October 31, 1918 
LAND ^ WATER 
What is Victory? — II: By Arthur Pollen 
IT was suggested last week that the position at sea 
could not be established satisfactorily after the war 
unless three essential terms of peace were made opera- 
tive. They were : the restitution by Germany of the 
merchant totinage destroyed, the assignment of the 
German colonies with their seaports to a non-German Power, 
and ordinances and guarantees that Germany should not 
possess submarines now or in the near future. It was also 
suggested that the submarine might by consent be made 
contraband of humanity, and if not made contraband, at 
any rate eliminated finally as an instrument for the exercise 
of the rights of search and capture. But the essential matter 
is the tonnage, the colonies, and Germany's final deprivation 
of unden-water instruments of war. There are, however, 
further points wliich are partly naval, partly territorial, and 
partly military. The fate of the High Seas Fleet need not 
delay, us] in this connection, as this is part of the general 
question of the enemy's disarmament. 
Heligoland : the Baltic : the Dardanelles 
So I pass on to the problems of the closed seas and Heligo- 
land. As to this last, the folly of 1892 must certainly be 
undone. In a moment of fatal blindness we then ceded to 
Germany an island to which our moral title was of the slender- 
est, in exchange for certain rights in Africa to which Germany 
had no title at all. The possession was, indeed, of no positive 
value to us at that time, nor, for that matter, to Germany, 
for it did not appear in 1892 that there was anything in 
German world policy that would bring her into conflict with 
a naval Power. The singular thing about the attitude of 
mind of British statesmen at that time was their blindness 
to the very obvious fact that the real value of Heligoland 
to Germany would come when Germany was at war with 
England. Well, we have survived the war and the folly 
which gav-e our enemy this quite priceless advantage ; but 
we must see to it that it cannot once more be used against 
us. In a sense, the most satisfactory arrangement would be 
to return it to its original owners, the Danes ; but it clearly 
must come out of German hands, and k is possible that if 
restored to Denmark, its seizure by Germany in time of war 
could not be prevented. However this may be, it must 
be German no longer. The questions of the Baltic and the 
Black Sea are more complex. The entrances to the Black 
Sea have long, been dominated by the Power possessing the 
land on either side of the very narrow straits leading in and 
out of the Sea of Marmora, but modern armament would 
enable Sweden and Denmark to close the Baltic as effectually. 
It is more to the point that any considerable naval Power 
on the Baltic side of the Sound could make penetration 
through the narrow waters of the Danish Islands into the 
Baltic extraordinarily dangerous without any obvious breach 
of Danish neutrality, while_ the seizure of the islands after 
a fleet had penetrated would, of course, cut thejr. communica- 
tions completely. It was for this reason that it was said 
that the problem of sending a British fleet into the Baltic 
was not naval, but military. If Germany retains her present 
naval force and her monopoly of the Kiel Canal she would 
be still able to control the sea communications of Russia 
and Finland absolutely, except for such alternative means 
as Kola Bay affords. But Kola is very distant from the 
centres of Russian industry, so that its emplojTnent would 
be exceedingly uneconomical in peace time, though of vital 
value in war. What the Allies have to do is to see that 
German domination of the Baltic cannot be re-asserted at 
any time, just as they must also see that Turkish domination 
of the Black Sea, by her possession of the only exit from it, 
is terminated also. But in the case of the Baltic the position 
of Germany is far stronger than that of Turkey, for if a 
Power commanding Gallipoli and the Asiatic shore can 
make it impossible for a hostile navy to force a passage past 
the Narrows, it is also true that a hostile navy can make it 
almost impossible for any Turkish fleet to leave the Dar- 
danelles. But Germany is in no such difficulty. The posses- 
sion of the Kiel Canal gives her a perfectly protected com- 
munication with the North Sea, so that if no powerful fleet 
threatens her in the Baltic, that sea must become a German 
lake. It is neither to the interest of ourselves, nor of any 
of the new States, Finland, Poland; and a regenerated Russia, 
that are now coming into being, that this, state of things 
should continue. Means must, therefore, be found of 
denationalising the waterway and putting it under inter- 
national control. 
