December 26, 1918 
LAND 6? WATER 
Ihart of the War 
seraph -^t/ie/[eavybwkeitlme-'rspreset7£s thestnts afciviIazzLmora/eiiiC^rmany: 
trari^n^air/edas standai^ at /OO^ irtAugasfJ9^4. Zero/or £/ie sameline, is traken tv 
aitej^%ctiue majority of dze GerrziaiL people tvc/l refuse fosupport^the war, 
mt(^£/iis line is deternuaed mainly ^£i^ coizsideratiafioftiie deflections ofY:fie 
c/t represent thej^rces exer^u^ ttie ^rsafes^ ia/Iuence on^^ Oerman. s&ift- ^minc^. ^ 
was no more reliable than was generally available in this 
country. The enemy had reasons for concealing the real 
state of his food supplies, and it was far more difficult to 
arrivejat exact estimates of these than of the military situa- 
tion, which could be measured in terms of casualties and of 
annual classes of men. 
The progress of the submarine campaign from May of 1917 
to its end with the end of the war seems to have had httle 
influence on public opinion in Germany, though it is of 
interest to note that there is a certain coincidence between 
the state of Austria-Hungary and the submarine sinkings 
during the first six months of the campaign. 
From the German point of view, the key to the war, of 
course, was the state of civilian moral, and all the other 
lines must be taken as affecting this by their rise and fall. 
Naturally, the actual military situation stands as the pre- 
dominant cause of deflection, considering the chart from 
this point of view ; but it is matter for thought that the food 
situation had not more influence. This, however, may be 
accounted for by the genius of the German Government for 
prorriising without hope of fulfilment. There was always the 
promise of food coming from the East, from the conquered 
territories of Russia and Rumania, and, with 60 per cent, 
of the normal supply in hand, and a whole granary of pro- 
mises, this as a determining factor of the state of opinion 
could be rendered fairly negligible — so long as military 
superiority could be assumed. Similarly, poUtical unity or 
disunity might remain a minor factor, so long as the army 
was able through its position in the field to outshine poUtical 
leaders and to prove their gloom unwarrantable. 
A point that is far more apparent from this chart than 
from any other form of statement is tlie magnitude of the 
German effort in every way in the spring of 1918. Civilian 
confidence in the future was stimulated to the highest pit^a 
by the middle of February, and maintained to the end of 
May at a higher point than it had reached during the two 
preceding years ; political unity was re-secured, and was 
kept up until the beginning of June ; even Austria-Hungary 
was reassured, mainly by the success of Caporetto, from late 
1917 to the end of April in 1918, but it is evident that Austro- 
Hungarian confidence in the result of the war had begun to 
fail comparatively long before the last disastrous offensive — 
the staying power of Germany's chief ally had disappeared. 
One other tiling which this chart makes clear — more clear 
than could be in any other way — is the long strain to which 
the Allied nations were condemned from August of 1914 
to November of 1917. There is a very gradual fall in German 
prospects and in the state of German opinion throughout 
that weary period, but it is gradual as the faU of a tide, 
almost imperceptible, and in it is explanation of the "stale- 
mate" theory, as of all the adverse factors to the Allied cause. 
The results of action, shown from late November of 1917 to 
the end of the war, were more endurable than that depress- 
ingly slow decline, for there was evidence of movement 
and of the possibility of some end — there was cause for strong 
feeUng, and a removal of the apathy on which Germany 
counted for disunity among the Allies. 
» To us, in these opening days of 1919, the chief point of 
interest will be the way in which these liaes of enemy 
confidence in the result, and cause for that confidence, 
go down to zero and out from our cognizance. The chart 
itself entirely bears out the view consistently presented 
in Land & Water by our principal military correspondent, 
Mr. Hilaire Belloc, and shows that Germany's militaiy forces 
bore, as he stated, a close resemblance to a/od of toughened 
glass, which could not be fractured by any single blow, but 
which, under continued hammering, would snap suddenly 
and finally — as haOpened in November last. 
