August 29, 1918 
LAND &> WATER 
The Baffled Pirates: By Arthur Pollen 
A Review of the Submarine War, and the Changes in the German Admiralty 
THE loss (jf ships in the month of July was greater 
by over 30,000. tons than in the month of June. 
The increase in the British loss is about 11,000 
tons, and in the allied and neutral lo^ nearly 
20,000. These results have been given to the 
public as "somewhat " or "very" disappointing. Kut is this 
quite just to those who are running the anti-submarine 
campaign ? The figures certainly have not disappoihted me, 
for the circumstances being what they are, the losses are 
very considerably less than I e.xpected. These circumstances 
may be grouped under six headings. 
1. British losses are up 11,000 tons; allied and neutral 
nearly 20,000. But the losses include the Justicia, whose 
gross tonnage exceeds the total increase both lor British 
and for neutral and Allied shipping. Had Justicia been of 
the average displacement of the ships sunk in 1917, which 
was less tlian 4,000 tons, British losses would be 18,000 tons 
less than the June losses, and total losses within 4,000 tons 
of that month. If we are to regard the tonnage lost as a 
measure of the efficiency of our defensive campaign, then 
we must distinguish when a ship of exceptional tonnage is 
included. If the measure were not tonnage, but the number 
of successful attacks, there probably would be nothing to 
choose between July and June. 
2. Three weeks ago I warned the readers of this journal 
that one of the German repljes to the offensive that Marshal 
Foch had then just begun would have to be a greater effort 
at sea. It was, therefore, fully to be expected that the 
enemy would push his submarine activity to the utmost, 
and that commanders and crews would have every induce- 
ment held out to them to face greater risks and, at any cost, 
to get better results. I did not know at the time of another 
factor not less powerful that was making for an increased 
submarine activity. It was precisely in July that the agita- 
tion against Holtzendorff was coming to a head. He had, 
therefore, every motive for doing his utmost to justify the 
policy of which for two and a half years he had been the 
protagonist. Viewing the position, then, from the point of . 
view both of the enemy's general necessity and of the embar- 
rassments of the Admiralty Staff, at least half of the period 
under review was one likely to see the enemy's maximum 
offensive effort. 
But to this it must be added that July was also a period of 
our minimum effort. The public is familiar with the fact 
that the March offensive incited our gallant allies in America 
to send men over both to this country and France in such 
numbers as have never before been contemplated. We 
know that month after month an average of over a quarter 
of a million men left the American ports and landed safely 
in British and French ports. We also know that more than 
60 per cent, of these were brought in British ships, and that 
80 per cent, of all the ships bringing troops were convoyed 
and protected by the Royal Navy. Now, the convoying 
and protective forces — cruisers, sloops, and destroyers^ 
suffer from the same disadvantage as the lamented Sir Boyle 
Roche. They cannot be in two places at the same time ; 
and though aircraft are more like birds than anything that 
eloquent Hibernian had ever dreamed of, they, too, arc 
subject to a similar limitation. Now, it is obvious that the 
American troops, their transports and their supplies, are a 
first charge on our defensive organisation. The marvel is 
this : That this organisation had greatly expanded we all took 
for granted. But now it seems to have found itself equal to 
q\iadrupling the shepherding of the army that is to win the war, 
while maintaining to the full the care of our own, the neutral 
and the Allied vessels that are engaged in the general business 
of supply. Note that the period has not been marked by 
the loss of a single troop-laden transport. Those that have 
suffered, such as the Justicia herself, have been returning 
empty for more troops. The convoying, then, has been 
thoroughly done — without our merchant shipping having 
been correspondingly exposed I The submarines have during 
the last three months, and especially during July, had a 
better field than at any time throughout the year. It is 
surprising that they have not made better use of it. 
3. To the foregoing must be added another circumstance, 
and it is this. July was a period of the longest daylight 
— and of the most luminous daylight — of any period of the 
year except June ; and, except for brief intervals, it was 
marked by continuous fine weather, the two combining to 
make very favourable conditions for submarine work. 