Summary of Imposed Conditions 
We can now group the conditions of peace into three.- 
There are, first, those which satisfy the punitive and 
retributive sides of justice. These conditions are, first, the 
punishmerit of those guilty of atrocities ; secondly, the 
surrender of conquered territories and the restitution of 
stolen goods ; thirdly, the payment for or replacement of 
stolen property, buildings, churches, factories, and par- 
ticularly of ships ; and, lastly, the indemnification of those 
who have either themselves suffered personal injuries, or 
whose relatives have been murdered or tortured into in- 
capacity. 
These four requirements of punitive and retributive justice 
call for the performance of certain tasks by Germany, and 
the performance of these tasks must be guaranteed. 
We get, therefore, a second group of peace conditions, in 
which the principles are, first, that Germany must be dis- 
armed, so as to be unable to recommence the struggle ; 
secondly, points of commanding strategic importance, such 
as ports, capital, fortresses, etc., must be occupied ; and, 
thirdly, certain solid guarantees, such as the customs 
and Treasury receipts, railways, and so forth, must be 
in Allied hands, until the several restorations are 
completed. 
Thirdly, the world must have some security that the 
agencies which gave rise to this war shall, so far as may be, 
be extinguished. The military power of Prussia must be 
ended by the abolition of autocracy and by substituting a 
constitutionally expressed popular will for that of an irre- 
sponsible monarchy. 
Reciprocal Obligations 
These three groups deal with the obligations which the 
Allies will impose on Germany ; but there is a fourth group, 
which must express the obligations which Germany has a 
right to expect the Allies to honour. The essential matter 
here is that, as in groups one, two, and three, we shall have 
prescribed what punitive and retributive justice requires, 
shall have guaranteed its due execution and prevented the 
recurrence of the crimes atoned for ; so the fourth group 
shall make it clear not only that there is no effort to impose 
two punishments for one offence, but no intention of so 
shaping the punishment as to leave Germany without the 
power to make the retribution that we exact. If, therefore, 
we deprive Germany of her present merchant fleet, and 
require that for six or ten years or more her shipyards shall 
labour solely to make up the deficit which her present fleet 
is unable to replace, then it follows that, when the needs of 
the Allies are reasonably met, a fair service of shipping shall 
be at Germany's disposal not as possessors, but as users. 
Again, if by being shorn of her colonies she is deprived of 
any national source of tropical products, a fair ration of the 
world's supply must be allowed to her. Further than this, 
the Allies, and those that sympathise with them, monopolise 
whole groups of the raw materials of the world. Of these,. 
Germany must have a reasonable proportion. It is obvious 
that, unless some such equitable and, indeed, generous 
arrangement is made, it will be impossible for Germany to 
meet the indemnities or to build the shipping, or to make 
the services effective that she will be .under compulsion to 
put at the Allies' disposal. Our own interests, then, demand 
a certain largeness of view in dealing with these matters ; 
but there is a higher reason why our conduct in this respect 
should be exemplary. 
A New Spirit in Trade 
The militarism of Germany has not, as we all know, beeri 
limited to the action of her armed forces. For many years 
and in all countries her diplomacy has been secret, double-, 
faced, disloyal, and disruptive. But there is nothing in her 
military or diplomatic records more rapacious, predatory, 
and essentially dishonest, than her commercial dealings. 
These things have excited the reprobation and disgust of 
the civilised part of the world. It would not be surprising 
if they were followed by a wide determination to deal with 
Germany no more. It is, indeed, a very human and a very 
natural instinct for each individual to say that, whatever 
others may do, he at least has done with such traffic for ever. 
But if we are sincerely aiming for a real peace — a settlement 
that will ultimately result in a reconciliation of wills — we 
