October 17, 1918 
LAND &» WATER 
11 
the Bulgarian position was the determination to have Mace- 
donia. Everything, said Koloucheff, depended upon that. 
His conversations reflected the general Bulgarian view that 
Bulgaria had fairly won this territory in the first Balkan War, 
that the Powers had unjustly permitted her to be deprived 
of it, that it was Bulgarian by race, language, and tradition, 
and that there could be no permanent peace in the Balkans 
until it was returned to its rightful possessors. But Bulgaria 
insisted on more than a promise, to be redeemed after the 
war was over ; she demanded immediate occupation. Once 
-Macedonia were turned over to Bulgaria, she would join 
her forces to those of the Entente. There were two great 
prizes in the game then being played in the Balkans ; one 
was Macedonia, which Bulgaria must have, and the other 
Constantinople, which Russia was determined to get. Bul- 
garia was entirely willing that Russia should have Con- 
stantinople if she herself could obtain Macedonia. 
I was given to understand that the Bulgarian (ieneral 
Staff had plans all completed for the capture of Constantinople, 
and that they had shown these plans to the Entente. Their 
programme called for a Bulgarian army of 300,000 men 
advancing upon Constantinople twenty-three days from the 
time the signal to start should be given ; but promises of 
Macedonia would not suffice — they must have possession. 
Bulgaria recognised the difficulties of the Allied position. 
She did not believe that Serbia and Greece would voluntarily 
surrender Macedonia, nor did she believe that the Allies 
would dare to take this coimtry away from them by force. 
In that event, she thought that there was a danger that 
Serbia might make a separate peace with the Central Powers. 
On the other hand, Bulgaria would object if Serbia received 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as compensation for the loss of 
Macedonia — she felt that an enlarged Serbia would be a 
constant menace to her, and hence a future menace to peace 
in the Balkans. 
One of the best-informed men in Turkey^was Paul Wcitz, 
the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung. Weitz was 
more than a journalist ; he had spent thirty years in Con- 
stantinople, and he was the confidant and adviser of 
the German pmbassy. His duties there were really semi- 
diplomatic. Weitz had really been one of the most successful 
agencies in the German penetration of Turke\'. I 
had several talks with Weitz about Bulgaria during 
those critical August and early September days. He said 
many times that it was not at all certain that she would 
join her forces with Germany. Yet on September 7th Weitz 
came to me with important news. The situation had changed 
over-night. Baron Neurath, the Counseiller of the German 
Embassy at Constantinople, had gone to Sofia, and, as a 
result of his visit, an agreement had been signed that would 
make Bulgaria Germany's ally. 
Germany, said Weitz, had won over Bulgaria by doing 
something which the Entente had not been able and willing 
to do. It had secured her the immediate possession of a . 
piece of coveted territory. Serbia had refused to give 
Bulgaria immediate possession of Macedonia ; Turkey, on- 
the other hand, had now surrendered a piece of the Ottoman 
Empire. The amoxint of land in question, it is true, was. 
apparently insignificant, yet it had great strategic advantages 
and represented a genuine sacrifice by Turkey. The Maritza 
River, a few miles north of Enos, bends to the east, to the 
north, and then to the west again, creating a block of terri- 
torv, with an area of nearly 1,000 square miles, including 
the important cities of Demotica, Kara-Agatch, and half of 
Adrianople. Wliat makes this land particularly important 
is that it contains about fifty miles of the railroad which 
runs from Dedeagatch to Sofia. All this railroad — that is, 
except this fifty miles — is laid in Bulgarian territory., this 
short strip, extending through- Turkey, cuts Bulgaria's 
communications with the Mediterranean. Naturally Bul- 
garia yearned for this strip of land ; and Turkey now ha.nded 
it over to her. Besides the railroad, Bulgaria obtained 
that part of Adrianopk which lay west of the Maritza River. 
In addition of course, Bulgaria was to receive Macedonia 
as soon as that province could be occupied by Bulgaria 
and her allies. 
I vividly remember the exultation of Weitz when this 
agreement was signed. 
"It's all -settled," he told me. "Bulgaria has decided 
to join us. It was all arranged last night at Sofia." 
The Turks also were greatly relieved. For the first -time 
they saw the way out of tlieir troubles. The Bulgarian 
arrangement, Enver told me, had taken a tremendous weight 
off their -minds. 
