November 7, 1918 
LAND 6? WATER 
falling back — that in itself is not defeat — nor was lie only 
losing heavily in men and guns — that below a certain number 
would not be decisive. He was also by the nature of his 
positions extending the length of line he had to hold. The 
advance of the Allies beyond the Piave was compelling the 
Austro-Hutigarians to attempt to hold successive hnes (i), 
(2), (3), which were not only not prepared and therefore 
required more men, but were also longer and therefore re- 
quired still more men — and they had not the men to hold 
them. 
The immediate consequence of this was the rupture of the 
line at its most critical point. This rupture took place upon 
Wednesday, October 30th, the sixth day from the beginning 
of the action and the fourth from the opening of the main 
attack. We ought particularly to notice how long a time 
it took — nearly four full days of violent action — before the 
rupture took place ; for only by emphasising this point can 
we fiilly appreciate the military character of the whole affair, 
and make certain that it was not the mere dissolution of an 
ill-fitted army, but a true strategical operation involving 
victory or defeat. 
THE KEY POSITION 
\ The critical point upon the Austrian line was Feltre, and 
the importance of Feltre lies in this — that through it must 
pass all the lateral communicdtions between the Atistro-Hun- 
garian armies ofi the plains and the A ustro- Hungarian 
armies in the mountains. From Feltre to Belluno runs the 
railway which afterwards goes through up into the Alps. Frcm 
Belluno down across the foothills of the Alps on to the Plain 
runs an excellent road — by a way among the most beautiful 
in Europe, passing by the little Lake bf the Cross, a precious 
stone. Westward of Feltre a good road goes up on through the 
foothills and this combination of road and railway frcm the 
plains into the hills through Feltre which I have marked on 
the accompanying Sketch I with the letters L L is the only 
avenue whereby the enemy's right might reinforce his left or 
his left his right. It is the only road whereby a car can go and 
establish even personal communication between the com- 
mands, let alone the stream of ordinary traffic. Occupy 
Feltre and you have completely cut the Austro-Hungarian 
line in two. 
Now the occupation of Feltre took place upon the Wed- 
nesday not through any collapse within the enemy force, 
but as a result of sheer hard fighting. In front of Feltre lies 
the great mass of the Grappa mountain, the bulk of which 
the enemy had held for months. Behind this is the mass 
of the Cosen and under the Cosen lies Feltre. The Grappa 
and the Cosen were carried after a terrible struggle in the 
course of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. It was only 
on Wednesday, the 30th (if I am not mistaken) that the 
Italian troops looked down from the northern slope of the 
Cosen upon Feltre in the valley below — but at vety long range, 
over 10,000 yards. Nor were the heavies yet brought up. 
The traffic through Feltre had ceased under the menace, 
and immediately afterwards the town was occupied. 
From that moment the enemy was cut in two and his 
defeated columns forced back upon divergent lines of retreat : 
on one ran the railways which meet in the Trentino Valley, 
which railways I have marked "R.A.," on the other the 
railways and roads going eastward across the plain to the 
Isorzo, which I have marked "R.B." 
Once you have divided an army into two fragments you 
may turn your attention to either fragment and achieve 
your victory. The obvious fragment to receive the main 
pressure was that of the plain, and after the rupture had 
taken place in the centre the Austro-Hungarian armies in 
the plain were compelled to a retirement which in some 
places degenerated into a rout. 
All the latter part of this great operation was, it is true, 
accompanied by revolution within the empire, but the menace 
of defeat came first ; nor did the army which was defeated 
show any signs of disintegration until these heavy blowfe 
had been delivered. It was a military victory. 
Let us turn, in conclusion, to the situation in the West, 
which remains the last problem of the war. 
The map which follows illustrates this in some detail. 
THE ENEMY'S LINES OF DEFENCE 
The first erroneous impression which we must eliminate 
in a discussion of the present situation in France and Belgium 
is the impression of a series of strong lines upon which the 
enemy shall successively withdraw : taking up a defence upon 
each one after the other. 
Such a conception is erroneous because the enemy's present, 
situation dees not admit of it. It is true that there are lines 
provided by nature, by political frontiers, and by the art ef 
man in the shape of canals, roads, and railways, which lend 
themselves better to defence than others. But the German 
armies in France and Belgium are in no position to retire at 
■RHEl 
10 2a Jo 'HfUes so 
_j I 1 1 1 
