i8 
Land & Water 
August 15, 19 1 8 
Talaat and von Kiihlmann 
K.Uhlmann was in 191^ in Constantinople, 
acting as go-bctwci-n ^in peace negotiations. 
liiin into frequent conflict with Enver and Talaat ; they told 
me many times that they could not control him. It was 
for this reason that, as I have said, they were glad to see him 
go — not that they really expected him to capture the Suez 
Canal and drive out the English. Incidentally this appoint- 
ment fairly indicated the incongruous organisation that then 
existed in Turkey. As Minister of Marine, Djemal's real place 
was at the Navy Department ; instead of that the head of the 
Navy was sent to lead an army over the burning sands of 
Syria and Sinai. 
Yet, Djemal's expedition . represented Turkey's most 
spectacular attempt to 
assert its military power 
ai^ainst the Allies. As 
Djemal moved out of 
the station, the whole 
Turkish populace felt 
that an historic moment 
liad arrived. Turkey in 
fifty years had lost the 
greater part of her 
dominions, and nothing 
had more pained the 
national pride than tlie 
English occupation of 
Egypt. All during this 
occupation, Turkish 
suzerainty had been 
recognised ; as soon as 
Turkey declared war 
on Great Britain, how- 
ever, tiie British had 
ended this fiction and 
had formally taken over 
this great province. 
Djemal's expedition 
was Turkey's reply to 
this act of England. 
The leal purpose of 
the war, the Turkish 
people had been told, was to restore the vanishing empire of 
the Osmans and to this great undertaking the recovery of 
E^ypt was merely the first step. The Turks also knew that, 
under English administration, Egypt had become a prosperous 
country, and that it would, therefore, yield great treasure 
to the conqueror. It is no wonder that the huzzahs of the 
Turkish people followed the departing Djemal. 
About the same time Enver left to take command of 
Turkey's other great military enterprise — the attack on 
Russia through the Caucasus. Here also were Turkish 
provinces waiting to be "redeemed." After the war of 
1878, Turkey had been compelled to cede to Russia certain 
rich territories between the Caspian and the Black Sea, 
inhabited chiefly by Armenians, and it was this country 
which Enver now proposed to reconquer. But Enver had 
no ovation on his leaving. He went away quietly and 
unobserved. With the departure of tliese two men the war 
was now fairly on. 
Despite these martial enterprises, other than warlike 
preparations were now under way in Constantinople. At 
that time — in the latter part of 19 14— its external charac- 
teristics suggested nothing but war, yet now it suddenly 
became the great headquarters of peace. The EngHsh Fleet 
was constantly threatening the Dardanelles, and every day 
Turkish troops were passing through the streets. Yet these 
activities did not chiefly engage the attention of the German 
?2mbassy. Wangenheim was thinking of one thing, and one 
thing only ; this fire-eating German suddenly became a man 
of peace." For he now learned that the greatest service 
which a German Ambassador could render his emperor would 
be to end the war on terms that would save Germany from 
ruin ; to obtain a settlement that would re-introduce his 
fatherland to the society of nations. 
In November, Wangenheim began discussing this subject. 
It was part of Germany's system, he told me, not only to 
be completely prepared for war, but also for peace. "A 
wise general who enters battle always has at hand his plans 
for a retreat, in case he is defeated," said the German Ambas- 
sador. "This principle applies just the same to a nation 
beginning war. There is only one certainty about war — 
and that is that it must end some time. So, when we plan 
our campaign for war, we must consider also a campaign 
for peace." 
