October 31, 1918 
LAND &> WATER 
THE WAR: By HILAIRE BELLOC 
The Meaning of a Lull 
Handicap of the Ardennes 
I NOTICE that one civilian or political phenorjienon 
has been repeated with the most faithful regularity 
throughout the war ; and that is a fluctuation of 
opinion exactly following mere movement upon the 
map. 
A carefully prepared blow is struck ; there follows an 
advance of some miles on a broad front, and the capture of 
some thousands of prisoners and some scores of guns. Opinion 
regards it as the beginning of aji unceasing advance which 
can but end- — and that soon- — in the breakdown of the opposing 
armies. There follow days in which, though there is very 
hard fighting, less advance is made ; opinion becomes gloomy. 
Then there is what is called "a lull" ; there is apparently 
no movement on the map. The most intense activity fills 
all the battle front. The belt just behind the line is as full 
of movement as a great factory or hive of bees. The most 
enormous things are preparing. But the public, which, 
beyond meagre (and not over-lucid) dispatches, has nothing 
but the map to go upon, calls it and thinks it a "lull." If 
this "lull" lasts the better part of a week opinion has already 
in that short time advanced by great strides towards the 
fallacies of two years ago. You hear of "stalemate" : of 
the "folly of premature optimism," and so forth. 
Then after the "lull" the next tremendous blow, for which 
it was a preparation, is struck. There is another great 
capture of prisoners and guns, another advance, a sudden 
elation of opinion. So the circle goes its round. 
A mere list of the whole series of actions from the middle 
of July to Cambrai the other day will show what I mean, 
and will, I hope, convince the reader. 
On July 15th, by the early afternoon at latest, the last 
great German offensive was smashed all to pieces east of 
Rheims. Opinion had no inkling of this ; but while the 
French were manoeuvring for the counter-blow opinion still 
followed the battle as an increasing German advance still 
fraught with the gravest peril. • 
On July i8th, by ten o'clock in the morning, the counter- 
blow had been delivered at Soissons ; the French and Ameri- 
cans had advanced to a maximum depth of eight miles, had 
taken thousands of prisoners and hundreds of guns, and 
(what was very much more important) had destroyed for 
ever the enemy's initiative and recovered it for the AlHes. 
Thenceforward all the enemy's activities were concentrated 
upon saving himself as best he could and at an increasing 
expense, until at last he reached that stage in which we now 
find him, when he is certain of final defeat, and is only con- 
cerned with the moderation of the terms that will be imposed 
upon him. 
It was natural that opinion failed, at the moment, to 
grasp the tremendous revolution through which the war had 
passed in those brief hours of July i8th ; but every one will 
agree that in the next few days opinion was elated by the 
return of the enemy across the Ma me, by the recapture of 
Chateau Thierry, and by the Allied advance. 
Then things slowed down (on the Marne) until the end of 
July, and in the first days of August the reduction of the 
Marne pocket proceeded — but proceeded at a pace which 
was not sufficient for the eager hopes at home. 
Those early, days of August were days of "lull"; and 
"lull" produces its crop of absurdities. 
On August 8th it should surely have been clear to anyone 
what that "lull" had meant, when the British forces in front 
of Amiens, with the French operating upon their right, 
broke right through the enemy positions. Again, there was 
an advance of some eight miles, again there was the capture 
of thousands of prisoners and hundreds of guns, again the 
slower reduction of a salient, and while this enormous affair 
was being worked out, exactly the same rhythm appeared 
in opinion as had appeared in the reduction of the Marne 
salient. The Times regretted the failure of "what might 
have been," etc. It was again a matter of about three 
weeks — and at the end the line appeared again to have 
stabilised. 
Then came the heavy blows of the end of August, the 
breaking of the Drocourt-Qu^ant switch, the enemy's taking 
up his water-line in front of Douai and upon the Canal du 
Kord, his heavy fortification of the gap of Cambrai, his retire- 
ment to strongly organised and deep defences of what was 
called the "Hindenburg" line, Mangin during later August, 
pressing north of the Aisne upon the roads to Laon, seemed 
to make but little progress. The Chemin des Dames held, 
the repeated blows delivered all along the new German 
positions produced but little effect upon the map. The 
enemy retirement east of Lille across the Lys was certainly 
voluntary, and the month of September, up to its last days, 
did not strengthen opinion as the month of August had done. 
Had the next batch of preparations taken a few days longer 
than they did, the uncertainty of opinion would have re- 
turned. As it was, we were perpetually warned not to over- 
estimate the situation, but to remember that there were 
still 200 German divisions in the field (there were not — but 
that is a detail), and those divisions were always solemnly 
estimated at full strength. Then came, on September 26th, 
the opening of what may be called' the main battle, which 
has raged continuously ever since. 
First came the attack on either side of the Argonne. This 
sector was absolutely vital to the enemy. He massed upon 
it. The American advance east of the Forest of Argonne 
was checked, the French advance west of it proceeded only 
by slow daily movements, with most imperceptible advances 
down the valley of the upper Aisne towards Vcuziers. The 
Ornes was reached, but already we were in October. 
If one had judged by the line of the map, nothing much 
would seem to have been done. The French had indeed 
reached the Ornes, and made the enemy retire frcm in front 
of Rheims. There was a certain movement, though not a' 
very great' one. Then came the tremendous blow of the 
British at Cambrai on October 8th and the other great blow 
to the north in Flanders in front of Ypres. 
The blow at Cambrai had such great effects that no one 
could misunderstand t^hem. The thrust had pushed the 
enemy line right back to Le Cateau. The thousands of 
prisoners and the scores of guns were again present in the 
dispatches, and, more important than this, the central salient 
of the enemy was in peril. It was abandoned, and he retired 
behind Laons. Still we were told that in Flanders weather 
conditions had halted the offensive, Courtrai had not been 
reached, Lille was still occupied, etc. Another short "lull," 
and another set of silly misconceptions. 
Then came Plumer's second blow in Flanders, with the 
startling (but surely obvious) consequence that the Lille 
salient went, and not only that, but the whole of the Belgian 
coast ; and on that coast, so hurried was the enemy's retire- 
ment, the batteries were abandoned. 
Most important of all, it had been proved that on no line 
whatsoever, however excellent its water defences, however thor- 
ough his -preparation of it, could he now permanently stand. 
In other words, these three months were a disaster of such 
magnitude as no army has hitherto received anywhere in 
the course of all these great campaigns. Meanwhile the 
immediate dependents of Prussia found themselves increas- 
ingly isolated. The Austro-Hungarian system was breaking 
up, Bulgaria had collapsed, the Danube was reached. The 
Turkish armies had been destroyed, and Prussia herself 
had asked for peace. 
What more, in all conscience, could those who confidently 
predict a complete victory expect ? What further practical 
reproof can those who deny our approach to a complete 
victory demand ? 
THE ENEMY'S CHOICE 
But these last few days of apparently slow movement 
upon the map, with the line nearly halted upon the upper 
Meuse, only slightly shifting in the centre, showing its greatest 
advance a few miles south of Valenciennes and nearly station- 
ary across Flanders, have another aspect which we ought 
to emphasise. 
The enemy has, during these days of expectation (when 
he is but standing for the next blow — a blow he cannot 
