Ss 
1796] 
fidé of the water; and when more fe- 
‘Tious apprehenfions of it are conceived 
on this, than at any former period, ycu 
will not perhaps refufe to give place to 
a few obfervations on a fubjeét fo tru- 
ly interefting, and concerning which the 
Opinions of our countrymen are {fo enor- 
tmoufly at variance. ° i 
The true-born Englifhman, on whom 
Mr. Burke beftows the well merited 
praife of cheri/bing bis prejudices, thinks 
he has clofed the debate, when he has 
bluntly afked, If we have not a _fuperior 
feet? Entrenched up to the chin, in 
this formidable pofition, he fmiles with 
equal contempt at the alarm of | his 
adverfary, and at the preparations mak- 
ing on the coaft of France. ih 
And “as long, indeed, as we are fure 
that the French government carry their 
views to nothing fhort of the conquett 
of the ifland, we have a tolerable affu- 
rance, alfo, that they will not land an 
army on our fhores while we have a fu- 
perior fleer to cut it off from all fupport, 
reinforcement; or retreat. But if com- 
plete fucecfs be not their ebject—if it 
be merely their meaning to ravage our 
coaft ; to{pread adangerousalarm through 
the country; to fhake the paper founda- 
tions on which the fortune of the ftate 
repotes ; or to eftablith themfelves in fome 
* ftrong poft, by way of cutting off part of 
our refources, and converting them into 
the fubfiftence of their own troops; 
m that cafe, it would be no eafy matter to 
- fhow how our fuperior fleet can defeat 
their purpofe, unlefs we fuppofe it gifted 
vith ubiquity, or furnifhed with a fufn- 
cient warrant to imprefs the winds. 
By the conqueft of Belgium and Hol- 
land, the French may be faid to have 
completed the inveftment of our ifland ; 
and this the bold and fagaciows Dumou- 
rier confidered as a proper preliminary 
to the invafionvof England. There is 
hot now a wind that blows from the 
heavens, that would not bear them to 
fome part or other of our coaft: but 
there are a great many that would op- 
pofe the paffage of our fleet to the quar- 
ter where its prefence might be necef- 
fary. Let us fuppofe, for inftance, that 
the French, by fecretly fending a {qua- 
dron north-about, to reinforce the Dutch, 
gain a fuperiority in the German ocean; 
as long as that fuperiority lafts—and 
it will laft as long as an eafterly wind 
may prevent our fending an additional 
force to thofe feas—fo long will our coaft, 
from the North Foreland to :he farther 
extremity of Scotland, lie open to their 
MonTuiy Mas. No. V1IIL. 
Theughis on an Invafion. 
627 
attempts. It would be tedious ani 
needlefs to multiply examples of this 
fort; every man who has the leaft nau- 
tical knowledge, can Gate, or conceive 
a variety of caies in which the the French 
can make a run over to -this country, 
unlefs we keep a greater naval force af 
Jea, im every point, than they can colleé 
an any cne; and that is plainly impoffi- 
ble. ‘ 
But their debarkation, how will that 
be effected? Fifty thoufand men are not 
landed in an hour; and the fleet which 
might be unable to prevent their com- 
ing to our coaft, would deftroy them bes 
fore they could effeét a footing on Eng- 
ith ground.—Not if they come ov:r in 
{mall craft, accompanied by a flotilla 
calculated to run into fhoal water. When 
once there, they might effect their land- 
ing, with little moleftation from the 
fide of the fea. Kept at a diftance by 
their great draught of water, our line of 
battle fhips could only witnefs a de- 
barkation which it would be utterly out 
of their power, to prevent. 
_It appears, then, to be undeniable, that 
circumftances may occur, in which the 
French may fucceed in landing troops 
on this ifland, in {pite of a fuperior flcet. 
Ifa folitary army were to debark, they 
might certainly be confidered as cufans 
perdus, {ent on a forlorn hope indced ; 
for our fleet, when once apprized of 
their pofition, would put fupplics, and 
Frcinforcements, and a retreat quite out 
of the queftion. But from the known 
abilities of the dire€tory, and the fyf- 
tem of warfare they have adopted, it 
may be conjeCtured, that after draws 
ing our attention to one quarter they 
would direé&t their efforts againft a va- 
riety of others, and take their chance 
for being able to effeé&t fubfequent de- 
barkations, during that diftraétion of 
our fea and land forces that would 
neceffarily enfue. 
_ But it is highly probable, that their 
intentions to invade us, like their pre- 
parations for a defcent, were never fe- 
rious, till they contemplated the poffi- 
bility of rivalling or outmatching us on 
our proper element. I know very well 
that itis a fort of herefy to doubt the om- 
nipotency of our marine. But be it re- 
membered, that in 1780, the combined 
fleets of France and Spain, drove Sir 
CharlesHardyup the Channel; and that in 
1786, Lord Howe was obliged to run be- 
tween Scilly and the main, to avoid a fupe - 
rior force. Nor fhould we have been able 
to have fhown ourfelyes in thefe feas 
4L during 




