6. 
LAND fe? WATER 
October 17, 1918 
Constantinople. Some said Mackensen could detach six 
divisions — presumably at full strength or near it (a quite 
insufficient force). Some even put the possible combined 
effort of Austria and Germans in this region at eleven 
divisions : a force which — were the units of reasonable 
strength — could certainly have held. 
We now know that the enemy was unable to do anything. 
For if he could have covered any point at all costs, that 
point was Nish. 
Nish is perhaps the most important nodal point in any 
theatre of the present war. The Balkans are so made that 
the line by which road and railway communications join all 
the East through Constantinople with the Dardanelles is 
naturally protected with most formidable barriers of moun- 
tains running parallel to, and well in front of, its course ; 
and these ranges have no roads across them for the passage 
of artillery, while their sparse habitation and lack of supply, 
as well as their naked ruggedness, make *hem as difficult 
a set of obstacles to advance from the south as anything in 
Europe. Through such country the only effective avenue 
of approach with a base behind it is the long trench of the 
Vardar VaTley, continued by that of the Morava, along which 
all armies attempting a northern advance through the moun- 
tains have had to proceed since the military history of 
this region began. 
Now, it is at Nish this sole avenue of approach from the 
south, based on the one good port of Salonika, comes into 
the great transversal east and west which carries the sole 
communication between Central Europe and the Orient. 
Who holds Nish and is supplied from Salonika cuts off by 
land Turkey and all the Near East from the German and 
Austro-German empires. To have saved Nish, therefore, 
had it been possible, would have been the first act of the 
enemy the moment he had heard of Bulgarian weakness — 
long before the Bulgarian collapse. He failed to save Nish 
simply because he had not the men. The particular situa- 
tion was part apd parcel of the general situation which is 
marked everywhere by the enemy's lack of numbers. He 
may have had the divisions. They may have been of good 
material. But they were not divisions of 9,000 nor of 5,000 
infantry. They were skeletons. That, I think, is the 
explanation of this event in the Balkans. 
Surrender the Submarines: By Arthur Pollen 
WE cannot this week complain that there is 
any lack of sea news or that the events that 
crowd upon each other are -wanting in impor- 
tance'. The difficulty, indeed, is in the avail- 
able space to deal only with those that have 
an immediate bearing either on the campaign or on the 
negotiations which the enem.y is so anxious to initiate. This 
limits the subjects to be discussed to two. The crucial 
influence that combined naval and military operations may 
have at this stage of the war is one that cannot be passed 
over, though it must be dismissed in a paragraph ; the new 
development of submarine activity — which may affect the 
campaign seriously, and must affect enemy negotiations 
decisively — must be dfealt with at greater length. 
Of the Durazzo bombardment we have now a far fuller 
report sent us by the Times correspondent in Rome. From 
this it appears that the operation was on a larger scale and 
employed a more formidable force than Signor Orlando's 
somewhat rhetorical first account suggested. It illustrates 
the secrecy with which the use of sea-power is always 
enshrouded that it is only new that we hear, not only that 
Italian battleships have been in action for the first time, 
but for the first time that they have even left their anchor- 
ages ! It was seemingly a squadron of the smaller of the 
capital ships that undertook tjie destruction of the Austrian 
vessels and works in the Albanian port of Durazzo. Pro-' 
bably a second battle squadron kept watch outside Cattaro. 
The expedition was under the command of Admiral Count 
Revel, formerly Chief of the Naval Staff in Rome, a man 
of great force of character, and regarded by his contemporaries 
as at once the soundest and most brilliant of the younger 
generation of Italian seamen. The story, when told in full, 
will no doubt afford a great number of points for technical 
discussion. For the moment it must be looked at from a 
wider standpoint. The nature of the force employed, the 
selection of a leader of marked initiative and exceptional 
powers of command, are guarantees that it is not intended 
that this operation should be an isolated event. So far, it 
seems to have been not only an operation purely naval in 
character, but strictly limited, as I at first supposed, to the 
destruction of the port by gunfire. There was, that is to 
say, no attempt either at landing troops or of blocking the 
port permanently. It remains, then, a success the full 
value of which will depend upon the use that is made of it. 
