September 19, 1918 
LAND 6? WATER. 
moment the general offensive should pass for good into 
Allied hands (which it has now done), the enemy's com- 
munications could not but betray a grave weakness such 
as did not attach to the Allied communications even at their 
worst moment. And that weakness depended upon the 
presence of the Ardenne. 
An advance straight upon that difficitlt bit of cotinlry, ivhen 
it has reached or brought under close-range fire the junction of 
Longuyon, cuts the German army into two so far as lateral 
commnnications are concerned. 
The phrase would be an exaggerated one if it were to 
convey a complete separation ; the cutting of the line between 
Metz and Mezieres at Longuyon still leaves small and bad 
supply lines which run through the Ardenne district, and a 
certain number of roads for petrol traffic as well. But tl>c 
enemy suffers so severe a handicap in communications, when 
once the main lateral line Metz-Mezieres is cut in front of 
the Ardenne at or near Longuyon, that he is then, for the pur- 
poses of rapid reinforcement, virtually separated into two 
parts. His opponent is then able to move back and forth in 
front of him at least twice as fast as he can move back and forth. 
The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient is the preliminary 
threat to Germany's lateral communications, and compels the 
cnemv to mass in defence of the vital points in these. 
But this compulsion put upon the enemy to mass in defence 
of a vital point is simultaneously a compulsion to ])ut him- 
self in an inferiority elsewhere. It is improbable that he 
will allow his lateral communications to be cut. He will 
concentrate as heavily as possible to prevent it. But he 
cannot so concentrate upon what is, after all, still in the 
northern part of his line, and at the same time stand in 
such strength as he would desire to close the open gap of 
Lorraine to the south of Metz. Yet loss of ground here, in 
Lorraine, followed, as it would be, by the immediate inter- 
ruption of one of his main communications with Germany, 
>would be equally serious. The reduction of the St. Mihiel 
salient, therefore, leaves the German in a dilemma as to 
which of two vital sectors hje shall defend. He must defend 
both in more strength than he can afford. He must defend 
simultaneously what is vital to him in the region of Longuyon, 
add what is vital to him far off to the south in Lorraine. And 
he must do all this while he is heavily engaged far to the 
west by the French pressure on St. Gobain. 
The tables have been almost, exactly turned from the 
moment when the Allies were in a similar anxiety — how 
they should defend against a superior enemj', possessed of 
the initiative, their lateral communications threatened at 
Amiens and, at the same time, at Chateau Thierry. The 
enemy is now up against that bad problem the lack of room 
to man.eiivre, just as the Allies were from March to July ; 
but with these three differences : First, that if we cut his 
lateral communications near Longuyon or, alternatively, get 
. across one of his main railways leading eastwards through 
Lorraine, he suffers a blow which he cannot repair. He has 
not the alternative power of movement behind the main 
line which w^ still had even when our main line had been 
cut in two places ; for the Ardennes interrupt him. Secondly, 
he has not, as we had, a very large number of open communi- 
cations leading up to the front ; he has but two sheaves 
— one through Belgium, one through Lorraine — separate 
each from the other, and by their separation threatening 
to separate the control of his armies. Thirdly, we have an 
increasing number of men. 
The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient has brought the new 
front within twenty-four thousand yards of Longuyon junction 
and within an equal distance- of the main communications 
with Germany and the main lateral communications which 
meet in the Sablons junction outside Metz. The new front 
threatens at an evf n closer distance of only fourteen thousand 
yards the- junction of Conflans, by which the lateral com- 
munications from Metz to Mezie'es cross, though this threat 
is not of the first importance, becau.se if Conflans is lost 
supplies can still go round by Thionville and Fontoy. 
From this analysis, which gives the strategical meaning 
of the victory and shows it as a prehminary to greater things. 
we may turn to the story of the recent action. 
THE FORMATION OF THE SALIENT 
The St. Millie 
and defence in 
after the Battle 
• The enemy, t 
was attempting 
the Meuse betw 
behind the mai 
the Meuse, but 
after he liad e: 
1 salient was formed by an accident oi attack 
the third week of September, 1914, just 
of the Marne. 
rusting to his great superiority in number, 
to undo the effects of that battle by crossing 
een V'erdun and Toul. and thus con:ing in 
in l-'rench armies. His thrust just reached 
had already dwindled down 10 a point, and 
tabli.slied a bridge-head upon the jxninsula 
of Chauvincburt, just opposite the little town of St. Mihiel, 
it halted. His advance was stopped, and he has remained 
on the same lines ever since. 
