July 25, 19 18 
Land & Water 
1 1 
The Bombing of Zeebriigge: By A. Pollen 
A Problem in Gunnery Technique 
^ MONGST tlic questions which correspondents 
/^L have put to me is one, as to which it seems a 
/ ^ good man\' people wish for information. It 
/~~^L relates to "the. condition of things at Zeebriigge 
•*- -^-and Ostend. 
It is getting on for two nifniths sincp Zeebriigge was blocked, 
ancl six weeks since the gallant Vindictive was sunk across 
the fairway at Ostend. It is evident from the (i.H.CX cinn- 
mimiqiies dealing with the activity of our aircraft, that the 
Germans are dredging away like furv at the first of these 
ports, while at Ostend, as we know, the port is not com- 
pletely blocked. We seem to be keeping up a constant 
bombardment of Zeebriigge, presumably to impede dredging 
operations and other attempts to restore the port to its 
former utility. I am asked why it is necessarv to do this 
work by aeroplane. Why bombardment by naval guns, 
directed by aeroplanes, would not be far more effective, 
because far more accurate. Aerial photographs have long 
since given us the exact location of every target, and surely, 
one correspondent says, if naval guns have anything like the 
accuracy of long-range guns used on shore, it would be possi- 
ble to find these targets and pound them to pieces with very 
few rounds. Should it not indeed be possible to destroy 
these bases altogether by means of ships' artillery ? It is 
understood that the advantage monitors have over battle- 
ships is that they are virtually safe from torpedoes and 
mines. Why then can they not destroy, not onlv Zeebriigge 
and Ostend, but the other German ports as well? We used 
constantly to be told that one of the chief faults of the old 
regime at Whitehall was that it refused to take the offensive 
at sea, and critics on both sides of the Atlantic, in deploring 
this omission in the past, have led us to expect that a re- 
vivified W'hitehall would do something striking along this 
line. Is it not here that sea-power could best be used ? 
A Problem in Amphibious War 
The first point to make clear in aiiswering these questions 
is that the destruction of sea bases^as distinguished from 
their temporary disablement — can never be effected by a 
purely naval operation. The only final way of destroying 
a base is to silencie and occupy the forts that protect it, and 
then, under cover of a sea bombardment, to sweep the 
minefields, and enter the port and blow up everything in sight. 
The first stage of the operations is to silence the forts and 
the improvised const defences ; then next to land troops to 
prevent their re-occupation, until the destruction is completed 
and the force disembarked, if it is insufficient to hold the base 
permanently. Thp taking of the German harbours is thus 
essentially a militarj' operation in which the Navy would 
supply the transport and the artillery. Gallipoli remains an 
awful warning of what must happen if an undertaking of 
this kind is treated as naval only. The complaining layman 
may be quite sure that no British critic nor American 
strategist has ever urged the repetition of so unpromising 
an undertaking. Whether it should be attempted as a 
joint naval and military operation is another question 
altogether. 
If it were determined to devote the numbers of men and 
ships required for such an undertaking to this business, it 
must be remembered that there is one enormously powerful 
— and purely technical — naval argument against it, and it 
is this : Success would turn upon tha artillery of the ships 
being able to destroy the trenches and concrete gun positions 
defending the coast. Can ships' guns silence and destroy 
the guns in a fort before the guns in a fort have silenced and 
destroyed the ships ? There is only one element in a fleet's 
favour in a contest of this kind. It can bring into the field 
the vastest number of guns, and those far more powerful 
than the forts can employ against them. Twenty of the 
most powerful British Dreadnoughts could bombard the forts 
that protect Wilhelmshaven with about a hundred and 
eighty guns of 15-inch, 13.5-inch, and 12-inch calibre, while 
exposed to the lire of far fewer guns of inferior calibre. But 
here every element of superiority ends, and for the following 
reasons : 
I. Guns on shore can be, and nearly always are, mounted 
to give extremes of elevation rarely if ever used in ships. 
