LAND & WATER 
December 19, 1918 
at the Mame was this. A great swing down through Belgium 
and Northern France, pivoting upon the region of Verdun 
presented, of course, an open flank at its extremity. This 
open flank — the right flank of the German First Army under 
Kluck — was not properly scouted — there was no provision 
for a sufficient flank guard with all its functions. A mixture of 
over-confidence and of unintelligence was the cause of such 
an error, and of that error the 
French Higher Command took 
immediate advantage. This open 
flank, protected by no more than 
two divisions, and these two 
divisions far too dose to the main 
army, were struck at noon on 
September 5th by the Sixth 
French Army, the initiative of 
this particular stroke being that 
of Gallieni, the Governor of 
Paris. 
With extreme rapidity, another 
example of tactical excellence, 
Kluck brought back his divisions 
from beyond the Mame and 
successfully met and resisted the 
attack upon the flank which he 
had so foolishly neglected, but 
though he was able to re-establish 
local equilibrium the main battle 
was lost, for the whole line was 
strained. Fifty miles away in the 
centre upon the fifth day of the 
battle there arose an opportunity 
for a counter-stroke, and Foch, 
there commanding, struck with 
the 42nd French Division right 
into the exposed side of the 
Prussian Gu:ird, overthrew that 
body of men, and thereby decided 
the Battle of the Mame ; the line 
was pierced and an immediate 
retreat was imposed upon the 
Germans. That retreat reached prepared positions upon the 
line of the Aisne, consisting of hilly country north of Soissons. 
These positions were carried across the plain of Cham- The essential of a siege is the confinement of a force to 
pagne, unhappily within dose range of Rheims. They utilised manoeuvre within containing lines imposed upon it by an 
GENERAL SIR HENRY BAWLINSON 
complete and unexpected a change in the situation, while it 
was grouping its men together round the north to use the 
open gate, that gate was closed by the Allies. With astonishing 
speed, by a piece of railway work far superior to any which 
the enemy himself could show even in the latter phases of the 
campaign, the British force was transferred bodily from the 
front of the Aisne to that of Ypres, and the French armies 
ran up, one superimposed upon 
the other in a ladder, dosing all 
the country in between from the 
junction of the Aisne and the 
Oise to the right flank of the new 
British positions. The Belgians 
and certain French forces mixed 
with them, notably the famous 
Marine Brigade, closed the last few 
miles of the front of the Lower Yser 
and reached the sea at Nieuport. 
With this operation complete 
round about October 20th-22nd, 
the preliminaries of the great siege 
war ended, and the investment 
or containment had begun. We 
have next to follow the far longer 
story of the siege itself, with its 
great sorties; the failure over and 
over again of the besiegers to 
effect a breach ; the triumphant 
success of the besieged in eliminat- 
ing one whole sector of the siege 
ring — Russia ; the use they made 
of this relief for the production of 
a new tactical instrument ; their 
employment of that instrument 
in the last great efforts in the 
West to break out — Caporetto and 
Amiens ; the final breakdown of 
those efforts upon July 15th of 
this year. This central, second, 
phase covers nearly four years. 
II 
the forest of the Argonne. They were occupied by forces 
still far superior numerically to those which had defeated them 
in the great battle. Those positions held against continued 
Allied assaults, which were soon 
found vain and abandoned. 
But the preliminaries, the 
throwing of the enemy into his 
fortress, were not yet accom- 
plished. There still lay after that 
September 2nd-3rd, when the 
pursuit to the Aisne was checked, 
a great open space between the ex- 
tremity of the German line which 
had haJted, and the sea. Drawing 
the line roughly, it reached from 
the neighbourhood of Soissons to 
the southern Bilgian coist. There 
was here a great open gate of 
which surely the high numerical 
superiority of the enemy could 
have taken advantage. Here 
might he have redressed the con- 
sequences of the Mame by coming 
round upon his right and restoring 
a war of movement. He failed to 
do so. Once again his strategy 
was at fault. 
The Prussian school of strategy, 
copied from the examples given 
by Napoleon, could imitate the 
pattern but could not for* a 
moment discover the soul of that 
commander. Its plans developed 
extraordinary detail, and super- 
ficially they seemed to comprise 
the supreme, the absolute, military 
virtue of rapidity. But only 
GENERAL MANGIN 
opponent. This does not mean that these lines are neces-. 
sarily stable. They may fluctuate. But so long as they are 
intact, and so long as the besieged are enclosed within them, 
siege conditions remain. The 
advantage of the position of the 
besieged are these : he moves 
upon what are called " interior 
lines "—that is he can transfer 
a force from one part to another 
of the boundaries containing him 
more quickly than the besiegers 
can similarly transfer a force. 
For they are working on the 
outside of a circle and he from the 
inside. Therefore, the besieged 
ought to be able to deal as an 
equal with bodies larger than its 
own. Finally, if there is the hope 
of ultimate relief from without, 
the besieged force may play a 
very useful role in occupying the 
energies of the besiegers and 
eliminating them from action 
elsewhere while relief comes up. 
The advantage to the besiegers 
is that they have their enemy 
under known conditions. A siege 
is the most calculable of all forms 
of warfare and, roughly speaking, 
the history of all great sieges is 
the defeat of the besieged save 
from two modifying accidents : 
I. The arrival of a large relief 
force. 2. Lack of tenacity on the 
part of the besiegers or quarrels 
among them. Short of these two 
of the besieged. 
To this advantage enjoyed by the besieger in a siege war 
must be added the auxiliary condition of blockade (the term 
mounted Pmssian strategy possesses, or rather possessed (for 
It is now dead), but rapidity of change it never possessed— thtit 
is the supreme quality of the French. Elastidty of mind, 
the power to grasp a new situation and to act in a novel way 
in conformity to it, that no German of to-day seems to possess 
whether in the military or in any other field. While th 
blockade is strictly used in the language of international 
law for a particular marine operation. The French word 
Prussian General c;tcff"'w.c ^\C;"-L "i "*"' "/'T "'" ^^"'^"^ ^'"^ ,'"°'"*^ commonly used in international docu- 
frussian General Staff was making its arrangements for so ments for a blockade by land : but I know of no English 
