LAND 6? WATER 
September 12, 1918 
t • 
The Rising Sun in Russia : By Gregory Mason 
Japan and the Siberian Rescue Expedition 
FOR those who have recently been behind the scenes 
in the Far East there is a pecuharly dramatic 
interest, in the spectacle of Japanese troops advanc- 
ing to the aid of the detachments of armed 
Czecho-Slovaks in the interior of Russia. Within 
the past twelvemonth Japan has executed a remarkable 
right- about-face on this issue of intervention in Siberia. A 
year ago the Japanese Press was devoting columns a week to 
proving (to its own satisfaction) that it was impracticable to 
send Japanese troops out of the Empire to any theatre of 
this war. 
Then came the Bolsheviki revolution. This interested the 
Japanese as much as any people, for if there is one" thing 
which arouses fear and horror in the Japanese soul it is 
extreme social radicalism. There were also other events and 
influences to jar Japan out of her complacent enjoyment of 
war-born commercial prosperity, such as the disquieting hint 
that a result of British successes against Turkey might mean 
a transference of German ambitions from the Near East to 
the Far East. 
But mainly it was the career of Bolshevism in Russia 
which aroused Japan to the realisation that the whole country, 
and not merely the Japanese Navy, was concerned in this 
war. Naturally the repudiation of Russia's debt, the blufit 
ways of Bolshevik diplomacy, and the hint of a world pro- 
letarian revolution to spring from the Lenin-Trotsky effort, 
more than moderately shocked the rather ultra-conservative 
type of statesman which still prevails in Japan. Then, last 
winter, come the reports (how well founded I cannot say) 
of Bolshevik outrages against the property and persons of 
Japanese in Russia. 
There was a curious division of opinion in regard to the 
proposal to intervene in the territory of a still friendly ally. 
The Japanese Army tugged at its leash. (Like many large 
standing armies, it is not averse to occasional exercise.) 
Viscount Motono, the Foreign Minister, was no less eager 
for immediate and vigorous action. The two large political 
parties were both, opposed to the Siberian scheme. Both 
feared that such a military venture would revive the then 
somewhat fading prestige of Count Terauchi, the soldier 
Premier, and extend the official life of "the Kitchener 
of Japan." Oddly enough, Terauchi was inclined against 
intervention out of fear that it would end in a fiasco to his 
discredit. (He was hesitating from wiser motives also.) 
The real rulers of Japan, the small group of Elder Statesmen, 
were opposed to intervention at that time from the com- 
mendable feeling that such a serious enterprise should not 
be begun except in the greatest extremity and after a most 
careful study of all conditions. The Japanese pubUc was 
apathetic. There is seldom, if ever, any real public opinion 
in Japan, in the Western sense of that term. There is public 
emotion, but not public opinion. 
The Premier felt more and more the force of the argument 
that intervention at that time might only drive the Russians 
(who still cherish anti-Japanese prejudices) into the arms 
of Germany, and make a bad situation worse. He feared 
that intervention might involve Japan in a much larger 
responsibility than her people would care to assume. The 
Japanese people are not of the aggressive temperament that 
starts offensive wars. But convince them that national 
interests or their homes are threatened by foreign aggression, 
and there are no braver warriors on earth. In consideration 
of all these facts, it did not seem to the Premier, six months 
ago, that Japan was warranted in moving until her allies 
unanimously requested it. *>*> "<( 
In this view of the affair the Premier was supported by his 
right-hand man. Baron Goto — at that time Minister of 
Home Affairs, and now Minister of Foreign Affairs. The 
tug-of-war between the Terauchi-Goto combination, on the 
one hand, and the Foreign Office-General Staff coalition, on 
the other, was a tremendous contest, and at times feeling 
became somewhat b tter. At first it did not seem that the 
Premier's forces could resist the sheer weight of the army ; 
but this was resisted, and then the line began to haul the 
other way.' The resignation of Viscount Motono and the 
succession of Baron Goto to the position of Foreign Minister 
marked the complete triumph of the Terauchi-Goto policy. 
But mark this. Count Terauchi and Baron Goto were not 
holding out without qualification against intervention in 
Siberia, but were simply contending that the time was not 
yet ripe, that circumstances did not yet justify such an 
e.xtreme measure as the uninvited penetration of a still 
nominally friendly country. In this, these two wise states- 
men were in accord with the position of President Wilson, 
and of the Liberals of Britain and America generally. And 
in this they were in harmony with the inarticulate feelings of 
the Japanese people, and with a certain great Japanese 
tradition, or fundamental political tenet. This is a tradition 
or policy which foreign statesmen sometimes forget, namely, 
that Japan's relations and aspirations toward China are the 
baro n shimpei goto, japan's minister for foreign 
affairs; 
This portrait of Baron Goto was given inscription, ' translated, reads at][the 
to Mr. Mason by the Japanese Minister right : " From Baron Shimpei Goto," 
lor Foreign AOalrs. The Japanese at left, " To Mr. Gregory Hason." 
foundation and buttresses of the whole structure of her 
foreign policy. 
It is her peculiar r61e as guardian of the Far East which is 
always most dear to Japan. The following statement, made 
by Baron Goto in an interview which he gave me in March 
last, throws light on this characteristic position of Japanese 
statesmen. We were speaking of the effect of Japanese 
intervention in Siberia on Japan's relations with China. 
'' Intervention in Siberia would have a good effect on 
China," Baron Goto declared. "It would promote unity 
and good feeling between the north and the south of China, 
and between China and Japan. I will speak quite frankly. 
A few weeks ago Japanese intervention in Siberia seemed 
imminent. For several days, to the public, the decision 
seemed to be hanging in the balance. Then it seemed to 
the public that a decision had been made against interven- 
tion. But this was not so. Japan's decision was merely 
to solidify China first, and so have a secure foundation 
beneath and behind her in case intervention -should later 
become necessary. Disorganisation and chaos is a danger 
to China, and it is just as much a danger to China's allies. 
China is as much threatened by Germany as Japan, but 
China fears that Japanese intervention in Russia will be 
used by Japan as a pretext for seizing rich plums in Man- 
