August 8, 191 8 
Land & Water 
in men and guns, bring him probably to within long range of 
Paris, with all the pohtical effect a bombardment might 
have. But, apart from this, it would continue the war of 
movement, further shake the Allied defensive line, and 
leave everything ready for a last main attack elsewhere 
■ which should break it altogether. Meanwhile, his Austrian 
ally, now free to bring to bear nearly the whole ol his forces 
against the ItaUans, should come down from tlie mountains 
and cut the Italian communications in the plain upon the 
Italian left flank, at the same time holding the main front 
by forcing the Piave. 
The first moves in this plan opened upon Sunday, June gth, 
against the western side of what I have called .the Compiegne 
saUent, all the way from Montdidier to Noyon, and the 
action has been termed, from the little river running through 
its centre, the Battle of the Matz. Probably because the 
enemy believed that his opponents were more exhausted 
than was actually the case, he attempted upon this occasion 
no surprise, and depended solely upon his weight of men 
and guns, and upon that new tactic of his which' had hitherto 
never failed when employed upon a large scale. For tlie 
first time since he had used that tactic it broke down. There 
was no breaking of the line ; nothing but a short advance 
in the centre, which gave him the Lassigny Hills, followed 
on the third day of the battle by so sharp a French counter- 
stroke on the left as stopped him dead. He had failed to 
reduce the saUent o.f Compiegne, and he broke off the battle. 
All this, however, was but preliminary to his main effort. 
His first attack on the Matz had not been undertaken with 
more than sixteen divisions, nor was it measured over a 
sector of much more than twenty miles. He may have put 
in before he broke off the battle nearly thirty divisions, but 
the thing was not upon the scale of his past efforts. He was 
reserving himself for a main blow elsewhere. Meanwhile, 
the attack of his Allies against the Italians upon the Piave 
line had developed. It was six days after the opening of 
the Battle of tbe Matz — upon Saturday, June 15th — that 
the Austro-Hungarian blow was struck from the mountains 
and across the Piave River. Most of the French and English 
troops sent to relieve the Italians in the earlier months had 
been withdrawn ^o reinforce the imperilled line in France ; 
such 4S were left were upon the Asiago Plateau. Their 
effort, coupled with that of the Italians to their right and 
left, completely shattered in the first twenty-four hours the 
enemy's attempt to come down from the mountains upon 
the Italian communications, which manoeuvre alone could 
have had a decisive result. By Sunday, the 16th, the battle 
had changed into a secondary operation incapable of decisive 
result and aiming (jnly at pushing back the Itahans on their 
main front on the Piave ; possibly of uncovering Venice. 
It completely failed. In exactly a week after the first attack 
—upon Saturday, June 22nd — the Austrians broke off this 
great battle for which they had prepared seventy and per- 
haps already engaged fifty divisions, and fell back across the 
Piave. Their abortive attack was to cost them over 20,000 
prisoners and their remaining prestige in this field. 
The story of the war, then, during this month of June 
has been one negative and undecided. But, at any rate, a 
turning of the tide has come, compared with the series 
of inconclusive but very great successes won by the 
enemy during all the preceding months. It would be at 
once bold and inaccurate to say that this apparent balancing 
of forces during June, in Italy as in France, was proof of any 
great coming change in the a^^iiect of the field. Very large 
forces remained intact for a renewed main offensive on the 
part of the enem\' ; tli^ Allied Higher Command still kept 
strictly to its r61e. of unmoving defence, varied only by little 
local actions designed to strengthen portions of the front. 
The real change in the whole aspect of affairs was not to 
come until a moment only just pr^pr to the writing of these 
lines. 
The German Higher Command waited six weeks from their 
check upon the Matz before striking their blow. They 
massed a full fifty divisions, of which more than twenty-five 
were in the front line, and the rest immediately in reserve. 
They were prepared, in case of success, to call up, as they 
had done four months before in March, more forces from the 
north to reap the full fruits of their success. They accumu- 
lated a mass of material equal to that of their first attack, 
and upon Monday, July 15th, they suddenly struck along a 
front of more than fifty miles from near the Argonne to 
Chateau-Thierry. 
Strategic Reversal 
My readers are familiar with what followed. Its conse- 
quences are still developing as I write. As early as the 
evening of that same first day — Monday, July 15th— it was 
clear to the French Command that the offensive had failed 
from Rheims eastward. The new system of defence organised 
by General Gouraud came as a complete surprise to the 
enemy ; caused him 50,000 casualties — a full fifth of his 
forces in Ijne and reserve — with absolutely no strategic or 
even tactical result. No prisoners fell to him save the 
scattered advanced elements which had sacrificed themselves 
in pursuance of this plan of a defensive in depth, nor a 
single gun. Upon the other sector, from Rheims westward, 
the enemy, having crossed the Marne with eight divisions, 
penetrated from three to four miles south of that river, was 
struck on his extreme right by the new American con- 
tingents, and stopped altogether. On his left, towards 
Epernay, he attempted, during the two days following 
— Tuesday and Wednesday — a painful advance. With dawn 
of Thursday, the i8th, he was completely surprised by a 
blow of the utmost violence struck in secrecy and with very 
great success by General Mangin, in command of French and 
American troops, all the way from Cutry southwards 
for more than twenty miles. 
By half-past ten of that Thursday morning — the attack 
having begun at dawn-^the whole strategic situation was 
turned inside out as you may turn a glove. The German 
offensive had completely broken down. The enemy was 
losing men and guns rapidly. He found himself congested 
in a pocket less than thirty miles broad by nearly thirty 
deep, wherein thirty-five divisions were struggling furiously 
to preserve their chances of retirement. By Friday night 
he was compelled to bring back all whom he had put across 
the Marne. The initiative had passed from his hands to 
that of the Allies, and in the succeeding ten djlys (these lines 
are written upon Sunday, July 28th) his action has been 
one, continued, difficult congested attempt to save himself 
in the bulge where he is being perpetually pressed in and in, 
mile by mile, with daily loss of prisoners, guns, and ground. 
He has already thrown into this battle, now turned from 
an offensive into a defensive, probably over sixty divisions ; 
and, meanwhile, the American contingents, whose number 
he probably under-estimated, and whose qua4ity he certainly' 
did, continue to gi-ow. 
The Roads of France 
B>- C. R. W. Nevinson 
