LAND 6? WATER 
December 26, 1918 
was now for practical purposes eliminated from the war. 
Her armies, corrupted by desertion and anarchy, might still 
for some weeks or months make despairing, or rather fruit- 
less, efforts ; but upon that eastern side the siege-wall was 
broken. Rumania, which had entered the war, could do 
nothing without the support of Russia and, lacking that 
support, collapsed. The United States would ultimately 
come in with all the forces which, ultimatelv. its organisa- 
tion and determination could demand. It had a vast 
population ; it had an industry superior to that of any other 
State in Europe ; it was singularly determined and" would 
make one whole. But it takes, as we have known to our 
cost, a long time to make an army — especially an army 
upon the modem scale. To transport such an army over 
3,ooo miles of sefa within a brief space of time might seem 
impossible. To do so in the face of the submarine menace 
might seem more impossible still. 
The result of these two new factors, the Russian "revol- 
ution " and the advent of the United States, was as follows :— 
It would be many months before the United States could 
come into play ; meanwhile Russia was virtually eliminated. 
In the interval it lay with the Central Powers" to use their 
new found opportunity and to achieve what military men 
called a "decision" ; that is, to put out of action the Allied 
armies in the West before the American forces should appear 
in strength upon the European field. The enemy, a compact 
alliance of some 150 million souls, had, perhaps, eighteen 
months— a long, and apparently ample opportunity — in which 
to do what he willed. The problem before the besieged powers 
was, therefore, to make the fullest use of the leisure aiforded 
to them, and in that long interval of superiority which they 
would possess to, construct an instrument of warfare capable 
of breaking the line in France or Flanders and, this achieved, 
to present themselves as victors in Europe over against the 
maritime combination of England and the United States. 
Had they achieved that victory by land, they would have 
proved mvincible. They could not perhaps have reduced to 
terms Great Britain, defended by her fleet ; still less the United 
States, very remote, and dependent for the power of attack 
upon sea communications, but, though hampered for some 
supply, they could have stood fast with the Continent in 
their hands. 
What we are about to follow is the atten^pt of the Central 
Empires, under Prussia, to use that ample opportunity, and 
the faUure of that attempt. But before dealing with this 
main matter, we must turn to extraneous operations which 
have also played a part in this great war. 
Now of these, which may be called " field actions, exterior 
to a siege," two conspicuous examples were afforded during 
the course of this war. Many months before the events 
we are now about to examine, the Turkish forces, under 
German organisation and suggestion, had attempted to cut 
the Suez Canal, which was of high, though not of absolutely, 
vital importance, an avenue of communication with the 
Far East. The attempt broke down and there followed a 
Slow counter-effort, the pushing forward of the AUies— in 
this case the British forces— upwards on the frontier of 
Palestine. The last consequences of this reaction were the 
rapid senes of victories, or rather triumphs, achieved in 
Syna during 1918. The second of these "field actions" 
extenor to the great siege was the Mesopotamia expedition 
which at first failed in the capitulation of Kut, and which 
was later retrieved by that admirable organisation which 
permitted the advance upon Bagdad, the capture of this 
Eastern capital, and the British seizure of all the Lower 
Euphrates and Tigris. 
These two exterior operations exhausted the forces of those 
outer walls of the siege which the Turkish Empire formed 
and therefore contributed in their degree to the final 
collapse. 
With so brief a note of such great and decisive military 
victories, let us turn again to the main problem, the struggle 
between the Central Empires and Europe (now aided by 
America) in the western siege war. 
Either they were to break our line by a last great sortie 
to roU us up and so obtain their decision, or we were to break 
them whether by breach or by disintegration, and to obtain 
our decision. 
The stage for this drama was set in the late summer or 
early autumn of 1917. We had failed in early 1917 in the 
spring, to make our breach ; we had indeed captured the Vimy 
Ridge and the country past Monchy. But the enemy stood 
intact Against the French, in an operation undertaken a 
week later, the enemy had similariy held his ground ■ and 
upon the Aisne, right through Champagne, he had held his 
ground against the tremendous assaults of the eariy part 
of that year. The last Russian efforts in the spring or early' 
summer of 1917 had quite broken down. Even the successful 
new tactics with the use of tanks before Cambrai in the 
autumn were successful only for a moment. 
