October 3, 1918 
LAND fe? WATER 
against tanks, stretching all the way from in front of Douai, 
on the Scarpa River, to Marquion, including for the latter 
part of the way the deep ditcli full of mud where it was not 
fuU of water, of the Canal du Nord. The neighbourhood of 
Marquion to, say, Gonnlieu was what may be called the 
gate of Cambrai, a stretch of some miles without water 
defence. Here, under the necessity of defending his junction 
at Cambrai, the enemy was massed in especial strength.' 
Here it was that the British broke through. The canal was 
crossed by a great combination of ingenuity (tanks passing 
over the backs of tanks) and courage. AH the German 
defences were over-run that day, and the morrow the out- 
skirts of Cambrai were reached and the water defence coming 
after the gap (which is the Canal of the Scheldt), was also 
crossed, in spite of its great breadth ; not only was Cambrai 
thus put out of action as a junction of roads and railways, 
but the two canals had been proved vulnerable to attack, 
and all the water defence to the north along the Valley of 
the Agache was turned. The British were right behind it 
by Sunday night, and it cannot be held much longer. But 
when it goes, another junction goes too — the junction of 
Douai. 
Such was the second blow. 
Now put yourself again in the shoes of the enemy's 
High Command and see how things stand on the second 
night of this vast battle, Friday night. 
Two sectors are heavily engaged and are demanding all 
the men you can send them. The absolutely vital sector 
between Argonne and the- Meuse (including its "tail" west 
of Argonne, where the French are keeping a very consider- 
able portion of your forces engaged) and the sector of Cambrai, 
which, though not vital to the very life of all your armies, 
as is the Meuse Valley, but vital at least to the line which 
you are hoIcUng so desperately between Douai and St. Quentin, 
and from which you fear to retire lest the retirement, in face 
of such strong pressure, should be disastrous. You must 
draw up something to try to save Cambrai if it can be saved. 
Where are you to get this new reinforcement from ? You 
have no great general, reserve. You weaken one of your 
remaining strong sectors to the south. Perhaps you take 
men from near St. Quentin, or perhaps from the St. Gobain 
pivot. But you cannot have your men everywhere at once, 
and, while you have depleted your old strength in the centre, 
you have left the north, that is your right wing, the two 
armies of Quast and Arnim, the skeleton weak things they 
have been so long. 
Hence the third blow upon the third day of the battle, 
(so regular and exact is the scheme !). That third blow 
comes with full force upon a Saturday morning against the 
two armies holding the northern end near the sea and they 
give way. It is a complete sweep. The Belgians upon the 
left, the British Second Army upon the right, go forward to 
a surprising depth, and within the first twenty-four hours, 
apparently — or, at any rate, within the first thirty-six 
hours — they are over all the ridges, even Passchendaale 
itself, and on the second day are on ground which no Allied 
soldier has trodden as a free man since 1914. Within forty- 
eight hours this surprising success has actually crossed the 
Menin-Roulers road. 
Now put yourself in the shoes of that enemy Higher Com- 
mand upon the night of the third day — that is, upon Satur- 
day night last. Is he going to let all the front defending 
Belgium go to pieces ? Even if he must retire, is he not 
compelled to see that the line upon which he retires shall be 
strong ? Of course, he is. Therefore, he must find men to 
reinforce the north. 
The problem is now getting very acute indeed. I say again 
he cannot have his men everywhere. In prisoners alone he has 
lost since Thursday morning something like 50,000 men, and 
heaven knows what in killed and wounded. But the north 
must be reinforced somehow ; the only place left from which 
to get those reinforcements is the remaining quiet sector of 
the centre. There has not yet been heavy fighting south of 
that Cambrai gate which he lost two days before. There 
are still important forces in the southern or St. Quentin 
portion of what used to be called "The Hindenburg Line." 
There is the left of Marwitz and the whole of Hutier still able 
to furnish from the reserves of their sectors men for the north. 
Hence the fourth blow, upon the fourth day. 
The dawn of Sunday last, September 29th, the last quiet 
sector, that between St. Quentin and the Cambrai gate, was 
attacked by British and American troops with the utmost 
violence. The Scheldt Canal was again crossed in the lower 
part at" Bellenglise, and to the left of this village wliere the 
canal goes underground in a tunnel, where there is a belt 
therefore without water defence, and where tlie strongest 
type of artificial work was necessary, the Americans upon 
that open front of 5,000 yards equally broke those defences. 
At the time of writing, the heavy battle in this sector is still 
proceeding, and of its further advance we as yet know nothing. 
There, then, is the scheme of these great four days. They 
have been essentially a series of strategical operations : the 
enemy first compelled to strengthen hurriedly as a matter 
of life and death the Meuse Valley. The moment he has with- 
drawn men elsewhere for that purpose, the next blow in the 
second most vital spot, Cambrai, the second weakening of 
his line elsewhere, to save Cambrai if it be possible : then, 
the thircj blow where he has been compelled to leave a very 
depleted body in the north, and on the great success of that 
third blow, followed as it probably was by a further depletion 
in the centre. A fourth blow, striking at that centre, and 
carrying its line. 
TJie enemy is now suffering, but on a far larger scale and 
with no prospect of coming recruitments, precisely what the 
Allies suffered in March, April, and May, when they were 
hurrying their rapidly dwindling reserve now' here, now 
there, never knowing where the next blow would fall, and 
with the utmost difficulty finding the men to prevent local 
ruptures of the line. 
But, if I may be allowed to say so, without that detestable 
note of boasting which is the ruin of military study, there is 
this vast difference between those days and these. In those 
days the Germans had not one definite strategical mind. 
They did not pursue one definite strategical plan. They did 
not think with unity. They did not concentrate with that 
"fundamental brain work," which is perhaps more essential 
in the military art than in any other, though in every art it 
is of supreme necessity. Any man can see for himself to-day 
upon the map that what has happened in these four days 
is the unrolling of a steady and majestic strategical con- 
ception. No one can say that of the two sporadic blows 
which followed the great German offensive in March, the 
blow north of the Oise, followed by the blow against the 
Chemin des Dames a month later. The German efforts were 
disconnected, were gambles. They almost succeeded, but 
not quite. 
The German efforts demanded intervals of weeks and 
were not consecutive. They did not play into each other's 
hands. This great action is consecutive and articulate in 
every part. 
I will conclude by noting certain details of the last four 
days, which are of great local interest. First note the import- 
ance of Montfaucon captured by Americans in their first 
advance between the Argonne and the Meuse. The accom- 
panying sketch of contours illustrates its value. It is the 
dominating observation post of the whole neighbourhood. 
But that is only one interest attached to it. It is clear that 
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such a point would not have been lost by the enemy if he could 
possibly have held. The fact that he did not hold it, but 
allowed it to be turned from cither side and surrounded, is 
the main proof of the surprise he suffered in this sector. 
The next point to which I will draw attention is the im- 
portance of the local action fought last Sunday by the French 
just east of the Argonne, when (only at the expense of very 
heavy fighting) they seized the height called Mount Cuvelet. 
There was no necessity to go far forward in this sector at all. 
It is obviously a containing sector, but the possession of 
Cuvelet Hill is essential even to holding ; for, as the sketch 
appended will show, Cuvelet Hill commands the whole of 
the Aire Valley. So long as the enemy had it, the French 
