December 5, 1918 
LAND &> WATER 
independence, and ultimately her own, to the mcst powerful 
and ruthless State." 
Some Strange Misunderstandings 
This passage is more than a little surprisirg. Neither 
Great Britain, nor any other Power, has ever abardcrcd the 
right to visit and search non-belligerent ships in war. It is 
indeed the one belligerent right always and universally 
admitted ; always and universally practised. What has 
been in dispute is not the right of visit and search, but the 
course that may be taken when search gives ground for sup- 
posing that there is either enemy property on board the ship 
or that the ship itself is on an enemy mission. Again, cur 
acceptance of the principle of "free ships, free goods," is cer- 
tainly not an acceptance in the sense of these who first put 
that catch-word forward. And, lastly, the reason why a 
great navy is vital to this country is not because a supreme 
fleet can to some extent maintain the balance of power in 
Europe against a preponderant military nation, but because 
a more powerful navy in hostile hands could paralyse 
our actual life instantly. 
All this is rather disconcerting because, as will be observed, 
the President does not here suggest that the proposed changes 
in sea law should be subject to the institution of^a League of 
Nations, which would, so to speak, be above the law. He 
contemplates a state of things when each nation must lock 
after its own vital rights and honour, and proposes a reduc- 
tion of naval armaments and a change in the rules for their 
use which, if passed, would reduce sea-power to very little 
effect. And he makes this proposal evidently thinking that 
Great Britain's interest in her submarine fleet fnd its liberty 
of action must be changed altogether by the extinction of the 
military threat in Europe. 
Of the debate going forward in the American Press on this 
subject, we have as yet no full details. But a fortnight 
ago the Times gave us one very illuminating passage from 
the New York World, a paper which, from the great ability 
with which it is written and its close association with the 
leaders of the democratic party, must be taken as repre- 
senting a considerable section of opinion. This article is so 
remarkable that I quote it in full. 
"In America," says the World, "freedom of the seas has 
always been associated with the sanctity of private property 
afloat, as is the case on land where internaticnal law is 
observed. We have held fast to the doctrine that free ships 
make free goods, which is to say that unless goods are contra- 
band they cannot be seized, and neutral vessels carryirg 
them cannot be captured or destroyed. 
"That we never were able to write this principle into 
international law has been due largely to the opposition of 
Great Britain. International law has been ignored too often 
in the present war on both sides, technicalities serving Great 
Britain and violence Germany. By pronouncing practically 
everything contraband, the one has inflicted enormous hard- 
ships upon neutrals, whereas the other with its submarines 
has wantonly destroyed life and property, neutral as well 
as enemy. The responsibility of Great Britain cannot be 
compared with that of Germany and yet, in degrees, both 
have been transgressors." 
The World continues the line of thought -of the Senate 
speech. Private property is by agreement sacred in war 
on land. It should be sacred at sea also and then the neutral 
trader could carry on his innocent traffic with either bel- 
ligerent, undisturbed by the operations cf that bel- 
ligerent's enemy. Unless this rule, for the establishment 
of which America has always struggled, is acknowledged, 
the world's life is at the mercy of force. The more yellow 
journals, such as Mr. Hearst's papers, go further and compare 
the "navalism" of Great Britain with the "militarism" 
of Germany, as if one were a sea and the other a land aspect 
of the same essential phenomenon, viz., unbalanced power, 
unscrupulously used to obtain selfish and indispensable aims. 
The issue then stands squarely before us, and we must 
face it squarely, and meet it candidly. This is not a subject 
on which this country can afford to be misunderstood, and 
the people of America are not of the sort to resent perfect 
frankness of expression where a disagreement exists. 
The difiiculty of this age-long controversy lies largely in 
the circumstances out of which it arises. The writers en 
belligerent rights at sea either defend the British ccntenticr — 
on the broad ground that the law of prize is a necessity to 
us in war, because without it a naval power cannot carry 
the war into an enemy's country and so compel enemy sub- 
mission ; or, they combat this view on the ground that pri2e 
is a ruthless use of force, and an excuse for free and naked 
plunder at sea, which civilised nations have forbidden in 
land warfare. Now, if we put our case on the ground of 
British necessity, we are using an argument which Germany's 
defence of her own peculiar sea practices has thrown into 
considerable disrepute. The Neu' York World, the reader 
will have noticed, puts British and German conduct into 
the same category. Both, that is to say, were illegal and 
unjustifiable — though there was, of course, the enormous 
difference that, our illegalities were humane and the German 
purelv barbarous. We must, however, recognise that the 
worlci will never admit that national necessity can justify, 
whether on land or sea, any use of power that is, I will rot 
say cruel or murderous, but even manifestly oppressive or 
unjust. If the law of prize is to be justified, it must be for 
some reason. The argument of national necessity may be 
good enough for us. We may feel its cogency — thouglf. 
