8 
LAND &» WATER 
November 7, 1918 
not to "uiKio the wrong done to France in 1870." It is a 
deliberate, conscious attempt to set a new difficulty in the 
way of that wrong being righted. . Germany knows that 
she cannot keep these provinces. She has done all in her 
power to make their restoration to France difficult, if not 
impossible. Again, Germany has admitted the re-creation 
of the Polish nation with access to the sea. Yet when 
Korfanti and his colleagues, taking President Wilson's 
words literally, asked in the Reichstag for Dantzig, they 
were howled down by that "most freely elected and most 
representative assembly" in the world. 
Is it conceivable, after this, that a genuine ?nd thorough 
restoration of ravaged Belgium and ruined France will be 
approached in a spirit of honest candour ? There is no sign 
of any such thing. If we can judge from the defence which 
Prince Max has' issued against the charge of plundering the 
art treasures of the invaded towns, the whole question of 
restoration and restitution will be treated in a spirit of petti- 
fogging chicane. "The men in charge of Prussia," said Sorel, 
" may change, but the traditions remain the same. Misfortune 
is bound to come to tliose who are ignorant of these traditions 
and do not take tliem into account." 
We must tlien, it seems to me, recognise that while it is 
quite possible that Germany, like her Allies, is on the point 
of collapse, it is nevertheless equally possible that the popu- 
larisation of her Government is only the best means to the 
end her leaders have always had in view. The fall of 
autocracy in Russia was followed — and inevitably — by 
anarchy. The fall of the Empire in Austria has been fol- 
lowed by the dissolution of that organism into its constituent 
elements. Germany may have rid herself of autocracy as 
tiie only means, both of carrying the fight to its logical end 
and of saving the country from utter collapse. It may, in 
other words, be following an older and better model than its 
late enemy and its. late ally. When the French monarchy, 
fell, the New Order, as Burke foresaw, produced the most 
wonderful military dictatorship the world has ever seen. 
There is, indeed, a vast difference between France of 1879 
and Germany of 1918. But if the people of Germany have 
any faith in their ideals and their destiny, it is at least con- 
ceivable that they may embark now upon a national war of 
liberation, with a spirit, a determination, and, let us not 
forget, with a success that has not followed their efforts 
under the Empire. 
A New Phase of War 
If this should happen, the fight, whether long or short, 
must be of an entirely new character. The growing military 
preponderance of the Allies on land makes it, of course, 
certain that the appointed issue can only be delayed. But 
a nation that fights with resolution, even if it is only with the 
courage of despair, can earn the respect, even'if it does not 
gain the pity of its' opponents. It is not the kind of fight 
that Germany has put up in its past history. It may be 
beyond its power to do it now. But we must be ready for 
it if it comes, and we must realise that it means a fight as 
resolute at sea as on the German frontier. 
It seems to have passed into an axiom that the disparity 
of strength at sea makes any naval action by Germany other 
than by submarine a thing that is not in any circumstances 
to be expected. We are reminded that we have so many 
more battleships, so many more battle-cruisers, that our 
ships are larger, heavier, and that our guns can fire heavier 
projectiles at longer range. - It is as if the quantitive theory 
of naval strategy held t"he field. But a dispassionate exami- 
nation into the situation should convince us that the tame 
surrender of the Germany Navy is neither the only nor, indeed, 
the probable thing to happen. 
The opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus creates a 
second theatre of interest. Until now there has been no 
possibility of a fleet action, except in the North Sea. If 
the ships building for the Russian Navy at the Nicolaiff 
Works are all three of them completed and repaired, and 
in the hands of German officers and well-trained German 
men, if to them is added the Goeben, recovered from her 
encounter with a mine last spring, then an exceedingly for- 
midable fleet must be destroyed before the command of the 
Black Sea is assured to us. We should, of course, have no 
difficulty in sending a force superior to this through the 
Bosphorus. But, with the Germans in possession and 
commanding the exit of that exceedingly narrow defile, an 
operation of extreme complexity and difficulty would be 
necessary before our full naval strength could deploy for 
action. That difficulty once solved, the solution of the rest 
of the problem would be simple. I refer to it merely to 
show that here certainly the mere command of superior 
force does not mean that the issue is a foregone conclusion. 
