September 26, 1918 
LAND &? WATER 
day the French and British ministers protested at Bucharest 
against this alleged violation of neutrality, only to be met 
with angry denials that the Germans were using this line. 
There is no doubt now that the Rumanian Government was 
perfectly honourable in making these denials. It is not 
unlikely that the Germans themselves started all these stories, 
fnerely to fool the Allied fleet into the behef that their supplies 
were inexhaustible. 
Let us suppose that the Allies had returned, say on the 
morning of the nineteenth, what would have happened ? 
The one overwhelming fact is that the fortifications were 
very short of ammunition. They had almost reached the 
limit of their resisting powers when the British fleet passed 
out on the afternoon of the i8th. I had secured permission 
for Mr. George A. Schreiner, the well-known Ariierican 
correspondent of the Associated Press, to visit the Dardanelles 
on this occasion. On the night of the i8th, this correspondent 
discussed the situation with General Mertens, who was the 
chief technical officer at the Straits. General Mertens 
admitted that the outlook was very discouraging. 
" We expect that the British will come back early to-morrow 
morning," he said, "and if they do we may be able to hold 
out for a few hours." 
General Mertens did not declare in so many words that the 
ammimition was practically exhausted, but Mr. Schreiner 
discovered that such was the case. The fact was that Fort 
Hamidi^, the most powerful defence on the Asiatic side, had. 
just seventeen armour-piercing shells left, while at Kilid-ul- 
Bahr, which was the main defence on the European side, 
there were precisely ten. 
"I should advise you to get up at six o'clock to-morrow 
morning," said General AJertens, "and take to the Anatolian 
Hills. That's what we are going to do." 
The Last Orders 
The troops at all the fortifications had their orders to man 
the guns until the last shell had been fired, and then to 
abandon the forts. 
Once these defences became helpless, the problem of the 
Allied fleet would have been a simple one. The only bar 
to their progress would have been the mine-field, which 
stretched from a point about two miles north of Erenkeui 
to Kilid-ul-Bahr. But the Allied fleet had plenty of mine- 
sweepers, which could have made a channel in a few hours. 
North of Tchanak, as I have already explained, there were a 
few guns, but they were of the 1878 model, and could not 
discharge projectiles that could pierce modem armour plate. 
North of Point Nagara there were only two batteries, and 
both dated from 1835 ! Thus, once having silenced the 
outer Straits, there was nothing to bar the passage to Con- 
stantinople except the German and Turkish warships. The 
Goeben was the only first-class fighting ship in either fleet, 
and it wou d not have lasted long against the Queen Elizabeth. 
Thus the Allied fleet would have appeared before Con- 
stantinople on the morning of the 20th. What would have 
happened then ? We have heard much discussion as to 
whether this purely naval attack was justified. Enver, in 
his conversation with me, had laid much stress on the absurdity 
of sending a fleet to Constantinople, supported by no adequate 
landing force, and much of the criticism passed upon the 
Dardanelles expedition since has centred on that point. Yet 
it is my opinion that this purely naval attack was justified. 
I base this judgment purely upon the political situation which 
then existed in Turkey. Under ordinary circumstances such 
an enterprise would probably have been a foolish one, but the 
political conditions in Constantinople then were not 
ordinary. There was no solidly established government 
in Turkey at that time. Among the subject races the 
spirit of revolt was rapidly spreading. The Greeks and 
the Armenians would also have welcomed an opportunity to 
strengthen the hands of the Allies. The existing financial 
and industrial conditions seemed to make revolution inevit- 
able. Many farmers went on strike ; they had no seeds, 
and would not accept them as a free gift from the Govern- 
ment because, they said, as soon as their crops should be 
garnered the armies would immediately requisition them. 
As for Constantinople, the populace there and the best ele- 
ments among the Turks, far from opposing the arrival of the 
Allied fleet, would have welcomed it with joy. The Turks 
themselves were praying that the British and French would 
take their city, for this would relieve them of the controlling 
gang, and emancipate them from the hated Germans. 
