Land & Water 
August I, iqi8 
tlie service demanded of it even in this war. Should it be 
rut however, there still remained the less serviceable sccond- 
arv' line marked 2-2 on the sketch, and passing through 
Sezanne The enem\-, from about June ist, when he reached 
the Marne- had cut the main railway for some miles abcvve 
Chateau-Thierrv. (or it lay directly under his K"ns He 
therefore imposed a considerable strain upon tlv? Allied 
communications from that day to the opening of his offensive 
six weeks later. When the offensive failed, there failed with 
it the hope of cutting the second line and modifying to our 
disadvantage the whole Allied front. But so long as eneniy 
troops remained on the Marne above Chateau- Thierry in the 
neighbourhood of Dormans the main line was still unusable, 
;md this is one example of the advantages the enemy could 
use bv holding on to as muoh as possible in this salient and 
of the soundness of our theorv that throughout the greater 
part of last week he intended so to hold if he possibly could, 
What prevented his doing so was the French and American 
advance upon l.a Fere. It was the threat to La Fere 
which brought on tVie fourth stage in this confused story 
and decided the German commanders finally to retire 
upon a large scale. The whole thing is a remarkably, com- 
pact lesson in strategy, and deserves detailyd examina- 
tion frcnn the reader. I accompany it by the large Sketch 
Map 2. , , 1 
Here the reader will see the line the enemy was holding 
as late as Thursdav, Julv 25th. He will further see how, 
between the points" A and B, on the e.xtreme south of his 
great salient, that is along a front of some ten miles, more 
like twelve with all its windings, the great railway to the Itast 
was dominated by the enemy guns on the north of the Kiver 
Marne and completely cut. 
H we look at the communications of the salient we are at 
once struck bv the fact that the chief centre of communica- 
t'.ons is the little town of La Fere. More than half of his 
forces must, if thev retire, retire b\- roads which ultimately 
take him through this junction. It is, at the same time, his 
railhead and though there is no tlirough communication to 
the north now that the junction of Soissons is cut, a certain 
amount of rolling stock lemaining cut oft between that point 
and 1 a Fere could be used for movements within the salient. 
He had certain second-class roads" leading north on the 
western side of the salient bv which he could there retire ; 
but vou cannot. withdraw half of your forces alone, and if 
I a Fere should go evervthing must go. The enemy put a 
very heavv weight, therefore, into the defences of this vita 
point losing the railwav, he pushed up -all he could to hold 
OuIoJiv-le-Chateau, and kept a strong bulge there for several 
days Meanwhile, he organised the wood in front of La 
Fere south of the railway, and attempted to hold there. 
The events of Thursdav and Fridav in this region were' the 
decisive ones which compelled retirement everywhere else. 
The French and Americans, by sheer hard fighting and 
against a very strong defence, got north and soutli of Oulchy- 
le-Chateau in the course of Thursday, the 25th. Upon 
Fridav, the 26th, the Germans found that little salient too 
dangerous and went out of it, leaving some 200 wounded to 
fall into the hands of the French. On the same day, to the 
south of the town, the Americans pushed well forward into 
the wood (marked C On the map), and by the evening Fere 
was within .j,ooo yards of the Allied artillery. This decided 
what was to follow. When darkness fell upon Friday, the 
order to retire was given, and all during that night the whole 
German front, from the Ourcq right away to the Wood of 
Courton, began to fall back. The line of the Marne was 
abandoned, Bv Sunday night the Allies found the enemy, 
roughly, upon the line indicated by the crosses on Sketch 
Map 2". The French were in La Fere, and the whole salient 
was flattening down to some line of resistance behind, which 
is yet to be discovered. 
