November 7, 1918 
LAND ^ WATER 
THE WAR: By HILAIRE BELLOC 
The Enemy's Crumbling Defences 
Military Causes of Political Collapse 
F E are under a greater necessity at this moment the West were unable to lend aid. Ferdinand 
' than ever before since the war began of dis- took a journey to the headquarters of the Pruss 
WE are under a greater necessity at this moment 
than ever before since the war began of dis- 
tinguishing the true causes of the situation, 
and of appreciating in this particular case 
that those causes are not political in the main, 
but in the main military. 
If. we conceive the idea that the great coalition formed 
under Prussia for the looting of Europe has broken up through 
popular discontent within and through political revolu- 
tion— onlj* as a consequnece of which its armies have 
been defeated — we shall not only be nourishing' a false- 
hood, but a falsehood of the highest practical disadvantage 
to our own future. The process of cause and effect has 
been exactly the other way about. The armies have 
been defeated, and as a consequence of their defeat the 
coalition against us has dwindled. In that defeat we 
must of course give its due place to the effect of blockade. 
But blockade itself is a military act. And the whole drama 
which we know to have been a military drama, for four years — 
that is up to the great counter-stroke of last July — remains 
a military drama to the end. 
The reason that a misconception on this point would be 
of such practical disadvantage to the nation in the near 
future is this : that it would confirm policy, or at least opinion, 
on the lines of neglecting the fruits of a military victory. 
It would turn the attention of men away from the true con- 
cept of victor and vanquished, which is the real situation, 
and nourish that quite false concept of a number of peoples 
and friendly populations which had nothing to do but to 
combine in good faith and put things to rights after the 
disasters of the war. That concept is already widely spread, 
because not all the belligerents have equally suffered from 
the effects of this war, and the less a nation suffers the more 
is it prone to false sentiment at the expense of its more sorely 
tried neighbours. 
This false concept would be particularly disastrous in 
practice.to Great Britain and her Empire ; for this reason : that 
this vast delicate organism, depending upon very vulnerable 
communications, its heart only functioning on condition of 
complete security by sea, is surrounded by a European world 
in which the full military value of the situation is clearly 
understood, and in which' the motives at work are motives 
born of the true situation. The French, the Belgians, the 
Italians, the Serbs, the various subjects remaining under 
Prussian control, are in no doubt. The one side knows 
that it is winning and intends to use its victory. The other 
side knows that it has been beaten, and is desperately con- 
cerned to avoid the full consequences of defeat. Should it 
succeed in avoiding those consequences, it would not settle 
down to a peaceable- future. It would create a legend of 
having held out successfully against the combined world, 
and on that legend would base another military future. It 
would at the weakest combine and intrigue against this 
?ountry and at the strongest fight again. ^^, 
THE EXAMPLE OF BULGARIA 
To see how true the thesis is that military defeat and 
military defeat alone has produced such a situation we are 
now enjoying, consider the sequence of events. We may 
be told, for instance, that the Bulgarian people have grown 
sick of the war, that they were "bolshevised," and that 
therefore they threw up the sponge. 
Such a thesis is historically simply false. ■ What happened 
was that the French and Serbs attacked an extremely dif- 
ficult mountain position, fought hard for three days to carry 
it, carried it, effected a breach of about 25 miles, and then 
by an extremely rapid advance right through north eastward 
cut the main enemy communications and at the same time 
separated into two isolated groups the Bulgarian armies. 
Why had they been able to do this ? 
Partly because material had accumulated in a sufficient 
degree with the lapse of time and had turned the balance 
on to the side of the Allies even on that difficult front : but 
more because the Central Empires in process of defeat on 
the West were unable to lend aid. Ferdinand of Bulgaria 
took a journey to the headquarters of the Prussian Govern- 
ment, and took that journey with the special object of 
discovering whether it might not be possible at the last 
hour to obtain the reinforcement upon which his position 
depended. That reinforcement was reluctantly denied him. 
Why ? Because the losses we had inflicted upon th^ Germans 
and the Austrians, and the terribly perilous position to which 
we had reduced the German armies in the West, made it 
impossible for the Prussians to ungarnish their front by so 
much as a battalion., How^ true this is we can further see 
by a consideration of what followed the Bulgarian defeat. 
Every military argument prompted the Central Empires, 
if they could not support Bulgaria, to at least defend the 
main railway to Constantinople and to make a stand outside 
Nish. They failed to do so because their position in the 
West forbade it. 
It is exactly the same with the British action in Asia. 
The Turks did not suffer internal revolution, followed by 
a disintegration of their armies. What happened was 
exactly the other way about. The British first of all organ- 
ised the admirable campaign which gave them Bagdad, 
one of the best pieces of military work. on record. Then 
the second battle of Gaza retrieved the effect of the first, 
and brought the army of Syria to Jerusalem. Lastly, 
General Allenby's great triumph completed the destruction 
of the Turkish armies south of Aleppo, and finally Aleppo 
itself was seized. Then and then only did we get the demand 
on the part of the Turkish Government for an armistice. 
But why has all this taken place ? 
THE FACTOp OF TIME 
Partly, as in the case of Bulgaria, because time had per- 
mitted the accumulation of material and the formation of 
detailed plans upon the Allied side. But also and mainly 
because support from the Central Powers became weaker 
and weaker as time went on and at last ceased altogether. 
Prussia and her more immediate dependents could not fur- 
nish the Turks with instructors and expert advisers, with stif- 
fening cadres, with muritionment and organisation. And why 
could not Prussia and her immediate dependents continue 
to do this ? Because they were defeated in the West with 
continuing and increasing effect. 
In this connection .it is also of vital importance that we 
should not run away with the amazing idea that the war 
was won upon the East; or that in some incredible way it 
was won by politicians and not by soldiers. If any educated 
man is seriously and honestly tempted to such an illusion 
I propose to him a very simple test. Let him consult the 
arguments advanced by any one — soldier or civilian — who is 
competent to discuss the art of war, its history, and achieve- 
ment. He will not find one who adopts so monstrous a 
theory. He will find a imiversal agreement that the great 
victory in the West is the cause of all. It has nowhere 
been better put than by General Maurice ; and to those who 
would reject my theory I would recommend his articles, for 
they are conclusive. General Maurice points out, as must 
every one who treats the matter seriously and as something 
more than a wretched provincial party question, that the 
strategics of this great campaign looked at in the broadest 
way present exactly the same problem as you get in every 
campaign, great or small, through history. And for that 
matter, in every tactical operation other than the most' 
minute. This problem is the -problem of balancing the 
strength required for containment with the strength required 
for attack. You find it in Carnot's f; mous note to Jourdan : 
"The enemy will bring a division up against your left. Parry it 
with a minimum of troops, and do not let it divert you from 
the main action." You find it in the great mana-uvre of 
the Marne when Foch deliberately refused to reinforce his 
desperately imperilled centre but threw in his spare division 
on the flank, thereby reaching La Fere Champenoise, and 
ultimately deciding the fate of Europe. You find it in the 
critical and decisive operations of July 15th and i8th of 
