552 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 
plained from mechanical principles, but that no such explanation could 
be given of the origin and the characters of living beings. Such was the 
position taken by the author of the introduction to the “ Universal His- 
tory,” whom we have already seen Kant quoting. 
The manner of the original formation of plants and animals, in which the 
wisdom of the Creator principally appears, has never been accounted for by any 
philosopher with any tolerable success; matter and the laws of motion having 
nothing at all to do in these things, whatever they have in the inanimate parts 
of the world.” 
And this was substantially the attitude which Kant adopted, in the 
one passage of the “ Allgemeine Naturgeschichte ” in which he definitely 
discusses the matter. 
We are in a position to say: “Give me matter and I will construct a 
world.” For given matter endued with the essential force of attraction, and 
[all astronomical phenomena] .. . can be traced back to the simplest mechanical 
causes, which causes we may confidently hope to discover. . . . But can we boast 
of any such advantage with respect to the meanest plant or insect? Are we in 
a position to say: “ Give me matter and I will show you how a caterpillar is 
generated”? Do we not in this case, from the very first step in our quest, 
remain in ignorance of the true inner constitution of the object in question and 
of the complexity of the manifold parts composing it? It should surprise no 
one, therefore, when I venture to say that the formation of all the heavenly 
bodies, the cause of their motions, in short, the origin of the entire present 
constitution of the universe, will become completely intelligible, before the gen- 
eration of a single herb or caterpillar can be made wholly clear from mechanical 
principles. 
This passage is, perhaps, capable of being construed as expressing 
rather an ignoramus than an ignorabimus. But considering it in con- 
junction with the yniform tenor of Kant’s subsequent writings, we are 
justified, I think, in saying that he at no time admitted the possibility 
of bringing organisms within the compass of a scheme of cosmic evolu- 
tion based upon mechanistic principles. He was, in short, throughout 
his career a vitalist, though in later life a curiously inconsistent one. 
The notion of an original “ spontaneous generation ” of life out of the 
inorganic always roused his aversion. Yet, as I have remarked, a vital- 
ist may without inconsistency be a transformist; living beings, once 
produced by non-mechanical causes, may still conceivably change their 
forms in the course of natural descent. But Kant throughout most of 
his life looked upon the theories of spontaneous generation and of the 
transformation of species with so blinding a hostility that he could 
scarcely tell them apart. We shall find that some thirty-five years of 
reflection were required before he was able to make so simple a dis- 
crimination as to recognize that, from the point of view of his own 
biological philosophy, the two stood upon a different, even though both 
stood upon an unsound, footing. 
9. The Review of Moscati on Man’s Upright Posture.—In 1771 
2 Op, cit., 1736, I., p. 43. 