His line ran from in front of Fresnes, almost due south 
across the steep wooded hills called the heights of the Meuse, 
for a distance of 15 miles ; it then turned a sharp corner 
in front of St. Mihiel, and ran almost east "and west (but 
with a very little north in it) to the big wood called the 
Bois le Pretre and the Moselle River, a few hundred yards 
below Pont-a-Mousson. The salient thus accidentally created 
had therefore the form of a . triangle, the angle or apex of 
which (at St. Mihiel) was rather less than a right angle, and 
this triangle had on either side of that apex a short line 
from Fresnes to St. Mihiel of 15 miles, and a hne from St. 
Mihiel to Pont-a-Mousson of 25 miles. 
So long as the enemy maintained his consideratle superiority 
and was, further, possessed of the initiative, the position at 
St. Mihiel, though useless and bad, could be maintained with- 
out loss ; and it was maintained on the general principle 
that as much of the occupied territory as possible should 
be retained in the invader's hpnds, especially towards the 
end of the campaign, because he hoped to hold it as an asset 
for bargaining if he should remain undefeated at the close. 
But when the enemy lost the cff nsive ; when the, to him, 
unexpected tactical value of the new American troops ap- 
peared ; when the new tanks had begun to change the methods 
of attack ; and when the growing numbers of the Allies 
through American recruitment further seriously threatened 
him with defeat, the enemy determined to give up this weak 
position of the St. Mihiel salient. ' 
It is characteristic however, both of the enemy's present 
uncertainty of strategic plan and of the Allies' present rapidity 
of action, and service of intelligence, that he only began his 
retirement a week ago, and that ottr blow was struck just in 
the middle of its concision. 
That is why he has lost such a very large number of 
prisoners. He had upon a front of 40. miles (Fresnes to 
Pont-a-Mousson) six divisions, not at full strength ; let us 
say 50,000 men — or very little more, if any. He has lost of 
these in prisoners alone, something like one-third up to the 
present count. Though he had got back most of his heavies, 
apparently all his air plant, and much of his other material, 
he also lost 200 field and other guns. He was attacked just 
at the right moment for a local operation. 
As the enemy was acquainted with the approaching attack 
and was obviously expecting it, that element of surprise which 
consists in a prolonged bombardment and attacking directly 
with tanks, was abandoned, just as it had been abandoned 
by Mangin under similiar circumstances in the attack of 
August 17th north of Soissons. A heavy bombardment was 
opened just after i o'clcck in the morning of last Thursday, 
September 12th, and was maintained for more than foyr 
hours, mainly along the southern front. At half-past five 
the infantry along this front — of which the great mass was 
American, and whose command was American also, forming 
the first large united American force under American 
direction used in this war — attacked upon the 11 miles front 
between Xivray and a point well to the west of thQ Bois le 
Pretre. 
Simultaneously, a lesser attack was delivered with a force 
consisting also mainly of Americans, but with a larger admix- 
ture of French, upon the other face of the salient, rather 
south of Fresnes, and for three or four miles on either side of 
Combres, which village, just at the foot of the Meuse hills, 
formed the centre of the sector attacked. 
It will be seen from the map that the two attacks, the 
large one from the south, and the smaller one from the north, 
would, if they were successful, pinch off the salient by meeting 
somewhere in the middle behind St. Mihiel, in the neigh- 
bourhood of Vigneulles and St. Benoit. 
This second attack upon the north was not only on a smaller 
scale than the main attack on the south, but was working 
through exceeding heavy country, all wood and steep hill. 
One feature was connected with the other. Because it was 
heavy country it was chosen for the minor attack which 
could not be expected to go far, just as the southern front, 
which was open country, had been chosen for the major 
attack, which was ordered to do the main business. 
The moment the bombardment opened, the German 
troops within the salient began their retirement. Though 
that retirement was conducted as speedily as possible, the 
enemy failed to complete it. All the wood paths and lanes 
by 'Which he could retire from the curve cut off by the two 
attacks converge upon Vigneulles and Hattonchatel. The 
garrison in St. Mihiel, for instance, which started at once 
(being the furthest off) marched away up. the main road 
through Chaillon. 1 do n(jt think it will be found that the 
greater part of them then went on by the main road through 
