August 2 2, 191 8 
Land & Water 
1 1 
If the reader will look at a chart of the XiTrth Sea, remem- 
bering that there is- a lively traffic passing between the 
Scottish and ScandinaviJin harbours ; that our plane-carrving 
ships, escorted in sufficient strength to make an attack on 
them by the German Fleet unlikely, appeared only a month 
ago within a hundred miles or so of Cuxhaven ; and that 
the waters between Emden and Calais are under constant 
patrol of destroyers, light craft, and aircraft, he can create 
a picture indicative of the constant pressure, the constant 
threat, that .British sea-power now holds over the enemv. 
A Decisive Change in Naval Policy 
The German impatience with the present conditions, then, 
is not limited to the gradual weakening of the submarine 
effort, nor to apprehensions that the completion of our 
mining programme may at any time negative that whole 
effort "quite suddenly. These are but one aspect of an 
initiative — as eager as it is skilful — ^that limits and annoys 
him at every point. All this makes it obvious enough that 
our forces at sea — anti-submarine, light craft, Grand Fleet, 
aircraft — are all working together with insistent energy and 
consistent success, that the enemy is cut off altogether from 
his old policy of raiding the East Coast towns with destroyers, 
and that our attacks and the frustration of his attacks are 
telling lamentably on the moral of tlie nation. Add to 
these that nf? person of sense in Germany believes in the 
submarine campaign now, and it will be realised that the 
enemy's Higher Command can certainly not lack motive for 
looking for a different, more vigorous, and a more sensational 
naval policy. 
All this is, of course, undeniable. It is not only obvious, 
but has long been obvious. But before we conclude that 
the German Fleet is certain to come out and exchange a 
policy of quiescence for a strategy of action, let us not over- 
look the fact that the conditions which have made the sea 
situation intolerable for Germany are exactly those which 
make her chances of success in a strategy of action so slender 
as to be non-existent. When the changes took place in the 
command of the Grand Fleet and in the control of the 
Admiralty in November, igif), I suggested at the time that 
the accession of Sir David Beatty to the leadership of our 
main sea forces was by far the more important event. This 
followed from the fact that the decisive element in sea war 
is the conduct of the main force, and nothing else. Now, 
the Germans know this as well as we do. When Scheer 
decided, on May 31st, to continue the action with Sir David 
Beatty's eight ships from a quarter to five till six, he must 
have known that it was on the cards that the Gran'd Fleet 
was out, and that it might come to Sir David Beatty's help. 
He continued the action because the German Staff of many 
years ago thought they had penetrated the British naval 
mind of that time, and had perceived that the doctrine of 
running no chances with the Grand Fleet was the foundation 
of our naval strategy. But he had, secondly, a more definite 
guidance. When, in January, 1915, Admiral Moore — who,. 
after Lion had been disabled, succeeded to the command of 
the battle cruiser force— broke off action with von Hipper 
because of the presence of submarines, the Germans took 
this to mean not only that he was acting on an accepted 
British principle that capital ships are not to be jeopardised, 
but that here was a particular form of risk^namely, torpedo 
risk — which was in no circumstances to be faced. The 
incident was complacently alluded to by the First Lord of 
the Admiralty in Parliament ; it mUst have appeared to the 
enemy that his judgment of our naval psychology was correct. 
Scheer, therefore, could contemplate: the meeting with the 
Grand Fleet with an absolute confidence that his torpedoes 
could prevent the encounter developing into a defeat. The 
event justified his forecast, and the doctrine acted on was 
set out in the British Commander-in-Chief's dispatch, was 
' trenchantly and indeed eloquently defended by his former 
civilian chief, and was categorically and unconditionally 
restated by Lord Jellicoe himself at the Fishmongers' 
banquet. The phrase in the dispatch was, as every one 
remembers, "the enemy opened the range under cover of 
torpedo attacks." Mr. Churchill put it more picturesquely : 
"to oppose the unprotected bellies of ships to the torpedo 
... is to seek paths to ruin." Lord Jellicoe's final statement 
of the creed was "the torpedo is effective up to 10,000 yards, 
and this requires that the ships shall keep beyond this dis- 
tance to fight her guns." It was, observe, an unconditional 
doctrine. 