Can Submarines Combine?: By Arthur Pollen 
L.\ST week the naval news was on balance excep- 
tionally interesting and satisfactory. There were 
certain casualties, an armed liner sunk, a destroyer 
ashore, the Justicia, one of the largest steamers 
afloat, torpedoed. But, except the last, they were 
casualties of a not unusual kind. All the other news was 
excellent. The seaplane raid on Tondern means, of course, 
much more than that a certain number of bombs have been 
dropped on Zeppelin sheds. A very considerable naval 
expedition has once more gone right- into German waters, 
and the enemy has not dared to interfere with it by any of his 
naval forces." The return of ships lost by submarine in the 
month of June is the lowest for a very long time. The rate 
of loss is in point of fact only two-thirds of what it was in 
the quarter before the ruthless campaign began, and only 
one-third of what the loss was at its worst a year ago. The 
first is a striking comparison for, as we know, ruthlessness 
doubles the rate of success. The figures, therefore, are a 
testimony to the progress of the counter-campaign as eloquent 
as they can well be. If we could leave them to speak for 
themselves, their message woiild ■seem to be that the situ- 
ation is as satisfactory as it can possibly be and as likely to 
improve. But this, for reasons which I will explain, is a 
matter as to which we should be on our guard. We have had, 
too, the privilege of entertaining Mr. Hoover in this country 
— a man whose splendid worth would have been wasted had 
the U-boat not been got under. His brief and modest 
account of America's efforts to produce food and conserve 
it showed us that, if we could protect or build the ships, 
America is not only willing but able to feed one-third of the 
population of France, Italy, and Great Britain. This is 
a fact that reflects enormous credit on Mr. Hoover and the 
department of government which he created. But I think 
the real credit, and I am sure Mr. Hoover would not dispute 
this, lies with his fellow-citizens. The American Food Con- 
troller came to his task fresh from the vision of famine in 
Belgium. He appealed to his fellow-countrymen to grow more 
wheat, to breed more beeves and swi^ne, to eat less food and 
to waste none. In a country where wages are high, and 
returns on capital lavish, and food cheap, a liberal habit of 
life had become general, and a certain large prodigality 
seemed natural to so wealthy and hospitable a people. But 
Mr. Hoover had seen hunger naked and merciless, and his 
appeal met with an instant response. In an incredibly 
small number of weeks the domestic ways of every American 
household, from the richest to the poorest, were changed. 
There was one detail in this campaign which struck me very 
forcibly. Mr. Hoover suggested that Americans should 
eat corn bread themselves and give up the bulk of the wheat 
flour to Fluropeans. 
Corn bread is, no doubt, excellent, but no one prefers it to 
the best wheat bread. But our guest only had to say, " You 
know how to make corn bread and you Hke it. Europeans 
cannot make it and do not like it. Give up the wheat." 
Well, as a fact they did, and millions of tons, far beyond 
the extra production, have thus become available for our con- 
sumption. The value of this act goes far beyond the added 
supply of wheat flour. It is a mark of Americans in the mass 
to see things simply and to feel them deeply. The war has 
made a real fellowship between them and their Allies in 
Europe. 
This self rationing was carried through in the spirit of 
a family that economises for the sake of a brother in mis- 
fortune. It should excite not only gratitude but affection. 
We see the fortunate result in the promise of better bread, 
more edible meat and unrationed bacon. Never were the 
chances of the country starving so far away. It must be 
galling to the Germans, just when their ratiqns are at the 
lowest. And it is wonderful to reflect that our more com- 
fortable prospects coincide with a 400 or 500 per cent, 
increase in the shipping of American infantry to France. 
The world's debt to America for supplying the food and the 
men, and to the Navy for protecting the ships that bring them, 
and to the builders who replace the tonnage unfortunately 
lost, is immense. It can he measured by the difference 
between victory and defeat. 
It is small wonder, then, that we were all ^inclined to be 
in very optimistic mood this last week, and by what seemed 
a felicitous chance, there was added for our gratification 
the announcement that the destroyer Marne had sunk a 
submarine, just as our Allies were marching victoriously 
across the river of the same name ! But two days later our 
complacency was somewhat disturbed. The 32,000 ton liner, 
Justicia, a priceless unit in the vital business of bringing the 
American Army to Europe, convoyed and escorted as her value 
demanded was, we were told, submarined on July 19th, in 
circumstances of a very peculiar kind. She had maintained 
a battle, we heard, for twenty-four hours against a veritable 
fleet of submarines. Some accounts said eight or ten. One 
witness, after a week's reflection, decided that it was only 
seven. The ship was hit early in the affray, but was got 
under tow and was making for a north of Ireland port, when, 
after defeating attack after attack, a final salvo did the 
business. ' 