No one understood this better than Talaat. He was 
taking no chances on making an expeditious retreat, in case 
the AlUed fleet appeared before the city. For several months 
the Turkish leaders had been casting envious glances at a 
Minerva automobile that had been reposing in the Belgian 
Legation ever since Turkey's declaration of war. Talaat 
finally obtained possession of the coveted prize. He had 
obtained somewhere another automobile, which he had 
loaded with extra tyres, gasolene, and all the other essentials 
of a protracted journey. This was evidently intended to 
accompany the more pretentious machine as a kind of " mother 
ship." Talaat stationed these automobiles on the Asiatic 
side of the city with chauffeurs constantly at hand. Every- 
thing was prepared to leave for the interior of Asia at a 
moment's notice. 
But the great Allied armada never returned to the attack. 
Arrival of Von Der Goltz 
About a week after this momentous defeat, I happened 
to drop in at the German Embassy. Wangenheim had a 
distinguished visitor whom he had asked me to meet. I 
went into his private office, and there was von der Goltz 
Pasha, recently returned from Belgium, where he had served 
as governor. I must admit that, meeting Goltz thus in- 
formally, I had difficulty in reconciling his personality with 
all the stories that were then coming out of Belgium. That 
morning this mild-mannered, spectacled' gentleman seemed 
sufficiently quiet and harmless. Nor did he look his age — 
he was then about seventy-four ; his hair was only streaked 
with grey, and hi^ face was almost unwrinkled ; I should not 
have taken him for more than sixty-five. The austerity and 
brusqueness and ponderous dignity which are assumed by 
most highly placed Germans were not apparent. His voice 
was deep, musical, and pleasing, and his manners were alto- 
gether friendly and ingratiating. The only evidence of 
pomp in his bearing was his uniform ; he was dressed as a 
field-marshal, his body blazing with decorations and gold 
braid. Von der Goltz explained and half-apologised for his 
regalia by sa3'ing that he just returned from an audience with 
the Sultan. He had come to Constantinople to present his 
majesty a medal from the Kaiser, and was taking back to 
Berlin a similar mark of consideration from the Sultan to 
the Kaiser, besides an imperial present of 10,000 cigarettes. 
The three of us sat there for some time, drinking coffee, 
eating German cakes, and smoking German cigars. I did 
not do much of the talking, but the conversation of von der 
Goltz and Wangenheim seemed to me to shed much light 
upon the German mind, a,nd especially on the trustworthi- 
ness of German military reports. The aspect of the Dar- 
danelles fight that interested them most at that time was 
England's complete frankness in publishing her losses. That 
the British Government should issue an official statement, 
saying that three ships had been sunk and that four others 
had been badly damaged, struck them as most remarkable. 
In this announcement I merely saw a manifestation of the 
usual British desire to make public the worst — the policy 
which we Americans also believe to be the best in war times. 
But no such obvious explanation could satisfy these wise and 
solemn Teutons-. No, England had some deep purpose in 
telling the truth so unblushingly ; what could it be ? 
" Es ist ausserordentlich ! " (It is extraordinary) said von 
der Goltz, referring to England's public acknowledgment of 
defeat. 
" Es ist unerhort ! " (It is unheard of) declared the equally 
astonished Wangenheim. 
These master diplomatists canvassed one explanation after 
another, and finally reached a conclusion that satisfied the 
higher strategy. Eng'and, they agreed, really had had no 
enthusiasm for this attack, because, in the event of success, 
she would have had to hand Constantinople over to Russia 
■ — something which England really did not intend to do. 
By publishing the losses, England showed Russia the enormous 
difficulties of the task ; she had demonstrated, indeed, that 
the enterprise was impossible. After such losses, Eng'and 
intended Russia to understand that she had made a sincere 
attempt to gain this great prize of war and expected her not 
to insist on further sacrifices. 
The sequel to this great episode in the war came in the 
winter of 1915-16. By this time Bulgaria had taken sides 
with the Entente, Serbia had been overwhelmed, and the 
Germans had obtained a complete unobstructed railroad line 
from Constantinople to Austria and Germany. Huge Kiupp 
guns now began to come over this line — all destined for the 
Dardanelles. Sixteen great batteries, of the latest modei, 
were emplaced near the entrance, completely controlling 
Sedd-ul-Bahr. The Germans lent the Turks 500,000,000 
marks, much of which was spent defending this indispensable 
highway. The thinly fortified Straits through which I passed 
in March, 1915, are now as impregnably fortified as Heligo- 
land. It is doubtful if all the fleets in the world could force 
the Dardanelles to-day. 
{To be continued) 