But it is a doctrine that has gone the way of the other 
fallacies that were inherited from our peace-bred naval 
leadership. It is not the doctrine on which the present 
Commanddr-in-Chief acted either at Heligoland, or in his 
pursuit of von Hipper, or in any of the phases of the Jutland 
action. It is not to be supposed that it could find any place 
in the battle orders' with which the Grand Fleet is already 
familiar. What is' perhaps more to our purpose is that the 
Germans know as well as we do that this particular form of 
mental aberration is now extinct not only in the British 
Fleet, but in the British Higher Command. It must, there- 
fore, bei clear to them that if they challenge a naval action' 
they will find themseh'es involved in a mighty grim affair. 
In other words, the Germans know that the change which 
has bteen made in the submarine campaign and that the 
new strategy which we have initiated in the North and 
Narrow Seas indicate another change greater and more 
fundamental. Indeed, they probably realise the major 
revolution has not been caused bv tne lesser two already 
revealed to them, but that these, in fact, have been derived 
from it. Whatever the influences, then, that compel them 
to action, there is one consideration that must make them 
pause. A battle with the Grand Fleet will be their last 
action. 
Germiany's Last Adventure ? 
Can the enemy embark on such an adventure until his 
situation is utterly beyond hope, so bad that even the destruc- 
tion of his fleet can hardly make it worse ? He has perhaps 
not realised this yet. But the failure of his "brilliant ally" 
on the Piave, the collapse of his own offensive, and then his 
defeats in the Chateau-Thierry salient, and in the battles 
of Amiens and Montdidier ; the sudden resurrection of the 
Eastern peril — which Brest-Litovsk was to have laid for 
ever ; the horrid reflection first, that the change on the 
Western front has come about without calling upon the 
American force for more than about a filth, or even a tenth, 
of its numbers in France ; and next, that before a year has 
passed there will be three million more Americans in the 
Western fighting line — put these things together, and it is 
possible that the German Higher Command may perceive 
that its distance from the desperation point is, at the best, 
measurable. ^ 
■ It is, then, anything but sound sense to ignore these plain 
elements of the situation. Circumstances are shaping them- 
selves to make Germany desperate, and thus to make a sea 
action probable. If the opportunity offers, the issue will 
depend upon the character of the command and the complete- 
ness of the preparations carried through in the last two years. 
If all the fighting elements are really ready to fight, the 
issue will not be in doubt. . We have the right to expect 
that a sea battle will now be final. It may not end the war 
instantly, but it will make its quick ending certain ; for it 
must shatter the German moral altogether. Failure to win 
on land can be disguised as a mere postponement of ultimate 
victory. Each attack that fails, each retreat that avoids 
a decision — all these can be represented as master strokes of 
cunning, exercises in the greater attrition that only make 
a final victory more certain. But when the fleet is anni- 
hilated at sea it is not in the power of words to hide the 
finality of the disaster. • ' 
Now, if it is not sound sense to ignore these truths, it is 
neither just to the Fleet, nor to the great sailor that leads it, 
to ignore another truth. It is that victory will not be the 
fruit of numbers and mass, nor is it certain nor even likely 
to be purchased in a trivial cost in ships and men. When 
victory comes it will be the just reward of silent, but incessant, 
thought and action. It cannot come unless each squadron 
is led as the Fleet is led, with the higher courage that is not 
blind, but counts the cost and is willing to pay. It will be 
a very great triumph, but it may be a very tragic triumph. 
The price of Admiralty, the greatest of ' our assets, may 
indeed be proportional to its value. 
These things are worth insisting on because I note with 
distress that the heavy lessons which the war has taught us 
are still being persistently misread. The old fallacies flourish, 
and in all their old vigour. How is it that a distinguished 
Canadian, who has been to the front and seen the Fleet, can 
be reported as saying, without correction, at a festive 
gathering, that "the Fleet stands, an impenetrable steel 
band, round these sacred islands to guard them from a/lack. 
... So long as that Fleet is intact, the British Empire is 
safe" ? It is the old defensive theory. It is not the Fleet s 
business to force the enemy to fight by thwarting all his 
plans and keeping a constant pressure on him, and then 
crushing him at any cost if he finds that pressure intolerable ; 
the Fleet is to wait until it is itself attacked. Again, in 
welcoming the Premier's tribute to the Navy, the Nation 
tells us that "it is not what the Fleet does; it is what it is 
that matters," as if by merely existing, it maintained the 
atmosphere at a certain pressure. When w'ill these good 
people realise that the Fleet exists only to fight ? 
