the laws of his mental faculties, it wn 
avoidably follows, that every lawyer, di- 
vine, phytician, and every ‘lover of the 
fine arts, in cafe they have not yet made 
fuéh acquaintance, thould no longer hefi- 
tate to make it. And they will then 
have abundant reafons to ftudy the me- 
aphyfics of Kant; for this philofo- 
pher has: opened new and im portant 
profpe&ts into the ficld of metaphy fics, 
which, however they may be at prefent 
difrecarded, yet ought to be ftudied and 
¢arefully ¢xamined. 
To know the laws of our. mental 
powers 5) it is requifite to know their ef- 
tects; for we can know powers only from 
their elicéts. The mental phenomena, 
eailed ideas, judgments, and reafonings, 
are, indeed, in fome meafure, the : cfreéts 
of external caufes, or external objeéis; 
but Kant has so demonftrated, that 
they are not entirely and excluficely the 
effc&s of thefe caules, and, therefore, ac- 
wire another caufe bef ides the- external. 
"Fhis other cauié is in the mind; is a, 
mental power. The fenfible ideas of 
external objeéts will, therefore, be the 
joint produce of an exierna/ and a menial 
caufe. The effects of thefe two different 
-eaufes, are, confequently, blended toge- 
ther, and conftitute a / ee idea. W ce 
ever, therefore, would know the mental 
eaule of a fenfible ideas and get acquaint- 
ed with its properties, muft fet ok all be 
able to diftinguith, in a fenfible idea, that 
effect which belongs to the menial canley 
fiom that effect which be elongs to the 
external caule. This difanétons, of which 
our philelophers do not even conceive 
the podfibil: ty , Kant has been fo fortu- — 
Mate as to ef dabiith.. And in order to 
thow the importance of an enquiry in- 
to his philofaphic fyitem, ¥ need on ly 
awell a few moments upon this remark- 
able diftinéizon. lf this diftinétion be 
prue, and iy our philotophers have not 
oedferved it, ealibue unavoidably, firtt, 
that they have, in their ideas of the ex- 
rnal world, afcribed ‘ chofe effeéts to the 
external world which belong to the 
mind; aud thofe efects to the mind 
which belong to the external world; 
fecondly, that in fo doing, tney have con- 
founded ‘ther vchts with tunings, and things 
swith thoughts ; - and thes, in fome mea- 
fure, perverted the very view and aipect 
of nature ; thirdly, that by this remark- 
able en they have given birth to 
matertalifm, fupernaturelim, idealifm, 
and fcepricifm, which fhake the very 
foundation of all human knowledge; 
and, fourthly, that they have yendcred 
at impoihible for themfelves to conitruct 
a éonfilient and fatisfaftory fyftem of 
Mr. Nitfch on Kant’s Philsfophye 
pO. 
knowledge concerning the mind; for ia 
this fyftem, the principal queftion to be 
Eine avill be, What is Reafon ? What 
is the Underftanding ? ? What is Senfe.? 
Bur as thefe powers -cannot be explained, 
but. from their effeéts, and as their effedts 
are confounded with other, and diderent, 
effeéts, we may ealily conceive how the 
explanations muft be qualified, which are 
deduced from fuch »confufed premifes. 
Should not, therefore, every lover of 
‘truth and fcience, contribute ‘fomething 
to, bring about an examin tion of the 
pretenfions of Kant: for fo mach Js 
c.ear, that if they are well founded,-a 
ereatand unexpected reform in the whole 
field of theoretical philofophy will be the 
immediate coniequence. But let none be 
prejudiced againit this philoiopher, from 
my having (ans that our views of nature 
are, in fome meafure, perverted by the 
prefent fy fiems. Natural philctophers 
have made folid and fubftantia!l diicove- 
ries Fhis KANT does not deny ; and 
when he fays their views are perverted, 
he means only that part of every one of 
them is fo. 
Let none imagine that this Pesos 
of thought ts triling, becante tt hinders 
not the progreis of great, difcoveries ; 
a natural phitofopher may dHeover man 
new and furprifing prenenes of bodies, 
though he cannot exactly diftinguifh be- 
Pee what, im his ideas, belongs to the 
things, and what to the mind; as amar 
imay make great advances in agriculture, 
though he “believes that the {un moves 
round the earths yet it was only. by 
leaving the fun at ref, and putting 
the earth in motion, that our grand 
fyftem of aftronomy was _conitrué- 
ed. JItwill be bya like reform in our 
views of things, by avoiding the confu- 
fion of thoughts with things, and things 
with thoughts ;-and by a “philofophy of 
the mind, built on the principles of 
KANT, chat the diffentions concerning 
mater, caufe, effed?, and Juljflance, can be 
brought to a final determination; and in 
this manner the fundamental {cience of 
all natural philofophy be rendered con~- 
fiftent with itfelf, and complete ; not to 
mention the beneficial effects w hich the 
Kantean notions muft produce upon the 
diffentions in Morals and Religion. 
Iam fully convinced, haven er, that it 
is utterly impothble to thom the import- 
ance of the Kantean Syfiem, by mere 
remarks on that fyftem. As that man 
has a very imperfect and coatraéted view 
cof the orandeur and beauty of St. Peter’s 
church, oS Rome, who only faw a few 
disjointed pillars of that noble building, 
fo he mult hare but a precarious idea “ot 
the 
