THE GREAT EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION. 13 
Egypt forced Ptolemy IV. not to overlook any means of defense and to resort to that force. If 
this had not been done for a longer time, the suspicion arises that those warriors beforehand had 
proved to be a dangerous element among the natives; they may have already given some 
trouble to the first three Ptolemaic kings. 
At any rate, the number of the native warriors must have been moderate. Wedonot take 
seriously the fanciful numbers of Herodotus (II, 165-166: still 410,000 remaining after the emi- 
gration of 240,000 to Ethiopia!) and Diodorus I, 54 (650,000, a number taken from Herodotus 
without criticism!). Polybius gives their total as 20,000 at the battle of Raphia, where Ptolemy 
IV. made that fatal mistake of gathering them. It is true, we can not guarantee that those 
20,000 represented the whole number. Ptolemy IV. might have called only a part to arms, 
mistrusting them from the beginning. ‘The great probability remains, even under this assump- 
tion, that their number did not reach that of the regular Macedonian and Greek soldiers. So, 
while it is not probable that the native warriors remained constantly quiet and loyal for the 
whole first century of Macedonian dominion, yet their limited number and their scattering 
over the whole country seem to have enabled the powerful first three Ptolemies to keep them 
under control. 
Various reasons increased their dangerous character under Ptolemy IV., Philopator, a king 
with whom, in general, a certain decadence of the flourishing Lagide state seems to begin. 
Polybius, of whom we possess a very valuable fragment on the outbreak of the great revolution 
(V, 107), attributes the reason principally to that mistake of gathering those natives for the 
battle at Raphia, 217 B.C. His report runs thus: 
To Ptolemy soon then after those times it happened 
IIrov\euaiw ye unv ev0éws amd Tov’TwWY THD 
that the war against (the) Egyptians broke out. 
Katpwav avveBawe yiyvecbairov mpos Aiyumtious 
7 O\ELOV. 
‘O yap mpoepnucvos Bactreds KaborXicas 
tous Aiyumtious ért tov mpos 'Avtioxov mo\Euov 
Tpos mev TO Tapov évdEexouévws EBovrEVTAaTO, TOU 
6€ péANoVTOS HoTOX GE. 
Ppovnuaticbevtes yap ek TOV Tepl ‘Padiay 
TPOTEPHUATOS OVKETL TO TPOT TAaTTOMEVOY oioL TE 
joav vmouevery, adr éefynrovv Hyeuova kal 
Tpocwrov ws ixavol PBonbeiv bytes abrois. 
Kat 6 Tédos (!) éxolnoay od pera ToNdy xpovor (! ) 
For the aforementioned king by arming the Egyp- 
tians for the war against Antiochus followed a plan 
practical for the moment, but he made a mistake for 
the future time. 
Becoming namely presumptuous by their success 
at Raphia,! they were no longer able to obey orders? 
but sought a leader and a pretext, as people able to help 
themselves. Which thing they finally (!) did, not 
after a long time (!). 
We see here that Polybius does not acknowledge that those Egyptians had a real complaint; 
they ought to have been satisfied with the blessings of the Ptolemaic government, according 
to his opinion. The national feeling of this Greek author, who viewed that best one of the 
Hellenistic states with complacency and pride, is plainly visible here. Unfortunately, his 
report as to finding a leader and “‘pretext’”’ (!) is lost. The latter expression, evidently, points 
to something which Polybius considered as not too unjust against the Egyptians or too grave a 
matter. The probability is that some administrative measure infringing on the rights or 
livelihood of the warrior class furnished that “‘pretext’’; certainly it would appear, if we knew 



1 So their phalanx must have played a more important part in that victory than the extant reports on that battle manifest. 
2 This expression (‘‘what was imposed on them’”’) points to regular duties or dues demanded by the state. 
