(1) the lack of farmer and sportsman initiative in starting game 
management on specific tracts of ‘land. 
(2) The need of collective action among groups of farmers, 
Nothing is known about the merit or demerit of Berry's actual 
@ re thods. It is clear, however, that he could be, under his scheme of organ- 
ization, something more than a mere "broker" of shooting privileges. Mey 
such absentee brokers already exist in the South. They are mostly real 
estate men, Berry, however, is himself a farmer, and his line-up is such 
that he could become the leader and manager of the game enterprise for his 
neighborhood. In other words he could become the means of awakening initi- 
ative and getting eaollective action in his farmer-sportman group. 
If we could now coneeive of some enterprising devidnltural colle ge 
offering a_ short course of vocational training in game management to a group 
of earefully selected young farmers who are themselves landowners, and then 
following it up with technical service by a game expert in its extension 
service, we would have a working mechanism of real merit. Its workability 
has already been tested in the agricultural field. 
It is possible that the proposed vocational instruction umer the 
Smith-Hughes Law, already proposed for Mississippi, should take the form 
of training neighborhood leaders, rather:than training each and every farmer 
to manage his own game, The best quail country will always consist of small 
units requiring collective neighborhood action, especially in activities, 
like predator control, which are subject to marginal dilution and therefore 
conducted cheapest on large blocks. The neighborhood leader idea also com- 
@ pletely meets the objections arising out of inter-farm drift of birds. Win- 
ter feeding, too, is cheapest when organized on 4 large scale. ‘The purchase 
of planting stock for re-vegetation of coverts is another activity better 
7 BO: 

