12 
LAND &> WATER 
November 28, 1918 
The Tanks {con^muea)-. 
By Major-General E. D. Swinton, C.B., D.S.O., R,E. 
(By request and with permission) 
" A little more of the Truth" 
ON August 8 it was the turn of the British to 
bring off a successful offensive on a large scale. 
This was once more a surprise effected by the 
Tanks. Then, almost daily, from the 2ist 
of the month up to September 3, Tanks 
were helping the unremitting pressure we were putting on 
the enemy. During the course of these operations, one 
Tank captured a six-inch gun, and another a three-gun 
battery. On the i8th Tanks assisted in our attack between 
Gouzeaucourt and St. Ouentin which resulted in the capture 
of 10,000 prisoners and bo guns, also on the 21st and 24th, and 
again on the 27th to the west of Cambrai, when our spoils 
amounted again to 10,000 prisoners and 100 guns. It was 
a strange coin- 
cidence that 
during this 
battle some of 
the "Elders" 
of the Tank fam- 
ily found them- 
selves where 
they had battled 
ten months be- 
fore near Bour- 
lonWood. Two 
days later the 
Tanks again 
played a part 
in the action 
near Vendhuile 
in which 4,000 
prisoners formed 
our "bag." 
This day, Sep- 
tember 29, was 
the • first occa- 
sion ,1 on] which 
British Tanks 
were manned in 
action by Ameri- 
cans — menVbers 
of the "Treat 
'em^ Rough" 
Corps. 
Tanks possess 
the power of 
offence of the fire-arms they carry, but they also are endowed 
with a unique attribute in their ability to crash their way 
through obstacles and to charge down and crush tli,e enemy 
personnel and armament. A striking example of this brute 
force action was given at the attack at Hamel on Indepen- 
dence Day, 1918, already referred to. After the light, 26 
machine-guns were dug up in one stretch of the German 
position out of the ground into which they had been crushed. 
And in this connection it must be admitted that the German 
machine-gunners are as a rule very brave men. On numerous 
occasions they have stuck to their guns to the very last 
moment and been crushed alongside their weapons. 
If a German account can be believed, there is a recent 
achievement of the Tanks in another theatre of operations 
which affords further proof, if any now be required, of their 
power against defensive positions even the most deliberately 
organised. It attributes to them the , initial success on 
September 15 of the Franco-Serbian offensive of the Bal- 
kan Front, which started the debdcle of Bulgarians, led 
directly to their defection from the Central Powers, and 
has been partly responsible for the subsequent great events 
in this part of the theatre of war. The account is referred 
to by the' Pall Mall Gazette, of London, of September 30, 
1918, in the following paragraph : 
It is distinctly amusing to read the patronising explana- 
tion of the Bulgarian defeat which is offered by the military 
critic of the Vossische Zeitung. The Tanks, says this 
authority, were an unpleasant surprise to the primitive 
race of the Bulgarians. There is another primitive race, 
if ive remember, who were equally taken back when the 
Tank made its first appearance upon the Somme. 
Incidentally, the manner in which this statement is made 
AFTER THE BATTLE 
By Captain Spencer Pryse, M.C. 
is one more example of the well-known happy knack pos- 
sessed by the German race of endearing themselves to those 
with whom they happen to be associated. 
Of the action of the French Tanks it is not within the 
province of the writer to say much. They have had their 
vicissitudes, as have had ours. According to the article by 
M. Abel Ferry already quoted, this new afm was mishandled 
at the great French offensive on the Aisne on April 16, 
1917, when any chance of surprise was prevented by ,a nine 
days' preparat(jry bombardment, the resultant discredit of 
the machines leading to great delay in their development. 
He is of opinion that the real entry of the Tank into battle 
was in June, 191S, and that the true conquerors in the 
fighting round 
Amiens and 
Montdidier were 
the French and 
British Tanks. 
According to 
him the increas- 
ing demand of 
thesoldier inthe 
front line for 
Tanks and mpre 
Tanks is logical ; 
and the queen of 
battles is now 
the mechanic, 
and no longer 
the infantry. He 
pointsout finally 
that the Ger- 
mans have al- 
ways been great 
believers in the 
employment of 
m e c h a n i-c a 1 
means of fight- 
ing, but that in 
this war they 
have, as regards 
such means been 
wrong three 
times out of 
four. They were 
correct in be- 
lieving in poison-gas. They were wrong in believing in the 
Zeppelin and the submarine. They were also wrong in 
disbelieving in the Tank. 
And how is it that the Germans have not done more to 
instal for their own use this machine which has for two years 
taken part in operations so much to their loss and detriment ? 
Partly owing to the state of their own industrial resources, 
and partly to the changes in their opinion of the value of 
this weapon as exhibited by our employment of it, there 
has not been continuity in their policy, so far as we know. 
Startled and impressed by the results attained by the British 
Tanks at their first appearance at the Battle of the Somme, 
they initiated certain experiments in the construction of 
similar machines during that winter ; but did not prosecute 
the enterprise with energy. Our offensive operations, in 
which Tanks co-operated during the first half of 1917, were 
not, so far as these machines were concerned, of a nature 
to enable them to show their real value or to cause any alarm 
to the Germans. The German General Staff did not realise 
that their undoubted failure was not due to any inherent 
fault, but was attributable to the breakdown of mechanisms 
caused by their employment under most difficult conditions. 
As luck went, therefore, our Tank operations during the 
summer of 1917 were in the long run and in one direction 
of benefit to us. They discounted the original impression 
produced by the machines, misled the enemy as to their 
potentialities, possibly caused him to doubt whether we shou:d 
again have recourse to them, and generally confirmed him in 
the false security in regard to them already engendered 
during the first half of the year. It was this that enabled us in 
November, at Cambrai, by suddenly and Secretly launching 
a large number of Tanks on ground which was practicable 
