October 24, 1918 
LAND &> WATER 
an excellent water line, but the two heavy disadvantages 
of bad communications behind it — for it has nothing behind 
it but the Ardennes, with their deep ravines, sparsely in- 
habited country, few roads, and insignificant roundabout 
railwaj'S — and of largely separating his Belgian from his 
Lorraine-Luxemburg group of armies. 
The j\Ieuse is a broad and deep stream nearly all tlie way — 
with no fords till quite its upper reaches, and these easily 
flooded. It is a straight line, with the narrow mouths of 
the river-loops easih' defended, and consequently a saving 
in fnen. But to supply tlie line holding it 'and, still more, 
to retire any considerable body across the Ardennes under 
pressure, would be a heavy task. Further, he would have 
behind him the deep ravine of the Semois, the few roads 
crossing which meet at very few bridges, tlie principal (and 
necessarily congested) nodal point being at Bouillon. The 
deep woods which dominate the east bank of the stream up 
to and past Sedan are to his advantage. But lateral move- 
ment on any large scale, to reinforce Lorraine from the 
Belgian plain, or the Belgian plain from Lorraine, would 
be impossible. That would be the main and probably fatal 
disadvantage of such a line : his armies would fall into two. 
Further, the line — which now lies only a few miles behind 
his present positions — would be no great saving in length. 
Its considerable proportion of water rather than its short- 
ness would be his asset in the saving of men. 
Supposing this line to be denied him either bj' the nature 
of the pressure to which he is subjected, or because of the lack 
of men on his side, there remains as an alternative what is 
much the shortest line of all and what, had he retired upon 
it long ago, might have offered the opportunities foi a pro- 
longed defence. It is the line covering Li^ge and going across 
the "Haute Fagne" — that is, the high desolate moors of the 
eastern .Ardennes to cover Luxemburg and Thionville, and 
rejoin the present lines in front of Metz. 
It is a line which saves nearly halfoi the length he formerly 
defended between Metz and the North Sea. It has excellent 
lateral communications not far behind it, and, within two 
hours petrol delivery, the railway system of Western Ger- 
many. It is close to supplies, for it covers at no great dis- 
tance his main factories. Nevertheless he will not take up 
that line, I think, even if the pursuit should pernfit, and that 
for this reason : that to take it up would bring the great 
and growing armies against him to the very borders of his 
own country. 
Such a line is politically perilous in the extreme for him ; 
even slrategically it is, under modem conditions, perilous. 
It would put his chief industrial centres under ceaseless 
attack from the air, even so long as it held, a score of large 
German towns would become hardly habitable and, should 
it break, invasion would at once follow, and invasion with 
no line to hold it. Every line east of the Lidge-Metz line is 
longer and longer as you go east : Ijhat of the Rhine is of an 
impossible length. 
The Li6ge-Metz Une would be an immediate promise of 
disaster, and it is probable he would accept the terms of 
defeat before attempting to hold it. 
All this discussion of the two possible rallying lines of the 
enfemy is, we must remember, very theoretical. What 
really governs the situation is the appalhng drain in men 
suffered by a force already insufficient, and losing effectives 
twice as rapidly as it can remit. But, theoretical as the 
analysis is, it is worth making, because it instructs us on the 
remaining slender opportunities of defence which the enemy 
still possesses. 
RESULTS SINCE THE FIRST COUNTER-OFFENSIVE 
(i) War of movement residred to the enemy's disadvantage, 
and that disadvantage maintained and increased. 
Every movement, without exception, is a movement of 
advance on the part of the Allies and a retrograde move- 
ment on the part of the enemy. These movements, unlike 
those imposed by the enemy in the period immediately pre- 
ceding (March 21st- July 15th), are continuous. The enemy 
in the period just mentioned had intervals of four weeks, 
thrice repeated, and this on account both of his losses in 
attack and of his lack of elasticity and rapidity in prepara- 
tion, to which add his strategical habit of massed attack 
upon the largest possible scale. No interval between main 
actions has lasted a full week since the initiative passed to 
the Allies. 
(2) Cumulative fatigue imposed upon the enemy. 
