8 
LAND & WATER 
December 19, 1918 
first weeks of the New Year, particularly strong in the month 
of February, and continued on through the spring. Its field 
was the Artois, that is the province of which Arras is the 
capital, and its object was to pierce the German defensive 
system in this region. It failed. And during its failure were 
discovered both by the enemy sind by the Allies two principles 
of the highest moment to the future of the war. The first 
was the unexpected strength of 
the modem defensive. The second 
was the still more unexpected 
scale upon which munitionment 
would be required. Both these 
new factors were heavily in 
favour of the besieged. He had a 
far greater immediate supply of 
equipment and munitionment, 
and, the besieged essentially 
relying upon the defensive, the 
strength of the defensive was in 
his favour. The theory almost 
universally accepted up to this 
moment that a'^defensive line 
would yieldfwithin a calculable 
time to a modern offensive had to 
be abandoned, and the prospect 
of a lengthy war appeared. 
_ Meanwhile upon the eastern 
side of the siege ring, where Tur- 
key had joined our enemies and so 
closed the Dardanelles, the forces 
of the Russian'' Empire, occupied 
in their turn with the attempt to 
effect a breach, were clearly 
inadequate to that task. They 
went slowly forward indeed, oc- 
cupying Galicia, but the line of 
the Carpathians held them, and 
there was no sign of a crack in the 
defensive lines, which'gradually 
retired before them tojthe north 
of those mountains until by the 
end of the spring the offensive^here was halted without 
strategical result. The occupation of Lemberg and the 
capitulation of the fortress of Przysml were successes which 
attracted the public eye, but they were not true strategical 
results, for the siege line remained intact on the defensive 
side. 
(c) The attempted breach of the DatJanelles. 
During this same period an 
isolated effort, due to the initia- 
tive of the British Government 
acting independently of its Allies, 
was begun. This was the attempt 
to effect a breach upon that 
sector of the great siege ring 
which commanded the entry to 
the Black Sea, that is, the Straits 
of the Dardanelles. It is clear 
upon the map that a successful 
breach effected at this point 
would have had immediate strate- 
gic consequences of the highest 
value. It would not, indeed, have 
broken into the besieged area, 
for the Turkish ally of the Central 
Empires might rather be regarded 
as an outwork to the general siege 
ring, the capture of which would 
not effect a breach in that ring. 
Even if all Turkey in Europe had 
been held the siege lines from the 
Baltic to the Roumanian border 
and from the Iron Gates to the 
Adriatic would have remained 
intact. But the forcing of the 
Dardanelles would have given 
immediate access to Rusiia. It 
would have released for the West 
stores of food and of oil and, 
much more important, it would 
have permitted western industry 
to supply the Russian forces. 
Now as the ultimate collapse of Russia was entirely due to 
lack of equipment— to the fact that Russia was not a highly 
industrialised country, while the war was turning out to be 
essentially an industrial war— there was need for equipment 
on an immensely larger scale than anyone had hitherto 
dreamed of. The power to furnish Russia from the West 
rapidly and continuously was essential to the full continuation 
of the siege. The effort to force the Dardanelles failed ; prob- 
LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR ARTHUR CURRIE 
GENERAL GOURAUD 
ably because it was not munitioned with a sufficient supply 
of shell. The fire power at its disposal was inadequate to the 
protection of the four miles of trenches which covered the 
peninsula. Had there been present in face of those trenches 
heavy artillery and its shell up to the scale of the contemporary- 
artillery work in the Artois, the expedition would probably 
have succeeded. There were, of course, many other causes 
which contributed to the failure. 
This seems to have been the prin- 
cipal one. It is, however, true, 
that if the attempt to force the 
Dardanelles had been made at 
once in the very earliest days of 
the war, still more if the Allies 
had seized Constantinople before 
Turkey had joined the Central 
Empires, the objects of the ex- 
pedition would have been achieved. 
It is too early yet to say where 
and how the failure of supply 
came in, but it seems clear that 
the original idea that the thing 
could be done by naval forces, 
alone was largely responsible for 
the delay. And there are some 
who maintain (a matter which 
only future evidence can clear 
up) that naval power would have 
been able alone to force the pas- 
sage had the effort been main- 
tained for a sufficient length of 
time ; but upwn this I am in- 
competent to write. 
(d) The fourth and last of the 
early efforts consisted of one more 
attempt on the part of the besieged' 
to break out in the West. 
Once again the field chosen 
was the field of the Yser, the- 
scene of their former defeat. This 
attack, which took place in the- 
month of April. 1915, bears the name in the British Seivice 
of the Second Battle of Ypres. It will ever be memo able as 
the first occasion upon which poison was used in war- — an 
innovation due to the Prussian General Staff, ard taking the- 
foim of poisoned gases which destroyed men with the utircst 
torment, and at the moment piofcundly rffected tl e con- 
science of Europe, which has since that date become accustomed 
to almost every perversion of 
warfare native to the German 
mind. It is remarkable that upon 
this occasion a rupture was actu- 
ally effected. When poison gas was 
first used the point chosen was the 
point of junction between the 
British and their French allies 
north-east of the town of Ypres. 
The extreme French right, here- 
composed offcolonial troops, gave 
way altogether, and the extreme 
British left, composed of Canadian 
troops, was therefore left " in the 
air." This latter force was 
handled with remarkable skill, 
and it displayed a discipline and 
energy which helped to save the 
situation. But it is none the less 
true that through the retirement 
of the French right, or rather its 
complete breakdown, there was 
for some hours on that day an 
open gap of which the enemy 
might have taken immediate ad- 
vantage. The reasons he did 
not seize it have not yet been 
made clear. At any rate he missed 
his opportunity, and the Second 
Battle of Ypres ended ':I:e the- 
first in the failure of the besieged 
to break throu 
With these four efforts what 
may be called the initial stages of 
the great siege come to an end, and we approach operations 
of a larger type ; for just when the power of the defensive 
had seemed' to prove, in, every sector where it had hitherto 
been tried, invuhierable, the enemy, calculating on the lack 
of equipment and munitionment of his opponents upon the 
eastern side determined upon a great sortie over that eastern- 
side, and the breaking through of the Russian lin opposed tO' 
him. 