past governments have not always felt it. But we car not asR 
others to accept, as an antecedent premiss to tl:e whole- 
discussion, that in every war in which Great Britain engages, 
she has an inherent right to victory at sea ! If we are to 
convince others, we must show that the law of prize can be 
defended on the same grounds as the law of blockade ; that 
it is just as essentially a corollary of sea war as are i^^■cstmerf 
and siege corollaries of land war. We have to show, in fact, 
that if there is any anomaly in the circumstances that have- 
brought the practice of law and prize into being, it is ret 
occasioned by the use of force against the neutral, but by- 
the attempt of the neutral to interfere with the natural^ 
humane and legitimate operations of the law of force. 
The weakness of our opponents' case is that their attacfe 
on the right of prize is based on the neutral's moral claim td 
continue trading during war as in peace. And they speak, 
accordingly, of prize as if it were a continuance of practices 
dating back to uncivilised ages ; as if the primarj' object of 
the British Navy was to enrich individuals in that force 
by seizing private property and selling it for their benefit — 
a thing long since forbidden as unthinkable in land warfare. 
It is, therefore, a necessary preliminary to the discufsicn to 
say that what is done with goods taken in war has ro moral 
connection at all with the rightness or wrorgness of the act 
of taking it. The British case for the full Vse cf sea-pcwer 
wouldjnot bealtered in the least degree if the right of raval 
officers and seamen to the value of the prizes taken was 
abolished. To enrich them is not the motive for taking prizes. 
We must, then, argue the case without reference, en the ore 
side, to its being|essential to us to get the due value of sea- 
power, and on the other, without obscuring the issue by discuss- 
ing the destiny of property taken in war, once it is taken. 
The issue in itself is really perfectly simple, ard one cen 
ask for no better statement of the case than that given by 
the New York World — if only because it gives, with sirgular 
completeness, all the familiar fallacies of this secular debate. 
"In America," says the World, "freedcm of the seas has 
always been associated with the sanctity of private propeily 
afloat, as is the case on land where international law is 
observed." Let us take two typical cases to illustrate the 
World's parallel. The German Army invades Belgium, and 
drives the defenders of that country to the line which they 
are to hold for four years from Nieuport to La Eassee. The 
whole of the property in Belgium east of this line is in German 
power. Until the Belgians and their allies can advance and 
drive the Germans out, there is nothing in the whole State 
— specie, securities, food, cloth, metal, arms, leather, clothes, 
rubber — which can be of the faintest use to the Belgian 
nation in the war. The lines of the German Army near the 
frontier stop all intercourse with the national army. The 
maintenance of the national army depcrds in no waj' either 
upon the nation's prosperity, on its industrial effcrt, or en 
its moral. So far as the war is concerned, all Belgian wealth 
— in German hinds — is exactly as if it did not exist. The 
Belgian Army's power to fight would not be increased if the 
German occupation were to treble the wealth cf Belgium. 
It would not be diminished if the whole country w ere reduced 
to literal ruin and beggary. 
All Belgian private property, then, is absolutely j,t tie 
disposal of the invader, and it can only be used for purposes 
of the war by the invader turning it to account in his own 
behalf. This international law permits him freely to do 1 
On the plea of military necessity, he can take everythirg in 
the country capable of direct or indirect employment to 
support his forces — so long is he either pays for it cr ghis 
the imforhmate possessor a receipt! The alternative reduces 
the title of the possessor to a matter of very slender value. 
It will be observed, then, that the convention that makes 
private property sacred on land permits of exceptions so 
wide as to make it nugatory. It cannot, in fact, le put 
higher than this : that it is a counsel of perfection addressed 
to a victor toVespect the possessions of those he has conquered. 
Now let us take what the World would call a parallel 
case at sea. Germany, believing that Great Britain would . 
