September 12, 1918 
LAND &> WATER 
THE WAR: By HILAIRE BELLOC 
The Operations 
Progress of the Offensive 
THE operations of the week have consisted of Httle 
more than the following up of the enemy's retire- 
ment to the permanent line which he intends to 
hold throughout the winter, against which he 
expects to tire out all the attacks of the»Allies, 
and from behind the protection of which, he undoubtpdly 
intends to spare men for the reinforcement of his line to 
east and soutli of the Argonne, and especially in Lorraine. 
It was pointed out in these columns that the victory of 
Monday, September 2nd, when the Queant switch was broken 
by the British in front of Eterpigny, though of considerable 
effect (accounting first and last for nearly 20,000 prisoners 
and many guns) . had not the full character ascribed to it in 
some quarters, and this because there lay immediately be- 
hind the protection of a water-line which afforded a better 
defence against tanks than the old artificial works of the 
permaneht line built by the Germans in the winter of 1916 
and 1917, when the tactics of the attack were very differ- 
ent. To that water-line the enemy has retired, and he stands 
behind it everywhere from the Scarpe to Marquion, where the 
upper stream of the little River Agache and the ditch of the 
Canal, du Nord cross the main Arras-Cambrai road. The 
obstacle of water is continued less perfectly down the line 
of the canal to the neighbourhood Marquion and Inchy, the 
broad and deep ditch of the canal here lies at a height 
where it is difficult to flood out completely ; but, unless the 
rather meagre report.^ which have reached us at home mislead 
us, the enemy has found it possible partially to flood these 
last two miles of his water system in the north. It is in the 
parish of Inchy that the Agache river rises, and, if I am 
not mistaken, the^cond brook which comes in from Moeuvres 
can be used for putting water into the canal bed here. As 
we consider the line to the south of Moeuvres through the 
wood of Havrincourt, and so on, to the other canal (that of 
the Scheldt) by Honnecourt, we come upon the most in- 
teresting part of the line, at least in that northern part of 
it which faces the British. Here the enemy defences cover 
Cambrai junction at a range of about twelve thousand yards; 
the British heavy artillery will not effectively shell that 
extremely important point in the enemy,'s communication 
under such a range as fourteen or fifteen thousand yards at the 
least. Cambrai -is therefore thoroughly covered so long as 
the Hindenberg defences stand. It may very well be, how- 
ever, that the Allied command will refuse to make a direct 
attack upon this critical sector of the line between Honnecourt 
and Moeuvres. It is a distance of only six or seven miles ; 
not enough for the deployment of a true front of attack, 
and easily reinforced by the enemy, who can draw forces from 
behind his water-line to the north and south in support of it. 
South of this critical and important sector the enemy's line 
again reposes upon water. It follows the canal uniting 
the Scheldt with the Oisef but there is not a water-hne 
the whole way. There is one sector where the canal goes 
under ground, and where the enemy's defence runs over 
it through open country, depending entirely upon its trench 
system. In the neighbourhood of St. Quentin it again runs 
through open country so as to cover the town ; the last few 
miles running southwards through the Oise, near La Fere, 
also depend upon trenches running throughout on ground 
without a water-line. It seemed possible at one moment 
that the enemy intended to stand along water in this neigh- 
bourhood everywhere and to hold the Crozat Canal. But, 
as we know, he has abandoned this obstacle, which the French 
have crossed. Everything which can be said about fhe 
present plan of the Germans to stand from the Oise to the 
Scarpe upon their old defences of two years ago has been 
said ; and, indeed, the comment is fairly obvious. If he 
can hold this line he makes the Allies pass the winter 
upon what he calls the Somme Desert — that is, the devastated 
area for the destruction of which very probably, when he is de- 
feated, he willjiave to pay a higher price than forany of his other 
acts during the last four years. He has excellent communica- 
tions behind that line, both lateral and main ; he has a string 
of towns to use for billets, and for depots, and for quarters. 
The Allies, in front of him, will have none of those advan- 
tages. All of this, I say, is obvious, and would be tedious 
to insist jipon ; but there are three conditions to-day which 
render his stand on this line a totally different thing from 
what it was when he first designed this system of trenches. 
These three things are : first, the change in tactics ; secoVidly, 
the condition of the enemy's mind both in command and 
through the army as a whole ; and, thirdly, the necessary 
and steady growth of the Allied forces which are already 
numerically superior and will be overwhelmingly superior 
before the spring. 
The new tactics depend principally upon the use of improved 
tanks, which are supported by a vastly increased air force, 
and have proved capable of breaking the most fully developed 
"'»/inirV"'''^"'''liiw'"inw" 
trench system. Nothing has yet appeared on the side of 
the defensive to check-mate these attacks. Water, especially 
marshy water, where it is available, is the only full^ reply, so 
far, to this instrument of war ; but^a continuous line of water, 
which shall at the same time be fairly straight, shall extend 
over such a considerable front as fifty miles, and be proi:>erly 
served by communications behind it and along it, is not to 
be discovered. Therefore the enemy is compelled to depend 
upon the remains of a former defence which he knows to be 
vulnerable. To the new tactics he [makes a new defence, 
especially trained men with special instruments, such 
as a new heavy rifle on a rest which fires projectiles 
capable of piercing the armour of a tank. By the use 
of such defensive measures he has produced a fluctuating 
defence as one does bv any new device to meet new forms 
of attack. But these new forms of defence are not 