" We Turks are entitled to the credit," he said, " of bringmg 
Bulgaria in on the side of the Central Powers. She would 
never have come to our assistance if we iiadn't given her 
that slice of land. By surrendering it immediately, and 
not waiting till the end of the war, we showed our good 
faith. It was very hard for us to do it, of course, especially 
to give up part of the city of Adrianople, but it was worth 
the price. We really surrendered this territory in exchange 
for Constantinople, for, if Bulgaria had not come in on our 
side, we would have lost this city. Just think how enor- 
mously we have improved our position. We have had to 
keep more than 200,000 men at the Bulgarian frontier, to 
protect us against any possible attack from that quarter. 
We can now transfer all these troops to the Gallipoli pienin- 
sula, and thus make it absolutely impossible that the Allies' 
expedition can succeed. We are also greatly hampered at 
the Dardanelles by the lack of ammunition. But Bulgaria, 
Austria, and Germany are to make a joint attack on Serbia, 
and will completely control that country in a few weeks. 
So we shall have a direct railroad line from Constantinople 
into Austria and Germany, and can get all the war supplies 
which we need. With Bulgaria on our side no attack can 
be made on Constantinople from the north — we have created 
an impregnable bulwark against Russia. I do not deny 
that the situation has caused us great anxiety. We were 
afraid that Greece and Bulgaria would join hands, and that 
would also bring in Rumania. Then Turkey would have 
been lost ; they would have had us between a pair of' pincers. 
We gave up that piece of land because we saw that that 
was the way to win the war." 
Effects of the Dardanelles Defeat 
The outcome justified Enver's prophecies in almost every 
detail. Three months after Bulgaria accepted the Teutonic 
bribe, the Entente admitted defeat, and withdrew its forces 
from the Dardanelles, and with this withdrawal, Russia, 
the country which, properly organised and supplied, 
might have brought the Allies a speedy triumph, disap- 
peared as a vital factor in the war. When the British 
and French withdrew from Gallipoli they turned adrift this 
huge hulk of a country to flounder to anarchy, dissolution, 
and ruin.. 
The Germans celebrated this great triumph in a way that 
was characte'ristically Teutonic. In their minds, January 
17th, 1916, stands out as one of the great dates in the war. 
There was great rejoicing in Constantinople for the first 
Balkan express — or, as the Germans called it, the Balkanzug — 
was due to arrive that afternoon ! The railroad station was 
decorated with flags and flowers, and the whole German 
and Austrian population of Constantinople, including the 
Embassy staffs, assembled to welcome the incoming train. 
As it finally rolled into the station, thousands of "hochs" 
went up from as many raucous throats. 
Since that January 17th, 1916, the Balkanzug has run 
regularly from Berlin to Constantinople. The Germans 
believe that it is as permanent a feature of the new Germanic 
Empire as the line from Berlin to Hamburg. 
(7"o be continued) 
Note. — Since Mr. Morgenthau's story was written, the 
march of events has destroyed German belief in the pertnanency 
of the Balkanzug as an accessory to the German Empire. 
Having joined in the overrunning of Serbia, Bulgaria was 
able to ensure the clear through line from Berlin to Constan- 
tinople ihat Germany desired, and to hold the lines from Lake 
Doiran to the north of Monastir, until General Franchet 
d'Esperey launched his offensive with the Allied forces based 
on Salonika, early in this autumn of 1918. The' Serbian 
Army led the offensive, in conjunction with French troops, 
striking from the north and east of Monas ir, and breaking 
the first defensive line held by the Bulgarian armies. As soon 
as the retreat in this portion of the line had begun, British arui 
Greek troops, in the vicinity of Lake Doiran, moved forward, 
and the retreat became general along the whole line, while masses 
of prisoners were captured. On the left, the. Serbian and French 
troops successivelv took Veles and Usknb, thrusting' a wedge 
in to northward that divided the eastern and western ha ves 
of the Bulgarian forces, and cut the western forces totally from 
their bases. The downfall of the Bulgarian Army was com- 
plete, and toward the end of September a new Bulgarian 
Government, leith Malinoff, a pro-Entente statesman, asked for 
an armistice in order that terms of peace might be discussed. 
General D'Esperev offered only unconditional surrender as the 
price of peace, and this xvas accepted on September yith, when 
Bulgaria went out of the war. At this present time of writing, 
the Serbian troops, advancing against the thin screen of Austrian 
and German troops left in Serbia, have captured and advanced 
beyond Nish, and the Balkanzug now runs only between Berlin 
and Belgrade, on the A ustro-Serbian frontier. With the breaking 
of this line of communication, the cause for which Bulgaria 
it>as bought as an adherent In' the Central T^owers ceases to exist. 