If it is succeeded by similar^ attacks on Cattaro or Ragusa ; 
if the coast-wise communications of the Austrian .^rmy 
operating in Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia can be cut 
— or, what would be better still, if a mixed naval and military 
force could be interposed from the sea, and so the enemy's 
land communications be compromised as well — then Durazzo 
may be the beginning of a new development in Allied strategy. 
Of what crucial importance such a development, had we 
all been ready for it, might be now, is certainly suggested 
by the news — apparently trustworthy — that the Germans 
have withdrawn their long-range guns both from Zeebrugge 
and all other points along the Flanders coast. There are 
further rumours that not only all submarines, but all 
destroyers have been retired from the Flemish ports, so that 
— in the literal sense of the word — the coast is clear, so far, 
at least, as these methods of offence and defence are con- 
cerned. I suggested last week that a military force landed 
on the Syrian coast might have precipitated, and in a most 
clecisive manner, the destruction of the Turkish Army. Is 
it possible to exaggerate the military value of a similar force 
landed in the rear of the enemy on the Flanders coast to-day 
— if such a thing were possible ? We cannot now go beyond 
the mere suggestion of such a possibility before passing to 
the very grave question raised by the sinking of the Leinster 
and the Hirano Mam. 
There is no necessity to dwell upon the shocking and 
wicked character of these outrages. The world is past 
being shocked, and the wickedness is acknowledged. The 
American troops, we are told, have again and again charged 
with the cry "Remember the Lusitania." Well, if the 
memory of that crime were in danger of fading, the enemy 
has, with singular fatuity, revived it^by his work of last 
week. For, not since that dreadful day in May, 1^15, has 
so large a toll been taken of non-belligerent life. But it is 
not this aspect of the question that concerns us most now. 
Two others take precedence. What do these events tell us 
of the enemy's war plans ? What influence are they bound 
to have upon his peace manoeuvres ? 
As to the first of these questions, the known facts of the 
case are curiously striking and suggestive. Ten days ago 
I was able elsewhere to publish the singular fact that, during 
September, there had been more submarines in operation 
than at any previous period of the war, while the number 
both of sinkings and of attempts to sink had been consider- 
ably less than in any month during the last two years. 
Admiral Sims has just informed some compatriot editors 
that, until recently, the average number of U-boats known 
to be at large at any one time varied from njne to thirteen. 
During August the number was nearly doubled. During 
September there was a still further increase. How, then, 
are we to explain why the number of attacks in British 
waters, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, were fewer in 
September than in August ? Only one interpretation is 
possible. And it is the interpretation suggested by Captain 
Briininghaus. At the first meeting of the Main Committee 
of the Reichstag, after the naval command was recon- 
stituted, this officer explained with great precision how, 
notwithstanding all the previous disappointments, the 
German Navy was not only still convinced that the U-boat 
was the most powerful weapon at the disposal of the Father- 
land, but was one with which the Anglo-Saxon world could 
surely be "brought to reason." And he did not fail to 
suggest that, just as Germany possessed to-day a larger 
fleet of submarines than at any time during the war, so, too, 
this fleet would, if only the confidence of the nation in its 
potency could be maintained, now be employed to achieve 
the end which every German desires. Now, put the known 
facts of the campaign, such as 1 have recorded, and this 
official declaration of policy together, and what do we find ? 
For the first time since the Tirpitz threat was uttered the 
German Admiralty has at its disposal and ready for work 
at sea more than 150 submarines, apart, that is to say, from 
obsolete boats and those retained for instructional purposes 
only. Never till within recent months — as the gallant 
American Admiral informs us — were more than nine to 
thirteen employed at any one time. In August and 
September — that is, immediately after Admiral Scheer took 
control of the Marine Amt — the previous maximum was 