This ceaseless pressure, exercised at every part of the 
line successively from the Meuse to the North Sea, and 
maintained by a number of attacks upon comparatively 
narrow fronts, steadily extending, has left the enemy less 
and less opportunity for resting his troeps as the manoeuvre 
proceeded. There is to-day no " quiet " sector west of 
the Meuse. Of the enemy's total force, ten days ago, 
less than 20 per cent, were on "qiiiet" sectors, 50 per 
cent, were in line, against the full action of the Allies. 
Of the remaining 30 per cent., 23 per ctot. were battered 
divisions withdrawn exhausted from the line, and unfit for 
action pending rest and recruitment ; only 7 per cent, 
were fit recruited and rested divisions held in reserve. 
Such proportions have never been seen before in this war. 
And they are actually increasing to the enemy's disadvan- 
tage as time proceeds. For the rate of recruitment is less- 
by far than the rate of loss. To this form of fatigue imposed 
must be added tliat of increasing lateral movement. As 
one's reserves decline, so one is under the necessity of making 
units travel further to reinforce threatened points or to 
relieve broken units withdrawn from the line. So long as- 
you have ample reserves, you can distribute them evenly 
all along the line ready to support from each point on which 
they are placed the sections immediately in front of them. 
But when you have few and dwindling reserves, you have 
to send them now here, now there, at a moment's notice,- 
and as your opponent strikes unexpectedly, at points widely 
separated, both the movement of your reserves and of your 
units in line is increasing active up and down the frcnt — 
that is, laterally. This was. the great asset of the enemy 
against ourselves last spring. He imposed a fearful strain 
upon the French and British armies by attacks widely- 
separated which imposed exhausting journeys of concentra- 
tion to meet them. For example, hardly was he held by 
concentration south-west of Amiens on April 4th, when, 
on April 9th, he attacked far off in the north, imposing on a 
number of French and English divisions journeys of 100 
miles by congested lateral communication. To-day it is 
we who are putting a similar pressure on him. 
(3) The losses inflicted on the enemy have been crippling. 
In men he has lost, as prisoners alone, one-third of a million,. 
since the counter-offensive began. His total losses caimot 
be accurately estimated, but if we double the loss in prisoners- 
we are certainly within the mark. His rate of loss is much 
more than double all his possible sources of recruitment, 
and it continues without interruption. His total losses since 
the opening of the year are approximately two millions, ^ 
of which more than a million are definite losses — that is, 
men who cannot return. His divisions never approach, 
to-day, the old reduced establishment of 9,000 infantry (three 
regiments of three full battalions each). Their average 
to-day is certainly less than 6,000, and probably has fallen 
to less than 5,500. Their best, and therefore most tried, 
divisions are often to-day only skeleton divisions — from 
a quarter to a fifth or (in one recorded case) a sixth of full 
establishment. Of guns they have lost in this brief period 
the equivalent of one quarter of their whole artillery, and 
one-third of that present upon theu Western front ; and of 
.this loss seven-eighths is loss by direct capture. The loss is 
at the rate of 9 per cent, a month — it cannot be replaced 
even at the half-rate at which the* loss ip men can (on paper) 
be replaced. More German guns by far have hpen taken 
since the counter-offensive began than were taken from the 
Allies by the Austrians and Germans combined in all the 
great attacks between October 17th at Caporetto and July 
i8th in front of Rheims. All our losses are already replaced. 
Theirs can never be. 
(4) The conditions of aerial bombardment are reversed. 
Before the period under review the two capitals of the 
AUies were under perpetual bombardment from the air; the 
main western towns of the enemy had but little experience 
of such raids. The line so stood that all advantage in this 
matter was with the enemy. To-day the line so stands 
that some of his great centres are directly menaced. 
The organisation has been produced which continually 
uses this advantage. The Belgian coast, essential to the 
raiding of London, has been lost. 
(5) The southern submarine bases are lost to the enemy. 
His distance from the Straits of Dover, for instance, has 
increased at one blow from one or two hours to twelve. 
(6) (And much the most important — inclusive of all the 
rest) The enemy has accepted the certitude of defeat. 
He is. at tlie stage when a beaten commander with an 
army still in being manoeuvres no longer on the field for 
victory, but politically for time and the least disastrous 
terms. 
What our attitude should be in the face of such manoeuvres 
is generally admitted. We should ignore them. But we 
also need a positive programme : concrete conditions of 
victory ; and to these I propose to turn next week. 
