December 19, 191 8 
LAND & WATER 
■word to express the idsa save the general term blockade). 
As the besieged are contained within the lines, while the 
besiegers have all the outer space at their disposal the 
besiegers should be able to receive supply up to the limits of 
the capacity of their demand. While they should equally be 
abla to prevent tha basiegsd from receiving supply, save 
such supply as can be produced from within the besieged area. 
Now in the light of these clear 
and simple principles, let us 
examine the conditions of that 
great siege into which the 
•war was transformed from the 
middle of October, 1914, to the 
collapse which began in July, 
1918. 
We note in the" first place that 
the besieged area is so great that 
the problem differs in scale from 
any other or similar problem in 
the past. Not only is the area vast, 
but it can produce a great mass of 
supply. It had more than half the 
coal of Western Europe and some- 
thing like half the iron, all the 
petroleum with the exception of 
the Caucasus supply which could 
not be got through the Darda- 
nelles where Turkey 'had joined 
the enemy, and it had — supposing 
a sufficient labour supply — enough 
cultivated soil to feed its popu- 
lation. That is the first point 
in which this siege differed from 
nearly every other siege in history. 
Secondly, you had the para- 
doxical state of affairs that during 
all the first year of the siege and 
during the last year as well, the 
besieged were actually more 
numerous than the besiegers. 
They had been contained by 
superior military skill not by superior numbers ; and that is 
an exceedingly rare condition in the history of siege warfare. 
It obviously gave the besieged a special advantage. 
The weapon of the blockade, which is the great auxiliary 
of the besieger, could not — supposing a sufficient labour supply, 
sufficient political discipline — actually starve out the besieged, 
nor could it seriously interfere with military supply (especially 
with the vital and fundamental 
production of steel) save in the 
matter of tropical or sub-tropical 
products of which the two most 
important are india-rubber and 
cotton, the latter being the essen- 
tial, or nearly the essential, for 
the making of propellent explo- 
sives. Imperfect, therefore, as the 
blockade was in this case (in most 
historical sieges it has been the 
chief weapon of the besieger) it 
■was rendered still weaker by 
the curious position in which the 
Allies found 'themselves relative 
to supply. The war was on such a 
large scale that the resources of 
the whole world had to be put 
under contribution, and the largest 
field of supply, the one containing 
all forms of supplv and by far the 
greatest mechanical power for 
producing it, happened to be 
neutral. It was the United States. 
Lest the opportunity of supply 
from this source should fail it 
•was necessary to accede in part 
to the claim of the United States 
that neutrals had the right to 
trade with either belligerent un- 
hampered so long as the goods they 
delivered were not contraband 
of war : e.g., the right to trade 
in foodstuffs for the civilian 
population, clothing stuffs for them (in which cotton might 
be included) and so forth. Until the United States entered 
the war the blockade was necessarily imperfect. 
Lastly, we must remember in connection with all siege war- 
fare the following principle. It is the business of the besiegers 
not only to contain the besieged but, especially when there 
is no chance of starving them out, to effect a breach, as it is 
called, in the lines behind which the besieged are defending 
GENERAL PERSHING 
GENERAL SIR HENRY WILSON 
themselves. Once such a breach is effected the defensive line 
ceases to exist as a whole, it is rolled up and the army de- 
fending it is defeated and the siege ends in a welter of dis- 
solution within the besieged garrison. Unless such a breach 
is effected the siege, when the besieged have ample supply, 
might be so long as to exhaust the besiegers. 
Conversely it is the business of the besieged to try to break 
out. If they can break out suc- 
cessfully they in their turn destroy 
the opposing line : roU it up. Not 
only is the siege raised, but the 
besieged achieve ■victory and 
destroy the army which had been 
besieging them, and these efforts 
of the contained garrison to break 
the line containing them are tech- 
nically known as sorties, a French 
word which, like most French 
terms adopted into technical 
military language, is of a simple 
conversational sort and merely 
means " a going out." A 
we shall see in a moment this 
great war was one long series of 
such unsuccessful attempts to 
effect a breach on the one side, 
to break out on the other, until 
the long process of exhaustion 
told at lastjmore against the be- 
sieged than against the besiegers 
and the collapse of the former 
eijsued. 
Bearing these general principles 
of siege warfare in mind and 
noting the particular conditions 
attaching to this individual great 
siege, we can proceed to enumer- 
ate its various phases. 
(a) The first phase was a vigorous 
attempt of the enemy to break out 
through the Western line. 
The sector chosen was the extreme northern end of the 
line against the North Sea, the sector defended by the British 
in front of Ypres and by the French and Belgians along the 
Lower Yser inside Nieuport. This attempt will be known in 
the history of the war to the British as the first Battle of 
Ypres, to the French and Belgians as the Battle of the Yser. 
The latter term is perhaps the more accurate, because the 
whole effort was made uppn the 
line of the Yser from south of 
Ypres northwards. The sector 
was ill-chosen. It is true that 
even if a breach were not effected 
here and the line merely pushed 
back, that operation, a failure 
though it would-be in the largest 
strategical sense, would yet give 
the Germans command of the 
Channel ports and thereby heavily 
impede the communications of the 
Western allies. It is further true 
that the sector chosen had the 
best communications behind it 
and could be more rapidly sup- 
plied with men and munitions 
by the great railway system which 
covers the Belgian plain and leads 
directly to the principal source of 
enemy supply, the Westphalian 
coal field. Nevertheless, strateg- 
ically the sector was, as I say, ill- 
chosen, because in breaking a line 
you have more effect in proportion 
as you are nearer the centre of 
that line. When you merely 
turn a line from its extremity your 
enemy has a much better chance 
of falling back before you intact. 
At any rate the sector was so 
chosen, and the enemy had the 
great advantage of heavy supe- 
rior numbers and a far greater 
superiority in equipment, especially in his supply of shell. 
The shock was delivered but did not succeed. The critical 
day was October 31st, 1914, the last day of very hea^vy 
fighting was November nth. After less than a fortnight it 
■was clear that the effort had failed. 
(b) The first counter attempt to effect a breach. 
This first round, as it were, in the siege was succeeded by a 
cdunter-effort delivered by the French and occupjdng the 