4. It has been said — and no doubt with justice — that the 
toll we have taken, principally ^y mine and depth charge, 
of German submarines has told upon the morale and resolu- 
tion of their crews. But we should be deceiving ourselves 
altogether if we supposed that that morale, in spite of so 
adverse an influence, was not still exceedingly high. Every- 
thing combines to show us, indeed, that, whatever the diffi- 
culty the enemy may have in finding crews still eager for the 
work, that he is nevertheless still finding them. And we 
should bear in mind also that whatever he may lose, whatever 
weakness he may feel from the crew difficulty, may be more 
than compensated by a growth of the skill and experience of 
his U-boat captains. It has often been pointed out that 
losses by submarine have seldom been proportional to the 
number of submarines engaged. But it has never been in 
doubt that the results got by each submarine are propor- 
tional to the skill, the nerve, and the resource with which 
it is handled. By this time the general character of our 
defensive measures is probably very thoroughly understood 
by all the pirate leaders ; and, heavy as is the toll we take of 
them, it stands to reason that we are more likely to get the 
less skilful than the more skilful, because the evasion of risk 
is, after all, the first condition of submarine success. Until, 
then, the career of the U-boat is summarily stopped by such 
physical obstacles as mines, which no ingenuity can over- 
come or circumvent, it is to be e.xpected that the reduction 
in numbers of U-boats may be balanced by a growth in the 
skill with which the survivors are handled, and this, despite 
the fact that the difficulty of finding crews of sufficient 
resolution to start in the business at all, may be considerable. 
This advance in skill and 'resource of submarine captains 
— if, as I suppose, it really is a necessary factor in the case — 
would show itself principally in getting ships out of convoys, 
in defiance of the convoys' protective forces. In the first 
six months after the convoy principle was adopted only 
I J per cent, of ships so protected were sunk. It would be 
interesting to know what the figure is now. For what it is 
worth, the Germans claim it has altered in their favour. 
5. Another material point that has to be borne in mind 
is that in the month of July 7,718,898 gross tons of shipping 
entered or cleared our ports, from and to ports over sea. 
This is by much the highest tonnage recorded, except in 
the month of May, when the British loss was more than 
50,000 tons greater than in July and the Allied loss only 
4,000 tons less. It is not unscientific to measure the success 
of our defensive by the number of targets exposed to attack. 
On this test the July returns are certainly satisfactory. 
6. Finally, we have to remember that the defensive 
campaign does not take the form of protecting 'each ship 
from its start till it enters into port. The policy is one, 
partly of protecting ships, partly of protecting areas. The 
application of this will become very apparent if we look 
back to page 14 of the issue of Land & Water of August 8th, 
whereon wiU be found an outline map in Mr. Whitaker's 
article, showing the sinkings round these islands in the 
month of April last year. It will be observed that the two 
main areas are south-west of Ireland and, diagonally opposite 
to it another between, let us say, Aberdeen and the mouth 
of the Humber. The area south of Ireland covers the western 
ends of the Atlantic laries ; the northern area the centring 
points of the North Sea trade. When the American destroyers 
came to this side they were stationed, as all the world now 
knows, at Queenstown, and it was their particular function 
to defend ships coming in from the Atlantic into European 
waters. Here, in co-operation with a large number of British 
craft, they very soon effected a marked cha.nge in the position. 
Almost simultaneously there grew up French bases also, a 
very necessary precaution in view not only of the over- 
whelming importance of the Atlantic trade, but the trans- 
portation services of the American Army. The measures 
taken in this area have met with a high degree of success. 
Speaking from memory, only one transport with men on 
board has Ir^een sunk, and the improved conditions of the 
Atlantic trade can be gathered from the fall in the rate of 
underwriting. As we have seen above, the effect of the 
recent quadrupling of the importation of American Army 
units has been to bring about a proportionate increase in 
the number of protective craft in this area. The effect of 
this is not only to make each transport safer than it would 
otherwise have been, it has made the whole area safer. 
The tendency, then, of the events of the last three months 
