1796.) 
of Our materialifts exprefs themfelves very 
clearly and elegantly ; and are not their 
works very much mifunderftood ‘by the - 
fupernaturalifts, idealifts, and {ceptics ? 
And is not each of thefe in its turn, 
equally miiunderftood by the others ?— 
‘There are, indeed, fome mex impartial 
and inquifitive enough tounderftand fully 
what others have to ftate againtt their 
principles, but their number is too infig- 
nificant to invalidate the truth of the 
ebfervation. Now as the philofophic 
public, though they are difinclined to 
follow the flandard of any feét, are yet 
divided into matevialifts, fupernaturalifts, 
idealifts, and feeptics ; and as Kan ’s 
works contain a train of ideas, militating 
not only againft all thefe parties, but alfo, 
in fome meafure, again? the foundation 
of all the fyftems which they have hi- 
therto formed, of the mind, of the foun- 
dation and principles of human know- 
ledge, of the moral naturé ‘of man, 
of the Deity, ef a future ftate, &c. it 
would be amiracle indeed, if, under fach 
circumftances, thefe works fhouid be di- 
rectly and generally underftood, even by 
the molt impartia} enquirers after truth, 
although the ideas contained in them, and 
the language by which they are conyey- 
ed, were models of clearnefs and pro- 
prety.) 
‘© But (fay thofe objectors) what can 
we expect from a fyftem which direétly 
runs againft the common fenfe of man- 
kind, and prefumes to rejeét all the fyf- 
rems hitherto framed ?’’ ‘To this I re- 
ply, that, if Kanr’s fyftem be falfe, it 
will be an effential requifite ‘of the true 
one, to keep at an equal diftance from all 
the fundamental tenets of thofe contend- 
ing parties. For though each of thefe 
parces muft neceffarily be right in fome 
re{pects, becaufe otherwife they would 
not have been able to figure in the world 
for one year, much lefs for many centu- 
ries; yet each of thete parties muft alfo 
be wrong in fome other refpetts, or elfe 
it wouid have been impodlible for an op- 
pofite party to arife, much lefs to fourith, 
along with them for as many centuries. 
The true philofophy, therefore, muft be 
shat which exciudes the’ errors of each 
fyftem, and comprehends only the truths 
contained in them all. If this obferva- 
tion be well founded, and if Kanv has 
difeovered a road totally different from 
that which other philofophers have pur- 
fued, furely we may now expeé&t much 
more of himthan if he had followed a 
feét, and fupported the eternal diffentions 
ef f{peculative philofophers. 
Mr. Nit{ch on Kant’s Philofophy. 
4 
“ Let us, however, grant fora mo- 
ment (fay thofe critics) that Kant had 
conftruéted an entirely new fyftem of 
{peculative philofophy, which approaches 
nearer to truth than any other known to 
the world; of what ufe can it be toa 
lawyer, a divine, a phyfician, or a lover 
of the fine arts, to employ his time upon 
‘metaphylics, efpecially as every’ branch 
of folid fcience has been very iuecefsiully 
cultivated, without their aliiftance 27’. 
To this I muft reply, that the quefticn, 
of what ufe a {cience might be? betrays 
feldoma genuine love of truth; for who- 
ever infifs upon a clear anfwer to it, 
before he can refolve to enter upon any, 
will make great progrefs in none ; efpe- 
cially as the ufe of a thing cannot be 
clearly perceived before the thing itfelf 
is fully known ; and the moft valuable 
difcoveries would have been loft to the 
world, if the difcoverers had: tried no- 
thing but what they knew before-hand 
would be of pofitive ule to their defiens. 
Befides, is it not fufiicient to know, that 
the chief fudy of mankind ought to be 
man, or at Jeaft the principal parc of man, 
which is the mind? Is i not.clear that 
every man of good education and learn- 
ing, while he ranges about in the field 
of external objeéts, and learns to mea= 
fure the fun and the ftars, fhould referve 
fome little portion of his time to get ac- 
guainted with himfelf, and with the’in- 
variable laws of his mental faculties 2 
For it is only by an accurate knowledge 
of thefe laws, that he is enabled to guard 
himfelf againft the errors and fluctuating 
opinions, circulating in our days, regard. 
ing objects to which no rational being 
cap be indifferent ; and it is oniy by an 
intimate acquaintance with the eternal. 
laws of cur judging, reafoning, and pérs 
ceiving faculties, that he: will have it in 
his power to fecure himfelif from that 
defpondence and fcepticifm which mut 
one day or other overtake him when he 
comes to examine, ferioufly and calmly, 
thofe maxims aud principles which he 
has imbibed from his infancy, by which 
he has judged of his fellow creatures, 
the world, and himfelf ; and by which 
he has regulated his conduét. No man, 
indeed, is perfeét ; he is ignorant of many 
things ; but he ought not to remain ig= 
norant of fuch things as direétly tend to 
preferve the dignity of his nature and 
the rationality of that character which 
diftinguifhes man from the brutes. If 
it be, therefore, clear, that every man of 
education and learning ought to endea- 
your at an intimate acquaintance with 
3 the 