The enemy had stood out upon the East and West with 
his reserve of forces and had meanwhile, through his now 
acquired superiority, slowly and carefully prepared the new 
tactical instrument which would give him victon,' before the 
masses of Americans could be trained and could liave their 
effect upon the field. 
THE ENEMY'S LAST SORTIE 
The Central Empires were determined upon victory before 
the United States could bring great forces, organised and 
equipped, into Europe. The collapse of what had been the 
Russian Empire gave them a numerical superiority ; how 
were they to use it ? 
The method they chose was wise. Acting on the defensive, 
both upon the East and the West, as we have seen, they 
withdrew from the strain of combat a great number of units. 
These they trained, especially the Germans, for the last 
sortie. They made a special provision of food for the men 
who were to undertake it. They instructed them separately 
in a new form of attack ; they gave them a certain leisure, 
and. at the same time a regular routine of new manoeuvres. 
In this scheme must be mentioned the use of troops picked 
for assault, the new tactics of bringing up light guns with the 
infantry, and the preparation of a very rapid "follow up" 
of reserves. 
It was in the autumn of 1917 that the first blow was struck. 
All during that summer, while the French armies had lain 
in wait, the British forces had attempted yet another breach 
in the siege-wall through Flanders, which once again had 
failed. This was that prolonged action in front of Ypres, 
generally called after the name of the Passchendaele Ridge. 
It was hampered, indeed, by weather and soO, but much 
more by the proved inability of the offensive, even including 
tanks used in the old fashion, to break through the defensive 
in any permanent fashion. 
Towards the end of October 1917 the new tactical instru- 
ment of the Central Empires, and particulariy of the Prussian 
General Staff, constructed with such care during the leisure 
afforded by the Russian collapse, and during the interval 
between that collapse and the possible arrival of any con- 
siderable American forces, was brought into play. Many 
excuses have been put forward by the victors for its success. 
These excuses, largely political, may be neglected. The true 
cause of its success was simply that the enemy, being possessed 
of so much leisure and such superiority due to the elimina- 
tion of Russia ajid of. Rumania, had been able to make a 
hammer, while we had neither the leisure nor the numbers 
for reconstructing a shield. 
He broke through at Caporetto upon the Isonzo, and he 
achieved the greatest>-ictory, if we count victory in number 
of prisoners and guns, ever yet achieved in the history of the 
worid. He took a quarter of a million prisoners and over 
2,000 guns. 
There was for some time a doubt whether the Itahan 
armies, thus broken through a rallying with difficulty, could 
stand east of the Adige, that is, whether they could save 
Venice, the great arsenal and port— the only arsenal and 
port of the Itahan Adriatic. By the advice of Marshal Foch 
It was decided to hold the difficult hnes of the Piave which 
just covered Venice, and were prolonged through the foot- 
hills of the Alps. The season was late; communications 
had become difficult through the mountains ; a few British 
and l-rench divisions were rushed down, and the terrible 
wave was halted upon the lines so chosen. 
The great struggle halted throughout the winter, awaiting 
the final blow. It was clear that the enemy had now pro- 
duced something not hitherto observed upon the field of war 
He had produced a new method of fighting, a new tactical 
instrument new values (the result of new numbers), 
which might weU have given him a decision 
As the winter of 1917-18 approached spring, a sort of 
hesitation hung over the European field. The Central 
Empires were still the superiors in numbers ; debates were 
held as to whether the Allies' western line would hold. It 
was beheved that it would, and this upon the vague paraUel 
of former assaults delivered before the new tactical effort of 
the Central Empires had been developed. What actuaUy 
happened was this. On March 21st the whole weight of 
Rrif.^r'r''" ^"^"'' ^^ *^™^" "PO" the right sector of the 
,™n ... "if «r' ^•'^'y j°^"^^ the French lines-that is, 
StQuentin^ ^ "' "^ ^''^^ *° *^^ ^i^' ^^'^th of 
WesT'I!!'''^ "''' 1?"";^^^ °^ ^" the German forces in" the 
West, more much than one-half of their fiehtine value 
was massed, whether in the first Une or in ultiSe^relete,' 
