Land & Water 
August 2 2, 19 1 8 
THIRD BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
The consequence of this success is the opening of the third 
phase in the battle, which is rapid and conclusive. There is 
an immediate retirement by the enemy all along the line to 
the Vesle, and across the Vesle to the heights beyond. These 
positions are reached and firmly held by the. Saturday night 
and the Sunday, August 3rd and 4th, and upon those dates 
this great action may be said to terminate. During the 
brief interval of three days there was a good deal of foolish 
talk in the Press about the chances of the enemy's reacting 
elsewhere. Those who wrote thus did not appreciate what 
, the drain had been upon his immediate reserves, nor what 
losses he had suffered, nor at what a rate the American 
contingents were coming in, nor the tactical value of those 
contingents. Least of all did they appreciate the greatest 
point of all, which was that Marshal Foch, having now 
vigorously seized the initiative, would quite certainly do 
everything he could to keep it. His way of keeping'jt was 
manifest at daybreak of Thursday, August 8th, when the 
second great battle, which has been called the Third Battle 
of the Somme, began against the northern salient. 
This battle was opened by the British on the north, and 
the French on the south, upon a sector of rather less than 
twenty miles, stretching from the Lower Avre, at Moreuil, 
to Ville on the Ancre, the whole under the command of 
Sir Douglas Haig. Its object and method were precisely 
the same as those of the first blow upon July i8th. That is, 
it was a surprise blow delivered upon the left or north-western 
wing (the German right) of the great salient thrust into our 
lines \^th the object of compelling the enemy to fall back 
from that salient, capturing prisoners and material in great 
numbers during the operations, and, above all, of forcing 
him to draw rapidly upon his remaining reserves in order 
to save himself from disaster. 
I have seen it suggested in an article published in the 
Titms that the scheme and objects of the battle were other 
than this, and of greater scope ; in other words, that much 
more might have been done than was done. I conceive that 
theory to be a demDustrable error^not a matter of opinion. 
but a matter of evidence; and it seems to me deplorable, 
that such a suggestion should be made at such a moment. 
An action launched with very distinct objectives and with 
the conception of finality or decision behind it, could not 
conceivably have been "mounted" on a front of less than 
twenty miles — in the first effort barely fifteen — and with a 
strictly limited concentration of men. The readers of the 
Times ipay rest assured that when the decisive action does 
come it will be on a very different scale from this. 
That argument fi;om scale is quite sufficient, but there 
are a host of others. For instance, the fact that the scheme 
of the battle included a second operation on the other flank 
on the second day. That means the reduction of a salient 
— not a final breach, which could only be effected in one 
stroke. Again, the sector chosen proves the same thing 
— that the reduction of a salient alone was intended ; and 
again the refusal to draw on reserves. The thing is really self- 
evident. 
Discussion of strategy is not the business of the journalist. 
He is there to explain and record, not to criticise the 
operations of the higher command ; and it is surely a pity 
to present as a gift to the enemy public blame of the Army 
on the morrow of its greatest achievement. 
The action has had three phases : In the first, which covered 
only the first day, Thursday, August 8th, the enemy was taken 
completely by surprise ; the British advanced nine miles, and the 
French extended their small front towards Montdidier in the 
north. Unfortunately, the evening of this first day the Hill of 
Chipilly, commanding the main road eastward upon which 
the British advance depended, was retaken by the Germans. 
The second phase occupied the following days — Friday and 
Saturday. In the afternoon of the Friday, Chipilly Hill 
was retaken with the help of newly arrived American con- 
tingents, while the French, at the other end of the battle, 
threw in on this same Friday afternoon the remaining right 
wing of their first army south of Montdidier, and pressed it 
northward several miles before nightfall. They continued 
their advance during the night, arriving at dawn at Faverolles, 
and thus cutting the main road eastward out of Montdidier. 
Meanwhile the British advance had come on to the hill above 
''lyiaiiL La&ral communLcatCorv 
of AiUes -; I I I I 1 I I I I I I 
l:>uie on July- 1'^^ 1^18 ...♦♦.♦..♦♦. 
Line after- rediictwit oft^ ta^ 
salLe-nts, Aug. J 8^ i$i8.^ - . — - - • 
30 ic so '' '^fUes 