A Last ^ea Effort 
In the North Sea there is only one particular in which- 
conditions have changed markedly in the German favour, 
since two and a half years ago the German Fleet faced the 
Grand Fleet under the leadership of Admiral Scheer. It is 
that the enemy has at his disposal an extraprdinarily large 
number of submarines commanded by men of exceptional 
training and experience. If the reports which tell us that 
all the U-boats have been recalled are to be trusted, then, 
in one particular at least, Germany is better equipped for an 
active campaign at sea than at any previous period of the 
war. In a second particular, viz., in the matter of destroyers, 
she has probably as many as she has submarines, and that is 
something between ,150 and 200. Her battleship and battle- 
cruiser strength is undoubtedly greater than it was at Jut- 
land. 'How much greater I do not know, because the fate of 
the Russian Fleet is unknown to me. Of fast, light cruisers 
she may have fewer than at the opening of hostilities, but 
those she has are both better armed and faster than the 
previous types. We can dismiss as altogether improbable 
any idea of the German Fleet coming out and fighting a 
simple ship to ship artillery action, such as is suggested by 
the sea-battles of a century ago. If the German Navy 
elects to throw its whole weight into the scale and perish, 
if necessary, for the sake of the honour of arms, it will cer- 
tainly adopt a very different course. The principles of its 
action have often been discussed, and need now only briefly 
be referred to. It will in all probability act on soine or all 
of the following principles. 
1. Diversion. — Battle-cruisers sent singly into the 
Atlantic with a view to raiding the American transport 
service would have to be countered by two to four British 
cruisers, to ensure neutralising their action or their speed- 
destruction' or capture. Three or four cruisers thus sent out 
might draw from ten to twenty British cruisers. 
2. Division.— If a threat of invasion were made against 
any portion of the 600 miles of British East Coast by a 
squadron of transports escorted by a pre-dreadnought battle- 
fleet, either the whole or part of the Grand Fleet would be 
drawn down to destroy it. If the High Seas Fleet then 
appeared at some other point of the North Sea, it might 
hope to encounter a force greatly reduced, first by the diver- 
sion of some of its units, second by its having been divided 
between the two objects. 
3. Attrition. — The bases of the Grand Fleet are perfectly 
well known to the German command. If the whole 
force of German submarines were disposed in a series 
of concentric rings round these bases, any sortie by 
the Grand Fleet would lay it open to short-range torpedo 
attack, assuming the submarine captains to possess the skill 
and resolution necessary for so delicate and perilous an under- 
taking. Such an effort at attrition made at the last hour 
might gain for the enemy that definite though temporary 
reduction of a force on which in the first days of the war he 
relied for equalising conditions at sea. 
4. Evasion. — Jutland showed us that the enemy had 
carried the art of the defensive use of torpedoes in action to 
a very high point. For a year the Baltic has been a German 
lake, so that the High Seas Fleet has enjoyed advantages for 
tactical experiment and manoeuvre denied to any other 
fleet. If the enemy has developed this use of the torpedo 
he may have a tactic at his command that would make any 
attempt to destroy him by gunfire many times more perilous 
than his somewhat crude measures on May 31st. 
5. Aircraft.- — If Germany still possesses Zeppelins and 
long-range bombing Gothas, and employs them for a massed 
and resolute attack on naval bases when the Grand Fleet's 
sortie is expected, and when submarines are in position, he 
may hope to reproduce, and with more effective results, the 
confusion that was so disastrous to the German Fleet in our 
attack on Cuxhaven at the opening of 1915. 
The governing factors of the position are that the enemy has 
the command, first of a great diversity of means and, next, o^ 
the initiative. The question is : Has he that particular kind 
of strategical genius that will be inspired to make the highest 
possible effort with inferior material, undeterred by the fact 
that ultimate and complete success is impossible. Villeneuve^ 
Ceryera, Rodjesvensky, and Craddock came out to fight unde 
the compulsion of what was due to the honour of arms. InJ 
each case their action can be looked upon as an example of 
heroic self-immolation in obedience to some instinct o^ 
honour or duty. 
If a far-reaching and ingenious plan, thoroughly worked out^ 
to give these principles full play, were resolutely carried intos 
effect by men who understood them, a series of naval operations] 
might ensue, the final result of which would be anything but| 
certain. Arthur Pollen. 
