THE WAR: By HILAIRE BELLOC 
Military Significance of the German Offer 
The Line of the Arnes 
I WRITE from Paris, on Sunda\-, October 6th, and a 
day earlier than usual, as this article must reach 
London in time for the present week's issue. 
The enemy's great and sudden effort to obtain a 
favourable peace, and to avoid disaster, was known 
privately rather late upon Saturday evening. I have 
not been told at what hour it first reached this city. 
It was already the subject of conversation between eight 
and nine o'clock. It was not received by the evening papers, 
however, in time for their last issues. 
The moment was exactly chosen — like the first air-raids 
on London. It was calculated — criidely enough — that, 
coming late on a Saturday evening, when many would be 
absent, and with tlie delay of Sunday to work on, those 
who were' already advised of the move could steal a march 
in favour of its authors. The intention had leaked out 
already. Every one had noted the sudden rise in English 
consols, and the French Government had wisely forestalled 
the enemy's action by a strong declaration — twenty-four 
hours earlier — that the subjects of Prussia, collectively as 
well as the individuals responsible for particular orders, 
would be called upon to pay — to make reparation — for the 
abominations of which they have been guilty. They must 
expiate them not only in money, but in service and in 
person. 
I say the knowledge that the enemy would make such a 
move had already leaked out. Thereby, it lost much of its 
effect. Nevertheless, that effect was very great. From the 
early hours of this Sunday morning, when the newspapers 
first put it into the hands of the general" public, the whole 
city has thought and talked nothing else but the meaning. 
of the act. To its terms little attention is paid ; they are 
thought neither sincere nor possible. No one, except a few 
word-spinners out of touch at once with the populace at 
home, the common soldiers, and the directing staffs (civil 
and military), has a word to waste upon the limits or possible 
extension of the enemy's offer ; but its meaning — ^wljy it 
was made, just when it was made — is another mat1,er. Every 
one is discussing that. And the popular mass — the humble 
people upon whom the war has laid its chief burden ; the 
private soldiers here on leave ; the women working in the 
factories and on transport ; the refugees who come from 
the villages which the Prussians and their subjects have 
destroyed, and whose own flesh and blood are even at present 
enslaved and digging tranches for the enemy — these are 
discussing it more thoroughly than does the Press. 
What is the meaning of the moment chosen for such a 
step ? A nation subject to invasion, conscript for nearly 
fifty years, and well acquainted with war from centuries of 
its practice and tradition, has answered this question with 
something like unanimity. The Prussian offer (for it is 
Prussian in origin) is made at this moment because nothing 
but a compromise upon the part of the Allies can now save 
Prussia, her dynast}-, and the system of predatory war by 
which she and her reigning family live, from complete 
ruin and annihilation. It is true that if the criminal 
is destroyed, civilisation will breathe freely again ; it is true 
that if the criminal is not destroyed — if his system survives 
and his crimes go unpunished — Europe will see no end in 
our time to the threat at least, and, more probably, to the 
actual succession of wars. But it is natural that the criminal 
should try to save his own life ; and -he is trying to save it. 
That is the meaning of the move. 
To understand its moment we must return to something 
with which my readers are more familiar in these columns 
than with political di.scussion. We must examine the military 
situation at the time when this new policy was launched. 
It was decided ujwn in Berlin during the late evening of 
last Friday, October 4th. Why was it decided on at that 
critical time ? Why was that time critical ? 
One might answer that question with some exaggeration, 
and perhaps too dramatically — but fully all the same — by 
sayirig : "Because Gotiraud had reached the Ames." 
I know well the defect of such sentences. They arc rhe- 
torical and, taken by themselves, they are ridiculously 
insufficient. What has decided Prussia to this forlorn hope, 
this attempt to save something from the wreck, is a vast deal 
more than any detail of the front. The entry of America, 
the imexpected excellence of the American units so rapidly 
pushed into the field, the tank (which is British), the strategy 
of Foch, at once continuous and triumphant since July i8th ; 
the triumph of Allenby — wiping out a whole third of the 
Turkish armies at a blow ; the collapse of Bulgaria and the 
consequent opening of incalculable ports in the south-east — 
all these have between them made up the gravity of this 
moment for Prussia and her subjects. 
But Gouraud's reaching the Ames brook is at once the 
symbol and the test of all this : — and I will say why ; for 
when we see that little advance of a few thousand, yards 
in the light of the last few weeks and their military record, 
we shall appreciate its historical importance. 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE MAIN BATTLE 
It will be remembered that up to the middle of September 
all the great things done by the Allied armies upon the West 
were in the nature of a preparation. They were the laying 
of foundations. The main building had not begun. The 
two months mid- July to mid-September were the "laying 
out" of the main battle, the establishment of its conditions. 
Until that main battle was joined, until its fortunes grew 
even after its first phases had unrolled, one could not make 
certain of the issue. 
Especially could not and would not the ^nemy despair 
of such issue. He could still hope on to the last moment 
in his power to reconstitute a strong defensive, when he should 
have been able to retreat to prepared lines, and to make a 
stand in conditions — as he hoped they would be — of his own 
choosing. 
When the German offensive broke down on July 15th 
east of Rheims the result might yet have been only negative 
if the Allied Higher Command had not seized the oppor- 
tunity with the utmost rapidity. The opportunity was 
seized ; ten divisions were swung round behind the whole 
battle line and appeared suddenly in front of Soissons upon 
Thursday, July i8th. It was a repetition on a gigantic scale 
of Carnot's work at Wattignies, or of Joffre's movement of 
the 4th Corps from the Verdun front to Paris during the 
first battle of the Marne. 
The bold manoeuvre succeeded — as it had succeeded at 
Wattignies 125 years ago. The 150,000 were not too fatigued 
to resume the offensive. They struck at dawn on that 
Thursday, and, by ten in the morning the face of the war 
had changed. It was certain that the enemy must, hence- 
forward, fight defensively and for time. 
But, even so, though the face of the war had so suddenly 
changed, it was not and could not be known whether the 
enemy might not re-establish a long and very difficult defence. 
He stood upon three great salients of his own making — that 
of Chateau Thierry thrust forward from the base Soissons- 
Rheims ; that of Amiens, thrust forward from the base 
Arras-St. Gobain ; and that of St. Mihiel. The Allies 
must first reduce these salients. That done, the German 
armies would still be intact and standing on a shorter im- 
indented line. There would their power of resistance be 
proved. They publicly announced that they would attempt 
such a retirement. They publicly boasted that once it 
was established they could stand indefinitely ; and there 
were plenty of people among ourselves, especially men con- 
trolling newspapers, ignorant enough, foolish enough, and 
timid enough to believe them. 
The salients were reduced. But they were reduced not 
at the enemy's time nor in his way. They were reduced at 
the dictation and after the fashion chosen by the Allied 
command. The Chateau Thierry salient went between 
July i8th and 30th. Then came Haig's great attack of 
August 8th, and the Amiens salient was reduced in ten days. 
But the enemy could not retire and straighten his line 
as he would. The pressure upon him extended and increased 
enormously. It spread out all the latter part of August 