But Wangenheim was interested then in something more 
tangible than this philosophic principle. Germany had 
immediate reasons for desiring the end of hostilities, and 
Wangenheim discussed them frankly and cynically. He 
said that Germany had prepared for only a short war because 
she had expected to crush France and Russia in two brief 
campaigns, lasting in all perhaps six months. Clearly this 
plain had failed, and there was little likelihood that Germany 
would win the war ; Wangenheim told me this in so many 
words. Germany, he added, would make a great mistake if 
she persisted in fighting the war to exhaustion, for such a 
fight would mean the permanent loss of her colonies, her 
mercantile marine, and her whole economic and commercial 
status. " If we don't get Paris in thirty days, we are beaten," 
WangenJieim had told me in August, and though his attitude 
changed somewhat after the battle of the Marne, he made no 
attempt to conceal the fact that the great rush campaign had 
collapsed, that all the Germans could now look forward to 
was a tedious exhausting war, and that all which they could 
obtain from the existing situation would be a drawn battle. 
"We have made a mistake this time," Wangenheim said, 
"in not laying in supplies for a protracted struggle; it was 
an error, however, that we shall not repeat ; next time we 
shall store up enough copper and cotton to last for five years." 
Germany Fears Turkey in Egypt 
Wangenheim had another reason for wishing an immediate 
peace, and it was a reason wliich shed much light upon the 
shamelessness of German diplomacy. The preparation which 
Turkey was making for the conquest of Egypt caused this 
German Ambassador much annoyance and anxiety. The 
interest and energy which the Turks had manifested in this 
enterprise were particularly causing him concern. Naturally 
I thought at first that Wangenheim was worried that Turkey 
would lose ; yet he confided to me that his real fear was that 
his ally would succeed. A victorious Turkish campaign in 
Egypt, Wangenheim explained, might seriously interfere with 
Germany's plans. Should Turkey conquer Egypt, naturally 
Turkey would insist at the peace table on retaining this great 
province, and would expect Germany to support her in this 
claim. But Germany had no intention then of promoting 
the re-establishment of the Turkish Empire. At that time 
she hoped to reach an understanding with England, the 
basis of which was to be something in the nature of a division 
of interests in the East. Germany desired, above all, to 
obtain Mesopotamia as an indispensable part of her Hamburg- 
Bagdad scheme. In return for this, she was prepared to 
give her endorsement to England's annexation of Egypt. 
Thus it was Germany's plan at that time that she and England 
should divide Turkey's two fairest dominions. This was one 
of the proposals which Germany intended to bring forth in 
the peace conference which Wangenheftn was now scheming 
for, and clearly Turkey's conquest of Egypt would have 
presented complications in the way of carrying out this plan. 
On the morality of Germany's attitude to her ally, Turkey, 
it is hardly necessary to comment. The whole thing was all 
of a piece with Germany's policy of "realism" in foreign 
relations. 
Von Kiihlmann arrives on the Scene 
Nearly all German classes, in the latter part of 1914 and 
the early part of 1915, were anxiously looking for peace, and 
they turned to Constantinople as the most promising spot 
where peace negotiations might most favourably be started. 
The Germans took it for granted that President Wilson would 
be the peace-maker ; indeed, they never for a moment 
thought of anyone else in this capacity. The only point 
that remained for consideration was the best way to approach 
the President. Such negotiations would most likely be con- 
ducted through one of the American Ambassadors in Europe. 
Obviously Germany had no means of access to the American 
Ambassadors in the great enemy capitals, and other circum- 
stances made it inevitable that she should turn to the American 
Ambassador in Turkey. 
At this time a German diplomat appeared in Constantinople 
who has figured much in recent history — Dr. Richard von 
Kiihlmann, at present Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the 
last five years Dr. von Kuhlmann has seemed to appear in 
that particular part of the world, where important confidential 
diplomatic negotiations are being conducted by the German 
Empire. Prince Lichnowsky has recently described his 
activities in London in 1913 and 1914, and he has figured 
even more conspicuously in the recent peace treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk. Soon after the war started Dr. von Kuhlmann 
came to Constantinople as Conseiller of the German F2mbassy, 
succeeding von Mutius, who had been called to the colours. 
For one reason his appointment was appropriate, for Kiihl- 
mann had been born in Constantinople, and had spent his 
earlj' life there, his father having been president of the 
Anatolian Railway. He therefore understood the Turks as 
onlv man can who has lived with them for many years. 
