches they are com- 
paratively invulnerable, the moment, nevertheless, arrives 
when, they must forsake the road to take up their battle 
formations. Close to the front line there are natural places 
d'armes where they must assemble, lines of progress they 
must follow, narrow passes they must use, ditches and 
gullies they must cross. That is where the enemy is sure of 
being met with. That is where he must be struck, at the 
very first warning, met with the gun-fire of a counter-pre- 
paration which shall disorganise his attack before it has had 