Hence the range of fort guns is always likely to exceed the 
range of ships' guns. It would be an error, therefore, to 
suppose that a sliip, armed with 15-inch weapons, could 
attack a fort anni'd with u or even ii-inch weapons, with 
any prospect of doing so from a point out of reach of tlie 
enemy's projectiles. 
2. To knock out a gtm in a modern fort, it is almost neces- 
sary to hit the gun itself — a feat in accurate firing of quite 
incredible difficulty. Whereas, to hit a ship from the fort 
demands hardly UKjre than a himdredth of the same exacti- 
tude, and few, if any, ships would remain in fighting trim 
after twenty or more ii-incli high explosive shells had 
plunged tlirough their unprotected decks, as they do at 
long ranges. The ship, in other words, is a target not only 
a hundred times as large as a fort, but a hundred times 
more vulnerable. ■ 
3. Next, it is infinitely easier for the fort to obtain perfect 
accuracy in hitting, than for a ship to do so. Superior 
efficiency in long-range gun-fire, assuming accuracy of aim, 
steadiness of platform, and all other elements to be equal, 
is entirely a function of the observation of fire. In a contest 
of ship against fort the other elements are, of course, never 
equal. The advantage in every respect is with the fort. 
But far greater than all is its advantage in observing and 
correcting fire. For, whether the ship spots from the mast- 
head or by aeroplane, or employs another ship at right 
angles to the line of fire, and opposite the target, it still 
remains that the point of impact of each shot is extra- 
ordinarily difficult to see. But every round that misses a 
ship plunges into the water right or left, or over or short, 
and sends a vast, tall column of water into the air, so that if 
observers are rightly placed, the error in the firing of each 
round can instantly be detected. 
4. But this is not the worst of it. Nine out of ten forts 
that guard channels and minefields are altogether invisible 
from the sea, whereas the ship stands four square to the 
winds of heaven, a clear and definite mark for the range- 
finders and gunners and observers on shore. The fort may 
lie behind a sand dune or low hill, and its guns be aimed and 
corrected from points literally miles away from it. 
5. If, by the help of aeroplanes, the ships' guns do find 
the target, the ship itself must not move from the spot from 
which it is firing, because to do so would mean losing the 
aiming line to the target, which it has discovered with so 
much difficulty. The final handicap of the ship then is 
that it must be stationary while it is bombarding. 
6. This handicap is not limited to the favour it gives to the 
fort's gunners. It makes it an ideal target for torpedo 
attack from submarines. There is all the world of difference 
between protecting a ship from submarine attack when going 
at high speed, and protecting one that is anchored and 
stationary. A ship going fast can be made almost safe by 
its manoeuvres alone. The sinking of Triumph and Majestic 
off GaUipoli shows that even the most strenuous efforts by 
destroyers may fail to save a ship that has no movement at all. 
Turning the Tables 
Until, therefore, means .are found and adopted by which 
a ship, once having found the position of a fort, can keep its 
guns trained on that invisible position and alter the range 
on the sights, as the ship's manceuvres cause that range 
to change — so that a ship, while manoeuvring freely and at 
high speed can, so to speak, and by automatic processes, 
keep firing at an invisible mark exactly as if she were stand- 
ing still — until this is done, no kind of equality between 
ship and fort can be restored. And until the equality is 
brought about, no operation which depends upon the 
destruction of the forts as a necessary preliminary to all its 
subsequent phases can be undertaken, except at a risk which 
is literally prohibitive. It would not be just risking ships 
— it would be throwing them away. We must recog- 
nise, in short, that the chief fighting ships, as thej' are 
equipped to-day, are built to fight other ships in the open sea 
and for no other purpose whatever. 
But let us also not forget that, when means are adopted 
by which a ship can engage in indirect fire while manoeu- 
vring at high speed, then the tables will be turned, for those 
who direct the fire from the fort's guni^ will never be able to 
anticipate which way the ship is going to turn next, nor to 
foretell the changes in her speed. They will be reduced to 
guess-work, so that they will be able to hit, if at all, by chance 
only. But the fort, on the other hand, must stay where 
it is found. It will still, of course, have the advantage of 
being really vulnerable over only a small area. But it will 
have lost its powers of offence. 
