September 5, 1918 
LAND 6? WATER 
THE WAR: By HILAIRE BELLOC 
The Paradox of Retreat 
The Enemy's Water Line of Defence 
IN order to understand the present position upon the 
Western front (which is the front decisive of the war) 
the first thing to be done is to consider (i) the shape of 
the present Hne, (2) its characteristics in the way of 
the ground, and (3) (above alt) the density of the 
enemy's concentration upon it in the nortli ; his lack of men 
in the south. 
First, as to the present shape of the Hne : 
Now that, the AlHed Higher Command has suppressed the 
two great saHents formed by the enemy's advance in the 
spring and early summer (the salient of the Somme up to 
Montdidier and that of the Marne up to Chateau-Thierry), 
the line, as a whole, takes the form expressed in the accom- 
panying sketch. It resembles a crank, such as the starting- 
handle of a motor car. The elements of that form are essen-, 
tially three sectors at right angles : a perpendicular from 
I 
'defrt 
north to south, a horizontal from east to west, and then another 
perpendicular from north to south. In other words, the main 
elements are those of thfe strongly marked straight lines on 
Sketch I., which reduce to their simplest expression the 
sinuosities of the front as it now stands. 
For convenience in following the analysis of the situation, 
we will call the first perpendicular line from north to south. 
Sector I ; the horizontal from east to west. Sector 2 ; the 
last perpendicular from north to south. Sector 3. Further, 
as we shall see in a moment, it is convenient to separate 
Sector 2 into two parts — A to the east of the Argonne Forest 
and B west of it ; because .\rgonne marks the separation 
between the congested area of the enemy and the area thinly 
held by him. Sector r runs from the north, at Nieuport, 
to the neighbourhood of Noyon, southwards. Sector 2 runs 
S(jmewhat south of cast, from the neighbourhood of Noyon 
to the region of Verdun ; Sector 3 runs somewhat east of 
south from the neighbourho<id of Verdun to the Swiss frontier. 
The Argonne Forest divides the whole of this long line into 
two nearly equal parts. 
As to ground, this tripartite line has an exceedingly 
strong obstacle at its first angle behind Noyon and Soissons, 
in the St. Gobain Hill and Forest, and the J.aon heights. 
These tempt the enemy to hold on here, to stand on the 
line Arras-Noyon, and therefore to leave his southern flank 
Soissons-Verdun exposed. 
There remains number : 
Now, the essential characteristic of this line at tlic present 
moment in respect of numbers is the fact that the enemy's 
strength is concentraled io an overwhelming extent upon the 
northern half, and over 45 per cent, of it is crowded bctivecn 
Rheims and Arras; aver 70 per cent, of it between Argonne 
and the sea. 
The whole strategy of the days through which we arc 
passing is, upon the Allied side, an hitherto successful attempt 
to compel the enemy to continue his ill-balanced concentra- 
tion in the north ; upon the enemy's side an effort to escape 
this fate and to redistribute his troops in time to protect 
himself against threatened adverse developments upon the 
southern half beyond Argonne. 
That is the thesis of the war as things now stand. To 
develop that thesis in detail is to understand what is happening. 
Let us first look in detail at the numbers. 
The enemy had on July 15th, the moment when he lamiched 
his last great offensive (which failed so disastrously for him), 
205 divisions in the West. We must grasp and keep in the 
forefront of all our pictures the capital fact that just as he 
launched this offensive upon Monday, July 15th (forty-five 
days ago at the moment of writing), three-quarters of its whole 
strength lay north and west of the Forest of Argonne. Of 
those 205 divisions, at least 150 — probably a few more- 
were to be found between the Argonne and the North Sea 
only the remaining 50 — and those not of the best quality — 
were left to hold what had so long been the quiescent parts 
of the line — Section B of Sector 2, and the whole of Sector 3. 
That is the salient characteristic of the whole affair. 
Since the breakdown of his offensive, the enemy has not 
been able materially to alter what was, while he was still 
attacking, a concentration in his favour, but what has become, 
since the resumption of the initiative by the Allies,/a situation 
heavily to his disadvantage. 
The enemy concentrated thus upon the northern half of 
the line because it was here that his success would have 
had the greatest result. As he could only envisage that 
success in terms of what I have called "the club" — that is 
by the action of one great blow delivered with all his avail- 
able strength upon one spot — he rightly chose the northern 
half of his line for the efforts he was about to make. Here 
lay first the point of junction between the British and the 
French armies in front of St. Quentin which he tried 
to break March 22nd to April 4th. Next, having failed in 
this, the opportunity which unexpectedly offered itself on 
April 9th was also in the north in front of Lille. Next, a 
blow upon the western end of Sector 2, between Soissons and 
Rheims, upon May 27th, which carried him to the Marne, 
was also in the north. Next came an attempt upon the Matz 
Valley— that is, the point nearest Paris, also in the north, 
upon June 9th. Lastly, he staged an operation on the very 
largest scale on either side of Rheims — that is, along the 
whole of Section A in Sector 2 — which he hoped would 
decide the war, upon July 15th ; and this was northern, too. 
.Ml his great massing for attack had necessarily packed his 
army for three months north of Argonne. 
As we know, this last effort broke down. In the midst of 
its breakdown he allowed himself to be surprised at Soissons 
on July i8th. From that day to this his great massing in 
the north has been turned from an offensive strength into a 
defensive weakness. He now desires above everything to 
■redistribute his strength, to hold in the north with no more 
than normal strength, and to reinforce the south between 
Argonne and the Swiss frontier. He has not been allowed 
to doiso. Attack after attack has compelled him to concen- 
trate his strength even more to the north than it was before, 
'and to remain in permanent anxiety with regard to the 
menace against him, in the south. 
The extent and nature of the concentration are not only 
to be appreciated by the figures 'three-quarters on the one- 
half and only one quarter on the other. Nor is it even 
sufficient to rerhark that the insufficient .one-quarter which 
is holding the whole southern half of the line is of poorer 
material than the three-quarters which are holding the 
other half. We must go into more particulars. 
The 205 divisions which the enemy had on the West upon 
July 15th would have numbered in infantry alone at full 
establishment between 1,800,000 and 1,900,000 men ; the 
present infantry establishment of a German division being 
about 'g.ooo bayonets (three regiments of three battalions 
each). The great losses of the present fighting season have 
certainly reduced the number to less than this. Even if. 
