August 15, 1918 
Land & Water 
19 
Personally he proved to be an interesting addition to the 
diplomatic colony. He impressed me as not a particularly 
aggressive, but a very lovable man ; he apparently wished 
to become friendly with the American Embassy, and he 
possessed a certain attraction for us all as I.e had just come 
from the trenches and gave us many vivid pictures of life 
forward to another greater world cataclysm than the present, 
he merely reflected the attitude of the dominant junker- 
military class. The Germans apparently wanted a recon- 
ciliation — a kind of an armistice — that would give their 
generals and industrial leaders time to prepare for the next 
conflict. At that time, nearly four years ago, Germany was 
at the front. At that time we were all ignorant of modern ' moving for practically the same kind of peace negotiations 
warfare, and Kiihlmann's details of trench fighting lield us ' 
spell-bound many an afternoon or evening. His other 
favourite topic of conversation was WeU-PoUlik, and on all 
foreign matters he struck me as remarkably well-informed. 
At that time we did not regard von Kiihlmann as an imptir- 
tant man, yet the industry with which he attended to his 
business arrested every one's attention even then. Soon, 
however, I began 
to have a feeling 
that he was exert- 
ing a powerful in- 
fluence in a quiet, 
velvety kind of 
way. Hesaid little, 
but I realised that 
he was listening 
to everything and 
storing all kinds of 
information away 
in his mind ;' he was 
apparently Wan- 
genheim's closest 
confidant, and the 
man upon whom 
the Ambassador 
■was depending 
for his contact 
with the German 
Foreign Office. 
About the middle 
of December, von 
Kuhlmann left for 
Berlin, where he 
stayed about two 
weeks. On his return, in the early part of January, 
1915, there was a noticeable change in the atmosphere of the 
German Embassy. Up to that time Wangenheim had dis- 
cussed peace negotiations more or less informally, but now 
iie took up the matter specifically. I gathered that Kiihl- 
mann had been called to Berlin to receive all the latest details 
.on this subject, and that he had come back with the definite 
instructions that Wangenheim should move at once. In all 
mv talks with the German Ambassador on peace, Kuhlmann 
was always hovering in the background ; at one most impor- 
tant conference he was present, though he participated 
hardly at all in the conversation, but his r61e, as usual, was 
that of a subordinate and quietly eager Hstener. 
January, 191 5, a Good Time to End the War 
Wangenheim now informed me that January, 1915, would 
make an excellent time to end the war. Italy had not yet 
entered, thougli there was every reason to beheve that she- 
would do so by spring, Bulgaria and Rumania were still 
holding aloof, though no one expected that their waiting 
attitude would last for ever. France and England were 
preparing for the first of the "spring offensives," and the 
Germans had no assurance that it would not succeed ; indeed, 
they much feared that the German armies would meet disaster. 
The British and French warships were gathering at the 
Dardanelles ; and the German General Staff and practically 
which slie has suggested many times since and is suggesting 
now ; Wangenheim's plan was that representatives of the 
warring powers should gather around a table and settle 
things on the principle of "give and take." He said that 
there was no sense in demanding that each side state its 
terms in advance. 
"For both sides to state their terms in advance would 
ruin the whole 
thing," he said. 
"What would we 
do ? Germany, of 
course, would 
make claims that 
the other side 
would regard as 
ridiculously ex- 
travagant. The 
Entente would 
state terms that 
would put all Ger- 
m my in a rage. 
As a result, both 
sides would get so 
angry that there 
would be no con- 
ference. No — if 
we really want to 
end' this war, we 
must have an 
armistice. Once 
we stop fighting, 
we shall not go at 
it again. History 
presents no in- 
stance in a great war where an armistice has not resulted 
in a permanent peace. It will be so in this case." 
Yet, from Wangenheim's conversation I did obtain a 
slight inkling of Germany's terms. The matter of Egypt 
and Mesopotamia, set forth above, was one of them. Wangen- 
heim was quite insistent that Germany must have permanent 
naval bases in Belgium with which her navy could at all 
times threaten England with blockade, and so make sure 
"the freedom of the seas." Germany wanted coaUng rights 
everywhere ; this demand looks absurd because Germany 
has always possessed such rights in peace times. She might 
give France a piece of Lorraine and a part of Belgium — per- 
haps Brussels — ^in return for the payment of an indemnity. 
Wangenheim requested that I should place Germany's 
case before the American Government. My letter to Wash- 
ington is dated January, 1915. It went fully into the internal 
situation which then prevailed, and gave the reasons why 
Germany and Turkey desired peace. 
A particularly interesting part of this incident was that 
Germany was apparently ignoring Austria. Pallavicini, the 
Austrian Ambassador, knew nothing of the pending negotia- 
tions until I myself informed him of them. In thus ignoring 
his ally, the German Ambassador meant no personal dis- 
respect ; he was merely treating him precisely as his Foreign 
Office was treating Vienna — not as an equal, but practically 
as a retainer. The world is familiar enough with Germany's 
military and diplomatic absorption of Austria-Hungary. 
Turkish Soldiers on Leave 
Dictating lettcrt to a'piiblic writer. Nearly 90 per cent, of the Turkish people are illiterate, 
3tni^ at a result, there is a reg ilar profession that earns its living reading and writing for them. 
all miUtary and naval experts in Constantinople beheved But that Wangenheim should have made so important a 
that the Allied fleets could force their way through and — — - ^" "'-^ ^ - „„„^.„*;„„. „„j u„..„ ^„u u *„ 
capture the city. Most Turks by this time were sick of the 
war and G«rmany lived in constant fear that Turkey would 
make a separate peace. Afterwards I discovered that when- 
ever the miUtary situation looked ominous to Germany she 
was always thinking about peace, but that if the situation 
improved she would immediately become warhke again ; it 
was a case of sick-devil, weU-devil. Yet, badly as Wangen- 
heim wanted peace in January, 1915, it was quite apparent 
that he was not thinking of a permanent peace. The greatest 
obstacle to peace at that time was the fact that Germany 
showed no signs that she regretted her crimes, and there was 
not the sUghtest evidence of the sack-cloth in Wangenheim's 
attitude now. Germany had made a bad guess, that was 
all • what Wangenheim and the other Germans saw in the 
situation was that their stock of wheat, cotton, and copper 
was incomplete. In my notes of my conversations with 
Wangenheim I find him frequently using such phrases as 
the "next war," "next time," and, in confidently looking 
move as to attempt peace negotiations, and have left it to 
Pallavicini to learn about it through a third party, shows 
that as "far back as January, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire had ceased to be an independent nation. 
Nothing came of this proposal, of course. Our Govern- 
ment declined to take action, evidently not regarding the 
time as opportune. Both Germany and Turkey, as I shall 
teU, recurred to this subject afterward. This particular 
negotiation ended in the latter part of March, when Kuhlmann 
left Constantinople to become Minister at The Hague. He 
came and paid his farewell call at the American Embassy, 
as charming, as entertaining, and as debonair as ever. His 
last words, as he shook my liand and left the building were — 
subsequently events have naturally caused me to remember 
them : 
"We shall have peace within three months. Excellency I " 
This little scene took place, and tliis happy forecast was 
made in March, 1915 ! 
{To be co:ttinu(d) 
