LAND &? WATER 
September 12, 1918 
and cannot be in their present state of development 
a complete reply to the tanks as the elaborate trench 
system was a reply to bombardment and infantry work a 
year ago. 
The second new element, the state of the enemy's mind, 
both in the rank and file of his army, touches upon the subject 
which I shall discuss later, and which is the chief interest 
of the moment ; that is, the complete change in the German 
attitude towards the war which has appeared in the last few 
days. This element is not measurable, and each man will 
judge it according to his knowledge of the German Empire 
and his reading of the somewhat scanty evidence presented 
to us. But if we cannot estimate it exactly, we know certain 
things about it which .are of value ; for instance, there is 
not a soldier asked to stand under bombardment for weeks 
between the Scarpe and the Oise who can look forward to a 
further offensive and the defeat of the Allies. The German 
Army is being asked to play a passive r61e in the face of a 
rapidly increasing enemy. That is a totally different state 
of affairs from the conditions which gave the Germans their 
moral of 1917. 
The third new element of the situation — the increase in 
the Allied forces — does not so much threaten to pierce the 
Hindenberg line as to turn it : and the threat, of course, will 
be met by the enemy saving as many men as possible from 
behind the strong defences, and sending them down to hold the 
southern weak and open parts of the line between Argonne 
and the Vosges. For the rest, until the next stroke is de- 
livered, we can only wait and watch what is for the moment 
(Monday, September gth) a stabilised situation. General 
Mangin's action on the immediate flank of the Hindenburg line 
against the great pivot and stronghold of St. Gobain Forest 
is not intended to turn it. It might do so by an accident ; 
the pressure is very strong, and the enemy's defensive 
here might conceivably collapse ; but it is most imlikely, 
and it is certainly not being calculated upon. 
Tliere is no room to pass on the left between the great hill 
forest and the marshy Oise Valley ; while the narrow Anizy 
Valley leading up to Laon between the formidable heights 
of the upper Ailette and the forest is far too narrow for an 
advance upon that side, and it is morally certain that the 
whole strong position will hold until it is turned. 
The Change in the Enemy's Mind 
THERE has happened in the last week something which, 
after the actual operations in the field, is perhaps of 
greater significance to the issue of the war than any- 
thing which has taken place since the battle of the Marne ; 
and that is a complete revolution in the enemy's mind — in 
his attitude towards the struggle. 
Why such a change should have been so long delayed, and 
why, when it came, it should have come so suddenly, are 
questions not easy to answer, and questions which will be 
answered differently according to each man's experience of 
national psychology. We all know from our own experience 
the curious way in which the great body of opinion will 
move. Some question which passionately interested the 
public for years in this country, and on which all political 
debates turned, will suddenly drop out at an unexpected 
moment and then, with astonishing rapidity, lose all its 
vitality. 
Again we have all had experience of reversals of opinion 
upon pubhc matters taking place, also without sufficient 
apparent causes, and with equal suddenness. Those who 
know the modern Prussianised German Empire best are 
inclined to believe that the curious and startling phenomenon 
of the last few days is wholly due to official suggestion. It 
looks as if some one, or some group of men at the head of 
affairs had at last come to a conclusion long doubtful, and 
had determined to provoke general opinion towards a new 
attitude upon the war ; but this could not have been done 
without there existing in the mass of the public a state of 
mind prepared to receive such an impression. Many of my 
readers will, I think, dispute such a judgment, and will tell 
me that the process has been more gradual than I say. 
This criticism would be just if one were only speaking 
of the difference between exaltation and depression. Since 
July i8th the ehemy has obviously been more and more 
depressed, the retreat, let alone the enormous losses in 
prisoners and guns, and the breakdown of hitherto vic- 
torious offensives amply accounts for that. Indeed, if any- 
thing, the last few days have shown a slight reaction in 
Germany towards less depression ; for the retreat has 
been successfully conducted, and these five days past 
there have been no heavy losses in men. Moreover the masses 
always judge from exact repetition of old experiences, 
and now that the army is back on the Hindenburg line, the 
mere name of that line helps to revive the feehngs with which 
it was connected eighteen months ago. 
But I do not mean by the revolution of which I speak a 
change from exaltation to depression, I mean something much 
more specific and definable. I mean that in the last few days 
the authorities governing Prussia and her dependent States 
have for the first time made up their minds that a victory 
is impossible, and, what is more, have for the first time adopted 
the policy of saying so openly to their people, and of risking 
the very bad effect of which such announcements always 
have upon an army. 
TWO EXAMPLES 
The proofs and examples of this certain change in the 
attitude of the of&cial Germans, and therefore of the people 
whom they govern, have not been numerous, buf they have been 
remarkable. Two particularly haye commanded the atten- 
tion of this country. The first has been the lecture delivered 
by the deputy Chief of the Staff to a social club, a 
lecture which, although the occasion was private, was 
printed broadcast, and given special publicity apparently 
by the enemy's Government. In this lecture, an analysis 
of the operations upon the Western Front during the last 
two months was given with great ability, and upon the 
whole, with truth. The lecturer could not divest himself of his 
national failings ; he could not divest himself of vanity and 
of excess ; but his view of what has happened between the 
mounting of the great offensive in July and the present 
deplorable situation of the German armies was not unjust. 
The picture only became distorted towards the end, when 
he began to describe the carefully hmited attacks upon the 
narrow sectors as attempts to break through. The charac- 
teristic of this lecture however was more than an analysis 
of known events. We have had plenty of these from many 
able students of the war, and they all more or less agree 
in the concluding phrase "We shall carry a defensive war 
to a victorious finish." Such words were clearly dictated 
not by the soldier, but by the civilian, and were put into 
the soldier's mouth. No soldier could use them, because 
'they have no military sense whatever, To carry the 
defensive to a victorious conclusion without a later offensive 
means nothing. We have here a clear case of a text to which 
the soldier had to speak, or rather of a conclusion to which 
he had to lead up. 
The other example in the same period is the statement of 
General von Ardenne. Ardenne is the best writer upon war 
in the German press at the present moment. What is more, 
he is, by repute at least, the writer most in touch with the 
authorities in his own country, and his verdict is of exactly the 
same sort as that just quoted. And Ardenne also is a 
soldier. 
Both these men, the first in a very liigh official position, 
and the second especially entrusted. with publicity, use the 
same phrase in each case, a phrase forbidden to be used 
in their profession — a phrase of set pattern mechanically 
repeated and hitherto never heard in a German mouth — 
one cannot avoid the judgment that each of these men was 
obeying an order. With so obvious a conclusion there are 
many other things which fit in. There is the extraordinary 
interview recently granted by the Crown Prince of Prussia 
to an Hungarian paper, and as is always the case with sucli 
documents, it was carefully written out by some permanent 
official, and as carefully corrected before it was allowed to be 
■put in print. We shall probabl}' have in the near future a 
corresponding announcement from the Emperor himself. The 
whole tone has been set to the singular declaration I have 
described. All hope of victory in the field must be aban- 
doned, and a mere passive defensive, sitting to receive 
blows, will in some way save Germany if she can stand 
the blows long enough to tire out those who are delivering 
theml 
Such is the official attitude suddenly adopted in the last 
week, and such is the change of policy it presumes. 
Now, that change is a tremendous event, and we should 
do well to examine the causes of it and then to consider its 
possible effects. 
