LAND ^ WATER 
November 7, 1918 
the present year in Champagne, when XJauraud's strength 
against the German attack east of Rheims was left stationary, 
and all the weight of the manoeuvring mass was thrown on to 
the extreme left between Chateau Thierry and Soissons. You 
always find it in every military operation whatsoever. You 
nearly always have the imperfectly instructed or timid 
soldier, and you almost invariably have the politician, getting 
frightened and spending too much strength on the defensive 
side of the problem, and thereby losing his stroke on the 
offensive side. 
THE VALUE OF EASTERN OPERATIONS 
Now throughout this war the main action has been in the 
West. That does not mean that Syria, and Mesopotamia, 
and Salonica were useless. They had a very vital r61e 
which, on the vast scale of this enormous war, was the r61e 
of the defensive or containing wing. They safeguarded com- 
munications essential to the Allies, and the best proof of 
this is that it was the very men most vitally interested in 
saving the West who insisted in London d iring those critical 
days upon the immediate occupation of Salonica, when the 
full weight of the enemy's attack upon Serbia was developing. 
In the same way, Palestine was necessary for safeguarding 
the communications of the East ; and Mesopotamia, though 
from it, so this first battle of the Piave, with its very heavy 
losses and its complete moral disappointment, laid the seeds 
of the second battle, which we have just witnessed. 
It is not true that in the second battle political dis- 
integration within the civil bodies behind the army produced 
the collapse of that army. What happened was a very 
stubborn fight, a definite strategical success, and, consequently, 
a great military victory. 
I must beg my readers to follow tliis point in some detail, 
for it is of critical importance. 
On Thursday, October 25th, after nightfall, the position 
of the opposing forces between Lake Garda and the sea was 
that described in the accompanying sketch. 
On the Asiago plateau and in the hill country generally the 
linei stood as they had stood all summer and autumn, oppos- 
ing each other unchanged as far as the plateau. Beyond the 
Brenta, across Mount Grappa, and up to the Montcllo, which 
is the corner or hinge of the line, they also remained unchanged. 
They remained unchanged along the Piave to the sea, the 
enemy everywhere holding the left or eastern bank. But 
on that evening was completed a certain transposition of 
forces which was to be of the very highest effect. The 
British, imder Lord Cavan (who had also been put to the 
head of the Tenth Army, with which the British contingent 
was), occupied the big island of shingle which stands in the 
less strategically necessary, had its containing effect in 
dividing the Turkish forces. 
)Si As has been the case with every successful action, large 
or small, throughout history, the defensive or containing 
body found its opportunity for acting offensively and 
attacking in its turn when the main action had begun to 
develop favourably, but not before. 
That, in its largest lines, is the whole strategical story. 
The last and victorious phase of the war began with the 
counter-ofiensive on July i8th, and as the fruits of that 
capital manoeuvre were reaped, its effects were felt in every 
field, and the abandonment of the East by Central Europe 
was its principal and immediate result. 
CAUSES OF AUSTRIAN COLLAPSE 
One may be told that this was not the case with the break- 
down of Austro-Hungary. But it was. The Austro-Hun- 
garian armies failed with very heavy losses indeed in their 
great offensive of this summer. The first Battle of the Piave 
was one of those actions which are too easily misunderstood 
from their lack of movement. The change upon the map 
was slight — almost unnoticeable. The effect upon moral 
and numbers was very great. The enemy knew that upon 
this sector he could not win — therefore, he was defeated. 
He had failed to come down out of the mountains across the 
very few miles that separated him from the main Italian 
communications. He had found himself checked there by 
the Italian, British, and French divisions which lield the 
southern limb of the Asiago plateau. He left few prisoners 
and, in proportion, still fewer guns in the hands of what had 
only been for the moment a successful defensive. But as a 
man who sows the seeds of a fatal disease by some 
imprudent act, without at the moment appearing to suffer 
broad bed of the Piave at the point marked "P" upon the 
sketch. This movement of troops was concealed not only 
by its being effected at night, but also by the disguising of 
the British contingent in Italian uniforms. The occupation 
of the island was only made possible by very careful previous 
detailed work in preparation and by the admirable industry 
of the Itahan engineers, to which Lord Cavan has given 
full and generous recognition. On the Friday and Saturday 
this occupation of the main island in the stream was followed 
by the establishment of apparently small bridge-heads upon 
the left or eastern bank opposite. Upon Sunday, October 
27th, the main operation opened. It took the form of 
utilising these bridge-heads and a vigorous blow along 
the arrow (i), which broke through the first organisations of 
the Austrians and carried back the line in a bulge, roughly in- 
dicated by the semicircle of dots (i) upon the sketch into which 
the arrow (i) thrusts. The enemy, thus alarmed, attempted 
a very strong resistance ; but, as he could not hold properly 
at the first point attacked against the effect of surprise — for 
he had suffered surprise — the bulge extended by Tuesday to 
something like the line of dashes (2) outside the line of dots 
opposite the arrow (i), and it was clear that everything to 
the south was in danger of being outflanked. Therefore, 
the next operation, the thrust of the Italian army to the 
south and on the arrows (2) (2), had everything in its 
favour, and the whole Austrian line was thrust back with 
losses in men and guns in proportion to its attempt at 
resistance. 
FATAL EXTENSION OF THE LINE 
But note at this stage the essential factor in the struggle. 
The factor was an advantage to the Allies in the struggle, 
and a disadvantage to the enemy. The enemy was not only 
